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# ***Daily Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

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Tuesday  
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# Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-AFR-90-123-S

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### **Mali-Mauritania Border Conflict Reported**

AB2206121490 Abidjan VOIX D'AFRIQUE in French  
10 Jan 90 p 6

[From the "Film of the Month" section]

[Text] Should one expect another conflict between Mauritania and one of its neighbors?

After the hot clashes in April 1989 between Mauritania and Senegal following border and ethnic differences, another conflict seems to be hatching between Mauritania and Mali. Several reports received early in May spoke of regular clashes between Malians and Mauritians at the border between the two countries.

There were reports of several cattle thefts and incursions in these regions for over several months. According to the same sources, there is not a day without victims.

What is more disturbing is that the authorities in Nouakchott and Bamako seem to have agreed to keep total silence over these problems.

Is this the way to find a happy solution?

Mali and Mauritania, two of the poorest countries in the region, can certainly not afford the "luxury" of a war, be it conventional or otherwise.

### **ECOWAS Official Abass Bundu Interviewed**

AB1206133290 Dakar PANA in English 1052 GMT  
12 Jun 90

[Text] ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] executive secretary, Abass Bundu of Sierra Leone, came to office rather unexpectedly two years ago. But since then much dramatic changes have taken place in the community with regard to the implementation of its programmes and protocols. In the second and last interview conducted by Swaebou Conateh of the PAN AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY (PANA) at the just ended 13th summit of the community in Banjul, Bundu talks about these changes and the importance of the Banjul decisions to the development of ECOWAS.

Banjul, 12 June (PANA)—PANA: You have just come to the end of your second summit as executive secretary of ECOWAS. Looking back before and after the period of your appointment, how far can you say your hopes and aspirations have been fulfilled?

Bundu: In the first place I came to the job with no predilection whatsoever. It was not a case of sitting down and waiting to get into the job. This job rather came to me unexpectedly. I never for once anticipated that I would be executive secretary of ECOWAS. It just happened through circumstances that I was called upon to serve the community, and that, I am presently doing.

Since my assumption of office, I have carried out an evaluation of the programmes and the decisions of the

community and during the first few months I was able to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to undertake a reorientation of the programmes in order to give a sharper focus to the integration process.

This programme was submitted to the Ouagadougou summit of 1989 where it was accepted and the heads of state then established a very clear priority among the programmes to be undertaken by us. Uppermost on their minds was the trade liberalisation, the free movement of persons, the monetary cooperation, the ECOWAS economic recovery programme and the other sectoral programmes like transport, communications, agriculture and industry. This is basically what we have been pursuing since Ouagadougou. The agenda of priorities was very clearly spelt out and it is to be our main preoccupation for the present and for the immediate future.

I believe that priority list is right. They do emphasise programmes which touch and concern the daily lives of the citizens of the community.

Trade is equally important. In fact, in some cases the citizens appear to be well ahead of the governments and the community. They are trading among themselves. What we now need to do is to bring some of the trading activities that they are engaged in into recorded trade, into official trade so that it is properly regulated and all concerned derive maximum benefit.

PANA: Why is so much emphasis being put in the communique on the need to educate immigration and border officials about these measures?

Bundu: When you examine the protocol on the free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment, it is clear that as far as the protocols are concerned, a great deal has been achieved. The first phase of that protocol deals with the abolition of visas and as I'm sure you will appreciate, a visa is no longer a problem. In terms of travel within the community citizens move about quite freely without the need for them to obtain a visa. So that is being adhered to very satisfactorily.

Then the second phase, which is right of residence, that too has come into force and at this summit in Banjul, the heads of state have approved a common residence card which every member state is called upon to print and issue to citizens of other countries who wish to reside within their territories. Then there is also the ECOWAS travel certificate, a kind of ECOWAS passport which again member states are required to print and issue to their citizens to facilitate their movement within the community. Once that is done, there will no longer be the traditional national passport which they carry with them when they travel at the present time. The ECOWAS passport will in effect replace the national passport.

Equally important, at this summit they approved the protocol on the third phase which is the right of establishment. Now, of course, member states are expected to ratify the protocol so that it can come into force as early

as possible. Now the totality of this suggests a great deal has been done as officialdom and the community are concerned. But the problem remains that a number of people do encounter difficulties at the border points crossing from one territory into another. And there really, the problem is a human problem. This is why member states are being urged to conduct seminars to sensitise and educate their immigration and other border officials on the provisions of these protocols. There are complaints about harassment at the borders. These seminars are aimed at educating the officials concerned so that we can eliminate altogether these complaints about frequent harassment which reach us in the secretariat from ordinary people.

At the level of the community we've been grouping member states and their immigration and security officials together to inform them about what the community has done and so on. But again, it needs to be supplemented at the national level by each member state.

PANA: What can an aggrieved West African do? For example, if the border officials demand payment of money from him before allowing right of transit?

Bundu: The individual citizen has a right to refuse to pay him that money and to assert his right. It is a right given to him by the community protocols and by national laws of all the member states. So he has a right to refuse. He is not under any duty to give a bribe to anyone. He has a right to insist on the unimpeded exercise of his right.

PANA: And then he remains at the border?

Bundu: (pause) Well, all I can tell you is he has a right to insist on the exercise of his right.

PANA: There is the question of rationalisation of the IGO'S [Intergovernmental organizations] of which there are 36 to 40 according to some estimates. One particular IGO is the CEAO [West African Economic Community], the Francophone West African grouping smaller than ECOWAS but which has proved itself to be effective in terms of the programmes and the policies it is pursuing. What will be the consequences of merging CEAO with ECOWAS in terms of finance, employment, etc. and similarly, of bringing about a merger between other organizations whose activities overlap in the sub-region?

Bundu: Let us first of all examine what the summit decided. I think you are pre-empting the secretariat and indeed the community at large in going into so much detail. What was decided here was a matter of principle. A political decision has been taken that there shall be a single economic community for West Africa. It's also decided that member states should do everything possible to strengthen and revitalise ECOWAS in order to make it become that single economic community in the sub-region. And they have given me a mandate to carry out the studies, spelling out the modalities, and fixing a time-table for the achievement of these basic objectives.

This exercise has yet to be undertaken but we do hope that we shall embark upon these studies as early as possible. We will have to consult with, of course as many IGO's as are involved in the exercise so that we can present a scheme of rationalisation to the decision making bodies of ECOWAS. So a lot has yet to be done and it is impossible at this stage to preempt any of the issues that will need to be addressed in the context of rationalization of the IGO'S.

PANA: There is so much talk about revitalising ECOWAS. What exactly is meant by this?

Bundu: It means basically one thing: member states should implement decisions that are taken at the community level, by the summit, by the Council of Ministers and by the other specialised agencies. First and foremost, they must all pay their financial contributions to the budgets of the institutions of the community. They should also ratify and implement protocols and other decisions which touch and concern the integration process. So when we talk about revitalising it, that is essentially what it entails—that you must honour your obligations and commitments. This is more or less being addressed more to member states than to anyone else.

PANA: With half the heads of state absent from the Banjul summit, did you sense that there is enough political commitment or political will for this revitalisation objective to be accomplished?

Bundu: ECOWAS is made up of 16 member states. They were all present at the Banjul summit. Some were represented at the level of heads of state, others at the level of heads of government, others at the level of ministers. But there can be no denying the fact that all the 16 member states were represented at the Banjul summit at which certain decisions were taken.

PANA: What are the future strategies and programmes of ECOWAS?

Bundu: We are trying to avoid new programmes as much as possible. ECOWAS has enough programmes already, apart from the treaty and the protocols that were annexed to the treaty. Since then (1977), 23 protocols were adopted up to the end of 1988. Each protocol addresses a specific cooperation programme. So we have enough on our desks already and I am not very anxious to add more until we reach the point where one could reasonably say that the existing ones have been implemented, as much as they could be. Our emphasis therefore will continue to be on the implementation of existing programmes and decisions.

PANA: About having one common currency for the whole sub-region, what improvements can this bring to the lives of the ordinary people of this subregion?

Bundu: Every possible improvement to their lives, I mean in every conceivable way. I really have to emphasize this point. Trading in single currency will obviously facilitate trade, movement and everything. I think it is



cardinal that we move inexorably towards establishing a single monetary zone within the sub-region. We've now set a new timetable for that. We hope that by 1994, we would have done enough for a single monetary zone to be established. This will enable West Africa to become a region that can collectively respond to the challenges of the 1990s and beyond.

PANA: There is the problem of security in the sub-region. What is being done about this and with what success?

Bundu: Well there are two protocols in existence that touch and concern the security of the member states. In 1978, the protocol on non-aggression was adopted and again in 1981 another protocol on mutual assistance and defence was adopted. I think the two combined provide adequate security for the sub-region at the present time. We will endeavour to do everything possible to have the provisions of these protocols respected and implemented.

PANA: And the mediation committee?

Bundu: The mediation committee set up by the summit falls within the preview of provisions of the two protocols.

PANA: Do you think it can effectively manage these tensions?

Bundu: I believe so, yes.

PANA: Finally, what is the importance of the Banjul summit to the life of ECOWAS?

Bundu: The Banjul summit, I think, owes its success to the fact that certain matters requiring urgent political decisions were squarely addressed by the heads themselves and decisions were taken on those issues. I have in mind the rationalisation issue. That has been going on since 1983 and studies have been conducted. But it was our belief that any further studies could only be meaningful if they were predicated upon a prior political decision. That political decision we've been able to obtain. Again, terms of implementation but we hope with the new timetable which came from the committee of central bank governors itself at their meeting in Conakry recently, we can conveniently combine technocratic feasibility and political vision. [sentence as received] And those two together will facilitate the implementation of that programme to bring about the realisation of the objective of a single monetary zone as envisaged by the heads of state when they first adopted the monetary cooperation programmes as far back as 1987.

The Banjul summit has also decided on a review of the treaty. I am sure you will agree 15 years is long enough in the life of the community for us to take a retrospective look at what we have done, how the provisions of the treaty have helped to bring about achievements or somewhat thwarted development, and try and update it to bring it in line with contemporary developments.

We see what is happening around the world, in the Americas, in Europe and in the Pacific rim. We all know that they are forging closer and closer links among the countries of those regions. The whole landscape is becoming characterised by economic regionalism. So we need to look at the treaty. We all know very well the chequered history on which it was founded and I think it is high time that we look at some of the provisions and try to update them to bring them in line with contemporary developments in order to give ECOWAS the thrust that it requires for accelerated progress. So that too is a remarkable achievement and there have been quite a few others.

The question of implementation of decisions has also received serious attention in Banjul to the extent that heads of state agreed on a set of sanctions against defaulting member states in the payment of contributions. They've renewed their pledge to do everything possible to ratify and implement community protocols and conventions, and the like. So these, taken together made the Banjul summit, a summit with a difference.

#### **PANA Interviews ECOWAS Chairman Jawara**

*AB1106153390 Dakar PANA in English 1233 GMT  
11 Jun 90*

[Interview with Gambian President and ECOWAS Chairman Dawda Jawara by Swaebou Conateh; place, date not given]

[Text] Banjul, 11 June (PANA)—PANA: For the second time in three years you have been elected chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). How do you see your election in terms of solving the problems of the subregion?

Jawara: I think my election has come at a time when really the authority of heads of state of the community are thinking of some radical changes as contained in the final communique and I see my chairmanship as very important in this regard. I hope to make it an active and a reflective chairmanship during this one-year period. Together with the secretariat and, of course with the cooperation of my fellow heads of state and government, we do want to make it a period of action and reflection.

The communique itself demands that we have to reflect on the broad aspects of the community and think of making it conform to the changing circumstances that we face in the world today. We hope to implement the decision to appoint a committee of eminent persons drawn from both government and nongovernmental circles to actually think about the future of ECOWAS to make recommendations as to any fundamental changes they may think necessary in the treaty itself. This gives us an opportunity to think and revamp the organisation where necessary in order to make it responsive to the changing circumstances of today.

PANA: One of the major decisions of the summit is to set up a permanent mediation committee. Having in

mind the problems in Liberia, Senegal/Mauritania, Senegal/Guinea-Bissau, what immediate steps do you propose to take as chairman with regard to the work of this mediation committee?

Jawara: First of all there will be consultation between the five member states constituting this committee. We will have to work out a strategy and see how to go about this very important assignment given us, to try and diffuse tension in the ECOWAS subregion. You have mentioned some areas already. There might be others and the first thing will be for the committee to try and work out a strategy.

PANA: Will this include co-opting states like Guinea which have been involved in this mediation especially the Senegal/Mauritania conflict?

Jawara: It will be up to the committee to work out a strategy and I cannot tell beforehand what this strategy would be.

PANA: In what terms can you say the decisions of the Banjul summit are of great importance to the integration of the subregion in future, in view of all the talk about revitalising ECOWAS?

Jawara: The decisions taken are very concrete in moving forward the process of integration. In the vital area of the free movement of persons, goods, and services. The right of residence and the right of establishment, concrete steps have been taken. Even residence cards has been completed now and a form of application has been finalised. Concrete steps have been taken in this vital area.

The monetary integration also has been discussed and concrete steps have been taken, a timetable has been drawn up, recommended by the governors of our central banks, and here we hope that in the next four years the process of integrating the monetary systems in ECOWAS would have been almost completed, if not completed.

PANA: On this question of monetary integration, what will be the advantage of the common currency to be established by 1994 for the countries and the peoples of the subregion?

Jawara: It will ease trade between the member states. The problem of convertibility between different currencies of the subregion would be eliminated if there is one monetary system and this should help trade considerably. One of the weaknesses of our community is that there is very little intracommunity trade. Most of the trade is between the 16-member states and the former colonial powers in Europe. Having a single monetary system would help smooth trade exchange and, we hope, increase intracommunity trade.

You would remember that in my statement at the summit I suggested that we should aim at having at least an increase of 20 per cent in trade between the member states in the next 10 years, within the 1990s decade.

Maybe with a single monetary system, we should see a stimulus to trade between the member states.

PANA: For most people the decision which has been taken to make ECOWAS the supreme organ for sub-regional economic integration can only mean the ultimate dissolution of the CEAO [West African Economic Community] and merging of its institutions into ECOWAS. How feasible and practicable can this be?

Jawara: This may not be all that easy to achieve, I mean the actual dissolution of CEAO. But discussions will continue between ECOWAS and CEAO to see how best to bring about reasonable rationalisation of their activities which overlap considerably. What form that will take will be the subject of negotiation. The ideal will be, of course, the dissolution of CEAO but as I have said it may not be easy to achieve this in the short term. But some degree of rationalisation could be effected, I think, and this will come about by dialogue between the two organizations.

One area in which rationalisation is progressing is for example the West African Health Authority where we have one Anglophone organisation and a Francophone organisation in the health area. A decision was taken by ECOWAS about two years ago for these two organisations to merge. That will affect one form of rationalisation of inter-governmental organisations within the ECOWAS area. A similar thing can be done in certain other areas. So these are the sort of lines we have to pursue to bring about the so-called rationalisation of intergovernmental organisations.

PANA: Can you give us details of the measures outlined by the summit to resolve the problems of arrears due to ECOWAS?

Jawara: The main decisions are that the arrears should all be settled in three years, that is by June 1993, all member states should settle their arrears. As regards contributions from 1990 onwards, payment should be up to date. No arrears would be entertained. Any arrears incurred by member states in respect to contributions from 1990 onwards would be subject to sanctions.

So a member state having arrears would have to maintain their current contributions and at the same time try and clear the arrears up to 1989 by June 1993. Every member state has three years in which to settle the arrears up to the end of 1989. And as for contributions from 1990, again they have to maintain the same; there should be no arrears with regards to the current contributions.

PANA: You mentioned sanctions, what sanctions?

Jawara: Well, I don't have the details here but I believe interest will be charged on arrears which are allowed to arise from 1990 onwards and there may be other sanctions as well.

PANA: Coming back to the CEAO and regional integration, does the ECOWAS have the political and technical

means to absorb the CEAO which is a very small but effective organisation taking into account its achievements in the monetary and commercial sectors and its establishment of an institution for agricultural training and research?

Jawara: I don't think I can give a straight answer to whether we have the technical capacity and so on. But as far as CEAO is concerned, I have said before that rationalisation would be approached by dialogue between the two organisations. ECOWAS has the larger membership and it is therefore considered that really it should be the main, perhaps the only, economic organisation in the ECOWAS subregion. But as I have said, the CEAO is well established, and the question can only be approached by dialogue between the two organisations.

PANA: Has the summit fixed a timetable for the actual integration and rationalisation of the economic organisations whose activities duplicate those of ECOWAS?

Jawara: No, there is no timetable.

PANA: How far have the results of the summit been affected by developments in Europe such as Europe in 1992 and the liberalisation process in Eastern Europe? How far have these influenced the results of the summit?

Jawara: I think these have served as an impetus for ECOWAS to actually redouble its efforts towards integration and I think this is reflected in the decisions which have been taken at this summit.

PANA: The problems of the subregion are in the areas of debt, reduced aid flows and low commodity prices. What do you propose to do, during your term as chairman, about these problems for the sub-region?

Jawara: As far as debt is concerned, the OAU had taken a decision, in which all ECOWAS member states participated, to call for an international conference on debt between the African debtor countries and the international creditor countries and institutions, and ECOWAS subscribes to this. ECOWAS also held a conference here in Banjul about a year ago on debt among the member states of ECOWAS and we reiterated the stand of the OAU to call for an international conference on debt. This is an idea we have to pursue in the following year.

On the question of aid, ECOWAS is pressing that the international community should increase aid flows to the subregion. The debt situation is such that there is an outflow of resources from the poor countries member states of ECOWAS, to the developed countries. The OAU has pointed this out. ECOWAS at its own conference of debt in Banjul also pointed this out and we will continue to point out this very anomalous situation and to ask that the debt problem be approached positively by the creditors and that aid flows should, if anything be increased. In particular aid flows to Africa should not be affected adversely by the attention being given afresh to Eastern Europe by the Western countries or because of

the political changes which have recently taken place there. These are matters we will pursue at every opportunity.

Commodity prices too are so abysmally low. This is one of the things which have been affecting very seriously the economic situation of the ECOWAS member states. Whatever we can do here we will. Pleas for improvements in this area have for a long time fallen on deaf ears. In fact the situation has been deteriorating very seriously in recent years leading to a further deterioration of our economies and those of countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon (which of course is not a member of ECOWAS) which had a strong economy based to a large extent on the export of primary produce.

These have, as a result of the drastic drop in commodity prices, had their economies suffering very badly indeed and this goes for every other member states of ECOWAS.

PANA: What is the significance of the convention on the inter-state carriage of goods and the protocol on the right of establishment within the overall ECOWAS objective?

Jawara: All these are part and parcel of creating a community. There has to be free movement of persons, goods, and services. To achieve this of course you have to have a high degree of free movement of vehicular traffic among member states. So this is just implementing this whole idea of free movement.

PANA: What is the role of the private sector in the community and could you comment on plans by the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce to create a common airline, shipping, and insurance agency?

Jawara: The private sector has a very big role to play in actually creating a genuine community. In almost every economic activity we think we have to rely heavily on what the private sector in our various countries do. The free movement of persons, goods, and services is actually opening the door to the private sector in all our 16 member states to move across the boundaries and exercise their entrepreneurial skills. The success of the community in opening up of our borders to the free movement of people, of goods, of vehicles and so on I am glad that the federation of the West African Chambers of Commerce is taking up this role seriously. [sentence as received] You mentioned their intention to establish an airline, a shipping company to serve the whole of the ECOWAS space. I think these are steps in the right direction. The private sector has a very important role to play in making ECOWAS a viable, and vibrant and active economic community.

PANA: Finally, what is the next step in Gambia/Senegal relations?

Jawara: Since the break-up of the Senegambia Confederation, the two governments have been carrying on a dialogue and our two ministers of foreign affairs have



met a few times and they plan further meetings. The aim is to have some framework within which the two countries would conduct their bilateral relations. This is going on.

#### **SADCC Transportation Commission Meeting Begins**

*MB1406183290 Blantyre Domestic Service in English  
1600 GMT 14 Jun 90*

[Text] The minister of transport and communications, Honorable Dalton Katopola, has stressed the need for continued cooperation in the transport and communications sector to help to solve problems faced by the southern Africa region.

Honorable Katopola made the remarks in Mangochi today when he addressed the opening session of the SATCC [Southern Africa Transportation and Communications Commission] ministerial meeting of SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference].

Honorable Katopola said Malawi was pleased with the strides achieved by SADCC. He said what was critical was the commitment of parties to whatever agreements [words indistinct] and apply what had been agreed upon.

Opening the meeting, the Mozambican minister of construction and water, Honorable João Salomao, urged the meeting to discuss the agenda thoroughly in order to help promote the transport sector in the SADCC region. He explained that the improvements of Zambian Railways and the introduction of Namibian transport systems would be vital transport components in the SADCC region.

#### **AAPSO Chairman on U.S.-Palestinian Dialogue**

*NC2206074690 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2347 GMT  
21 Jun 90*

[Text] Cairo, 21 Jun (MENA)—The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization [AAPSO] has expressed deep concern over the U.S. decision suspending the dialogue with the PLO. AAPSO Chairman Dr. Murad Ghalib today sent a message to U.S. President George Bush saying that this decision will encourage the extremist Israeli Government, which does not conceal its expansionist aims, to continue to massacre and torture the Palestinian people who live under Israeli occupation.

In his message Dr. Ghalib emphasizes that the dialogue between the PLO and the U.S. Administration is part of the mechanism of the Middle East peace process and that this decision grievously harms the peace process. Murad demands the resumption of the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue and the recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in order to establish a just peace.

#### **\* Population Growth in SADCC Region 'Alarming'**

*34000741A Harare SOUTHERN AFRICAN  
ECONOMIST in English Apr/May 90 pp 35-37*

[Article by G. Brophy: "Turning Back the Human Tide"]

[Text] Population growths in the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference] region are increasing at an alarming rate. It's time governments stopped giving lip service and became more committed to dealing with the problem.

Population growth is not the only cause of Africa's ills, but at the very least the continuing explosion is making its regions' problems a great deal harder to cope with.

The SADCC region, with over 80 million inhabitants or fifteen percent of the sub-Saharan total of over half a billion, is growing as fast as any, while on the other side of the picture it also includes the two countries with the highest use of contraception south of the Sahara.

Starting from widely differing bases—Swaziland has fewer than a million inhabitants while Tanzania has more than 26 million—they are all growing briskly. The rates of natural increase (the difference between birth and death rates) are thought to range upwards from 2.6 percent a year for Mozambique and Angola to 3.7 percent for Zambia. Rates like these may sound harmless. But translated into the time it would take for national populations to double, they are dramatic in the extreme.

At current rates there will be twice as many Mozambicans in 27 years, and this is alarming enough. But the populations of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania would double in just 19 years. The consequences of that just do not bear thinking about, so it is tempting to say that somehow or other it won't happen. But why not? The fact is that Zambia's population, to take a single case, has more than doubled in the last 25 years.

At the individual level, total fertility rates (TFR)—the average number of lifetime births per woman—range from around five in Botswana and Swaziland to over seven in Zambia and Tanzania, with Malawi close to eight. Even small reductions in individual fertility can be important in modifying population growth rates. But as a result of recent decades of high fertility there is now a built-in momentum in all the countries, as large cohorts of women enter their child-bearing years.

There are a number of factors that affect fertility, but modern family planning usually plays a key role—or could do so. Zimbabwe and neighbouring Botswana currently have the highest reported "contraceptive prevalence" levels, not just in the SADCC region but in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. With around 30 percent of women of reproductive age using contraception in Botswana and almost 40 percent in Zimbabwe, compared with an average of five percent for the whole continent, these two countries are clearly trail-blazers.

As might be expected, fertility in Botswana and Zimbabwe is low by regional standards, having fallen from the much higher levels of just a few years ago. How far and how fast it will continue to decline is far from certain. There is no automatically smooth or continuous fall in fertility once a decline has started. In some countries family planning programmes seem to have caused a decline in fertility for a time, by allowing people to avoid having more children than they wanted (an effect known as mopping up excess fertility), but the decline levelled out when the actual size of families came into line with the desired size.

The situation in Botswana and Zimbabwe should make one cautious about rapid further declines, as most of the women who have adopted family planning have done so for spacing purposes. A 1987 study of Zimbabwean women who had accepted family planning found that those who had done so to cease child-bearing, rather than to space it out, were not only a minority but already had six children on average.

The use of contraception for spacing births has its value from a health point of view. But if that is why most Zimbabwean women are using it, it may explain why the high level of use has not brought the fertility rate down as low as might have been expected. "Redundant" use of contraception, for example that which overlaps with breast-feeding and its effects, may be another explanation: some women may be stopping themselves having babies which they would not have had anyway.

In terms of future fertility trends in SADCC countries, much will depend on what happens to other factors known to be associated with lower fertility, such as urbanisation, economic opportunities and increased education for women. But there is no doubt that the commitment of governments to addressing population issues—and giving them real priority rather than lip-service—will be crucial.

There is evidence that women's attitudes have already changed faster than those of men, which is not surprising since information and education campaigns have so far been mainly directed towards women. Recent surveys in various SADCC countries have found that men, even the youngest and most educated, want bigger families than do women of similar age and education. If these surveys are correct then it is not just the women but also the men who need educating.

#### \* SADCC Countries Support Ivory Trade

34000618 Johannesburg THE CITIZEN  
in English 30 Mar 90 p 13

[Text] Harare—Southern African Development Coordination Conference countries, including Zimbabwe, stood firm in their support for continuation of trade in ivory at a conservation workshop yesterday.

Workshop organizer Mr Lesedi Makhurane said Kenya was the only country represented at the workshop which opposed ivory trade and elephant culling.

"They (Kenians) are basically conservationists and are opposed to culling. In other words they are saying we should not take advantage of the economic potential of our wildlife," said Mr Makhurane.

Delegates from Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa argued culling did not mean extermination and was necessary for elephant population control.—SAPA.

#### \* Economic Liberalization on Continent Discussed

34000727A Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 4 May 90 pp 22, 24, 25

[Article: "Go and Do Likewise; Africa's Renunciation of Socialism Is Good News—for a Non-Socialist SA"]

[Text] A revolution is afoot which could remould the troubled economies of Africa—but it's not the one Marxists have been dreaming of. Instead it could lead to more freedom and higher standards of living, which is what independence promised but failed to deliver.

SA [South Africa] is the economic powerhouse of sub-Saharan Africa and can only gain from enhanced continental prosperity. But it lacks the educated work force necessary to sustain a sophisticated private sector—and this will constrain the pace of development. But if it maintains its commitment to free enterprise—and the system's benefits become apparent throughout Africa—it will help create and share in a great expansion of wealth.

Countries which have begun the transformation into market economies include:

- Nigeria, which abolished all its commodity marketing boards in 1986 and saw farm exports surge and which has embarked on a massive privatisation programme;
- Mozambique, where GDP [gross domestic product] has grown 4.5 percent annually since an International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform programme was introduced in 1987, after GDP plummeted 40 percent the previous six years;
- Senegal, which has liberalised trade, slashed subsidies, tightened monetary policy and frozen public-sector employment and wages since 1985;
- Guinea, where reforms resulted in the GDP growth rate going from zero in 1980-1984 to 5 percent in 1985 and 6 percent in 1988; and
- Tanzania, where reforms have cut real food prices by half since 1986.

Africa began its fragile turnaround in the mid-Eighties, according to the World Bank. Sub-Saharan food production from 1985 to 1988 grew faster—at 4 percent a year—than population for the first time since 1970. The period 1985-1987 saw non-petroleum exports rise by

more than 10 percent—reversing a 15-year decline—and reach their highest level since 1970.

According to JCI's Ronnie Bethlehem, "Failure and pain are great teachers. Marginal economic growth and an increasing population have created a degree of poverty and political and social unrest that has compelled a re-examination of discredited dogmas."

A major factor is the passing of the first generation of leaders after the colonial era. The current reforms are being undertaken by a new generation of leaders, more educated and pragmatic than their predecessors.

Guinea's President Lansana Conte chose economic reform in response to demands for radical change, as did Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano after the death of hardliner Samora Machel. "This is not a religious conversion, but a very practical matter of economic growth," says Edward Jaycox, the World Bank's vice-president for Africa.

Gradual economic liberalisation was long overdue in rigidly socialist Tanzania, but only began after the resignation of Julius Nyerere, and even then his shadow prevents current President Ali Hassan Mwinyi from introducing radical economic and political reform. Last month, in a sign of the times, even Nyerere admitted that debate on the introduction of a multiparty system should not be regarded as treason.

New leaders look to examples such as Botswana and, to a lesser degree, the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi, which have somewhat open markets and have managed to sustain growth. Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa at independence, but a free-enterprise system allowed development of its diamond wealth and it's now among the wealthiest.

Though the shift was already under way, the upheavals in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have underlined the failure of socialist economies and one-party States. Mozambique renounced Marxism-Leninism as the country's official ideology in January, joined by Benin in February. Ethiopia, Africa's poorest country and also its oldest, followed suit last month.

The East-West tensions African leaders exploited to extract military and other aid have also been reduced. Western donors no longer fear African allies will look East for funds and are keeping closer track of aid, or even diverting money to eastern Europe. Total aid to sub-Saharan Africa decreased in real terms from US\$19.8bn in 1982 to \$17.9bn in 1987—and this compelled some long-needed discipline.

The trend was reinforced by the increasingly tough line taken by the IMF and World Bank. The two organisations insist on measures aimed at shrinking government deficits, lowering exchange rates to market levels, raising prices paid to agricultural producers, deregulating on a grand scale, creating programmes to fight corruption, reducing spending on large prestige projects and cutting

the military. (In the Eighties, Africa spent more money on weapons and armed forces than it received in aid).

As Africa slowly emerges from this morass, it is clear that colonialism, poor soil conditions, harsh climates, wildly fluctuating commodity prices, rapid urbanisation and unprecedented population growth has less to do with the continent's sorry state than abysmal government, and the bankrupt economic policies it implemented.

Post-independence Africa has enjoyed little economic freedom. Instead, leaders nationalised much of their economies, regulated prices, controlled foreign exchange, subsidised favoured industries, and pumped up the bureaucracy. Last year, per capita income was 15 percent lower than in 1979.

And of course, political opposition was outlawed and free elections were ruled out.

Former US ambassador to SA, Herman Nickel, says: "It is this lack of accountability—and the resultant profusion of corruption, bloated bureaucracies, underperforming public corporations and abuse of power—that has become Africa's common denominator."

Kenya and Tanzania provide a case study. They were both former British colonies that received their independence in the early Sixties and are very similar in terms of location and population (20m and 22m). Though socialist Tanzania has almost 250 percent more arable land per person, it has had to import food while market-orientated Kenya is self-sufficient. Despite the lack of diamonds, gold, iron and hydroelectric power found in its southern neighbour, Kenya's annual GDP growth was 3.1 percent from 1980 to 1985 while Tanzania's languished at 0.8 percent. Kenya has lower infant mortality, greater life expectancy, more physicians and nurses per capita and higher school enrolment.

The World Bank stresses reform measures can be effective only if African leaders become accountable to their people through judicial reform and multiparty elections. Without political reform, not much foreign aid, which buoys reform, will be forthcoming, it warns.

And political reform should aim to encourage the private sector, responsible in 1987 for roughly 70 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP and 85 percent of employment, but receiving only 30 percent of the credit advanced by domestic financial institutions. It did almost all the saving, but two-thirds of investment was spent by the public sector, with governments and State-owned enterprises receiving 80 percent of the region's foreign aid grants and 87 percent of subsidised loans.

With this in mind, a branch of the World Bank, the International Finance Corp, has provided loans to nearly 500 private enterprises in developing countries (about \$3.5bn worth). In 1987, it received a 14 percent return on its investments, suggesting profits and development are not incompatible.



How fast should reform proceed? Some economists favour the example of Poland, which transformed a centrally controlled economy into a market system virtually overnight. They hope to avoid the problems encountered in Ghana, which introduced a gradual programme eight years ago and has struggled to maintain stability as people lose patience with continued austerity.

But critics, while acknowledging the need to foster private initiative, say IMF terms are too harsh. Unlike eastern Europe, the margin between life and death is too small to cushion the sudden, though transitional shift to higher unemployment and prices that economic reforms would bring.

However it is achieved, to the degree that Africa turns itself around, SA will profit. Glenn Babb, a Nat MP and former deputy D-G for Africa in the Foreign Ministry, estimates that the country's trade with the continent tripled to about \$6bn from 1985 to 1988. Hubs for the distribution of SA goods were established in the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Rwanda-Burundi.

The SA Foreign Trade Organisation's Paul Runge predicts a steady rise in trade as SA itself reforms and increasing economic pragmatism lures African leaders and businesses south. "However, we must avoid inflated expectations, with Europeans concentrating on their eastern neighbours and African countries still severely constrained by a lack of foreign exchange."

In fact, Sally Gallagher, director of Johannesburg-based Business Development Africa, believes the jump in African trade is deceptive, largely the result of price increases rather than rising volumes. "But the potential for increase is there, with SA offering quality products at competitive prices and fast delivery."

According to Nickel: "As African countries see the attentions of the First World shifting away from Africa, they are developing a heightened awareness the continent needs greater economic co-operation and that Africa's most advanced and powerful economy must play a key part in it."

Unfortunately, SA lacks capital for direct investment abroad and suffers from sanctions, disinvestment and political and social upheaval, so there are limits to what the country can do to encourage this trend.

But what if SA itself—under an ANC [African National Congress]-dominated government, say—tries to turn the ideological clock back and ventures into socialism? As Bethlehem notes: "It's hard to tell deprived people—from whom hopes have been raised—that socialism has been discredited."

SA has been warned. Mozambique PM Mario Machungo says: "If the ANC were to ask me, I would tell them nationalisation is not the way to go" (Leaders March 16). Mozambique under Machel tried nationalisation, central planning and collective agriculture. They are now decentralising, privatising and welcoming private investors, including South Africans.

Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro van Dumen said recently: "The biggest mistake we made was to make the State sector larger and larger when we did not have the capacity to manage it. There will be a very big reduction of the State's participation in the economy."

But empirical evidence and wise words may not be enough. Socialism still attracts SA blacks who associate capitalism with apartheid here and poverty throughout Africa. Diehard (but wavering) communist Joe Slovo recently said: "Over 90 percent of the people on the African continent live out their wretched and repressed lives in stagnating and declining capitalist-orientated economies."

Never mind that labelling a handful of African countries capitalist is absurd.

To further discredit centralist ideas and contribute to the liberalising trend, SA must successfully redistribute wealth without destroying the means of creating it. It has to prove that social upliftment and free markets are compatible. With so many African governments having apparently learnt this lesson, why should we be left out?

## Cameroon

### Biya Said Under Pressure for Multiparty System

AB1906191690 London BBC World Service in English  
1830 GMT 15 Jun 80

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] President Biya of Cameroon might have cause to celebrate his country's soccer performance in Italy, but at home he is coming under ever-increasing pressure from supporters of the multiparty system. This week, the first vice president of the ruling and only party, Dr. John Foncha, added his voice to the calling in no uncertain way—he resigned from his post. Dr. Foncha is an English-speaker from Bamenda, in English-speaking west Cameroon. He called for a multiparty state, claimed west Cameroon was always being overlooked, and criticized the authorities' tough tactics against the formation of an opposition party in Bamenda, when a rally was broken up by security forces and six people were killed.

Dr. Foncha joins a wide-range of people calling for a political change. It began early this year among the country's lawyers, who found themselves at loggerheads with the government. Bernard Muna, president of the Cameroon Bar Association is in London, and Julian Marshall asked him if he thought President Biya will take any notice of Dr. Foncha.

[Begin recording] [Muna] I think that it is important that he takes notice. I think that as president of the whole country he must know that the problem can only be solved through dialogue, and this is basically what Dr. Foncha is calling for. You must remember that it is the west Cameroon that voted to reunite with east Cameroon; it was not the whole country that voted. Therefore, he is a bit annoyed that they voluntarily went, voted to reunite with their brothers, and yet they are being treated as if they are a people apart, and I think this is disastrous for the unity of the country.

I would like to add something: You see, within the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement [CPDM], as usual, there are two factions: There are the liberal ones, who really want democracy to come. I think that we might (?cite) one of President Biya's adviser, Ngango, former minister of education. He is in this mold of people who want concession. But there are those who have amassed wealth and done everything, and who do not want any dialogue; and who do not want any democracy because they might be exposed. So I hope that President Biya would weigh in, and know that the unity of the country can only be done through dialogue. I think that is what President Foncha wants; he wants dialogue.

[Marshall] You mentioned, almost without my bidding, the west Cameroon and the agitation that there is. Has this become now a clear division between English-speaking and French-speaking Cameroon, what started as a debate about multiparty politics?

[Muna] I would say a division in the party, not in the nation. The nation still remains basically united. I am leading more than 300 lawyers who are also basically remain united as to the fact that the constitution of the country and the human rights of all citizen must be respected. Therefore, basically the union about multiparty is for the whole country. But by treating Bamenda, as they did, apart; by sending in troops to encircle Bamenda; by saying themselves that this is a Bamenda party, or this is an Anglophone party, they have brought in this dimension, and the people of west Cameroon will not sit quiet and say: they are for west Cameroon. They are not going to say we are not; it does not matter where they come from. But I think the division has been brought in by those who, in trying to divide the nation, have fallen into this trap. The division is brought by the central government, and not by the west Cameroonians. The west Cameroonians, I think, are for west Cameroon.

[Marshall] Do you think that division is likely to get worse?

[Muna] In the party, yes. In the party I am sure that the party will certainly split definitely now on these lines. If you look at the letter which is written by the section, the CPDM section of Mezam, in Bamenda, you will also find that they are also very annoyed that the treatment which was given to the civilians in Bamenda, as if they were outcasts. I think this is very important. But this is only something that has diverted the population monetarily from the want for multiparty politics for real dialogue. We should remember also that this the problem in the north, and so forth. I think President Biya must listen to the more moderate voices in the country and bring a national conference of all the people who are speaking and look for a solution.

[Marshall] If he continues to resist what you claim is a grounds for an opinion in the country for multiparty politics, to what extent do you think that Cameroon could be engulfed in the kind of popular unrest that we have seen in Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast?

[Muna] I hope that he does do something very quickly. I hope that he does not resist too long. Really, this is my fervent hope. If he does, then I am very sorry, because I am not sure what is going to take place. You see, we are dealing with unknown factors; we are dealing with discontent. It might come out... [changes thought] you see, we have also very strong policy to curb our expenses. We are not going to have enough money to pay the workers.

All these are factors which, to me, are unknown and if the solution of dialogue is not resolved, then when these factors come in, they would be added dimension to the situation, and I am afraid there might be chaos. But I certainly hope that the president would do something fast to bring about all the children of Cameroon; all the sons and daughters of Cameroon together and let us talk about our country. [end recording]

**\* Trials for Subversion Underline State Mistrust**

34000425A London AFRICA ANALYSIS  
in English 13 Apr 90 pp 6-7

[Text] Yaounde. The unrest spreading through much of francophone Africa is disturbing the leadership here. Cameroon has always had a very tight security policy, dating from the period in the 1950s and 1960s when a serious rebellion affected the south of the country, especially among the Bamileke and Bassa peoples. It has also been a de facto one-party state since 1960, when the radical party behind the rebellion, the Union des Peuples Camerounais (UPC), was banned.

When Paul Biya came to power after the surprise resignation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982, there were even tentative moves to liberalisation, but the serious and bloody coup attempt of 1984 by pro-Ahidjo elements in the army meant that security has remained a major preoccupation of the regime. After 1984, the National Research Centre (CENER), a political police organisation, was reinforced, and in 1988 a former secret police chief under Ahidjo, Jean Fochive, was brought back to run it. A privately-owned press exists and freedom of discussion is now more possible, but there is tough censorship, journalists are frequently harassed, informers are everywhere, and the different wings of the security services, including the military, are often a law unto themselves.

Two recent trials draw attention to the continuing climate of governmental mistrust. That of the Douala lawyer, Yondo Black, sentenced to three years' jail under an anti-subversion law dating from the height of the rebellion in 1962, has brought protests from lawyers' organisations, not least because he appeared before a military tribunal and, although he was charged with holding an illegal meeting and distributing tracts, it is suspected that his real offence was to try to form a political party.

The second trial was that of Djeukam Tchameni, a Bamileke businessman sentenced to three years' imprisonment for subversion because he brought a tape from Burkina Faso, given to him by an officer in the Burkina Faso army, known as Captain Traore, who was, in fact, a Cameroonian called Guerandi who had been implicated in the 1984 coup attempt. The Tchameni case is being closely followed by human rights groups, both because he may well have been framed by business rivals, and because of reports that he was not just tortured, but was the victim of rivalry between military intelligence and the CENER.

In the context of a critical report from Amnesty International on conditions in Nkondengoi prison, it is worth noting that Bernard Muna, a prominent lawyer from Bamenda, son of the one-time premier of the former West Cameroon (the English-speaking part of the country) has spoken out against human rights violations and called for more democracy. Since Muna is also the president of the Bar Association (he succeeded Yondo

Black), who organised a 24-hour lawyers' strike at the beginning of the Yondo Black trial, this looks like throwing down a political gauntlet to the government.

**\* Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary Change Urged**

34000424C Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 3 Apr 90 p 5

[Editorial: "Cameroonians Stand for Evolution, Not for Revolution"]

[Text] Man, in all his reflexes, remains an active political animal. Following the tone set by the Wouri CPDM [Cameroon People's Democratic Movement] militants, Cameroonians took to the streets exhorting the New Deal apostle to continue in his patriotic path of gradual democracy. Blasting any precipitated rush to multi-party politics as unwise, CPDM militants are giving the Chief Executive unalloyed support.

No man is an island, John Donne once said, entire of itself. Threats to the existence of a collectivity are bound to set in motion a band wagon effort on the likely victims. As living witnesses to an unpredictable world political climate, Cameroonians prefer to jealously guard the bird in hand. The thousands in the bush, to many experts of our political landscape, cannot solve our most urgent problems today.

Spontaneously taking to the streets may be another way of showing a world used to revolutions recently, that the Cameroon of President Paul Biya cannot swallow hook, line and sinker, foreign political experience without bearing on our culture. Cameroonians cannot be said to be a special species of God's creation inoculated against historical vagaries. Our policy however, moves a step ahead of the changing winds. Pluralistic elections at the council, party and parliament came many years before the eastern European winds sparked change.

The true test of civilisation, it has been said, is not the numerous trophies won, nor the size of budgets, cities and political parties...no, but the kind of man the country turns out. In moments of danger, the patriot worth his salt will stand up to the challenge, chase the threat away before identifying our lapses for improvement. Cameroon's political culture has always taken the evolutionary path. This has ensured our status today as an island of tranquility in a turbulent ocean.

**\* Stress on Democratic Freedoms Enjoyed**

34000424B Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 10 Apr 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Eddia Soter: "The Triumph of Liberty and Democracy"]

[Text] The liberalisation and democratisation of the Cameroonian society which began in 1982 when President Paul Biya took office, has been slowly but steadily opening up and modernising the country.



As concerns liberty only the short-sighted will refuse that the New Deal era has really launched a heyday in Cameroon. Freedom of opinion as expressed through the numerous newspapers which have since seen the light of day, offer a permanent forum for the exchange and debate of ideas.

On democracy, a notion which is very dear to the New Deal, the strides accomplished since 1982 are eloquent. In 1986 when the basic organs of the party were renewed, there was a true show piece of maturity. This trend was maintained and widened during the local council elections when the pluralism of candidates was confirmed. Then came the tough democratic fight to enter Parliament in 1988.

If anyone needed to be more convinced about the resolve of the New Deal to democratise national political life, the record stands out as proof of a determination to put the country on a veritable democratic trail.

But as a contemporary political leader noted, there can be no true democracy without democrats.

What counts now is for Cameroonians to continue to display the kind of maturity which has permitted the entire nation to win the envy of the international community as concerns our newly won democracy.

Cameroon is a country in which the Rule of Law is upheld. In this domain, the New Deal government has liberalised certain important professions such as: pharmacists, lawyers and accountants. As concerns lawyers, their importance cannot be over-emphasized as they have regularly operated without intimidation or any other form of coercion. History teaches us that any country, whether developed or developing, only has the type of society it merits.

### **Freedom of Expression**

Of all liberties, freedom of expression has been most accomplished in Cameroon since 1982. Cameroonians can now discuss in public subjects which were once considered as taboos. President Paul Biya has opened up the society and made the debate of ideas possible.

Freedom of expression is an important aspect in any democracy. A July 1988 law authorised the plurality of candidates at all elections and created divisional constituencies in the country instead of the unique one which hitherto existed.

### **Free Press**

In the history of the development of the private press in Cameroon, the post—1982 era the country has been the most flourishing. This era is also synonymous to the New Deal years.

Today, there are over thirty private newspapers of varying periodicity. The most regular ones include, the "Combattant," "Messenger," "Liberal," "Football Elite,"

"Le Mont Cameroun," "Coco," "Detente." Ontop, foreign publications flow into the country with ease. This has opened still further the minds of Cameroonians.

### **Liberal Professions Expand**

The once closed nature of liberal professions no longer exists. In the eight years since 1982, there has been a boom, thanks to legislations which have freed it from the egoism of a few. Lawyers, bailiffs, architects, pharmacists and private medical practitioners are now many in town. The subtle nature of the new text are a pointer to the new liberal spirit in the country.

### **Hike in Entrepreneurship**

The liberal spirit which is now animating the country has led to a gigantic boost in entrepreneurship. Shopkeepers, small businessmen have taken their rightful place in society. The newly drawn up Investment Code has been attracting foreign partners for Joint ventures in our country.

But since agriculture is the backbone of the economy, emphasis is still being placed in this sector. In fact over 80 percent of the population lives in the rural areas that is why the new Credit Agricole is expected to devote its energies to finance small viable projects.

### **Freedom To Associate**

By guaranteeing the right to form associations within which they can improve their wellbeing, Cameroonians are fully enjoying the Rule of Law in the country. Cameroon recognises the freedom of the individual. But absolute freedom is relative. That is why the laws of the land have to be respected in any given domain. The law of June 12, 1967 organises and guarantees the freedom of association. In this connection, the law requires that all associations should obtain legal status before functioning. However several associations operate without this—a situation which is not comfortable in a country where the Rule of law exists.

### **\* Unity, Prosperity Supersede Multiparty Fervor**

34000424A Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial by Ebokem-Fomenky: "Mind-Forged Manacles"]

[Text] Even as CPDM [Cameroon People's Democratic Movement] Party militants this week move the on-going mass rally wagon from the Provinces to the Divisions with renewed verve, most of us militants must accept that the last two weeks have been the most unsettling in the five years of the Party. President Biya had to speak, as he did last Monday, not only as the Party Boss but also as Head of State; as any careful leader would do when his people are in difficulty. This is true to Biya and his leadership style: stepping in each time there is a burning issue of general interest.



And such circumstances of grievous importance have been few and remarkable since 1982: - August 22, - August 22, 1983 when he announced the creation of new Provinces; - March 14, 1984 when security forces announced the foiling of a coup attempt; - April 7, 1984 after the coup attempt of the previous day; - April 10, 1984 announcing measures taken after the coup; - May 17, 1984 calling on calm after judgement was passed on coup plotters; - September 20, 1984 warning the nation against rumour mongering; - November 20, 1986 giving more responsibilities to members of government; - March 30, 1988 after the Indomitable Lions' victory in the African Nations Cup; - April 9, 1988 announcing early Presidential elections and on May 3, 1988 thanking the nation for his re-election as President of the Republic.

Once again on Monday, President Biya's vision for Cameroon remained clear, hardly clouded by what other Party Chairmen in his position would have seen as the danger of multi-partism. That, in fact, is no danger to a Party like the CPDM whose basic texts contain clear built-in provisions for vigorous self-criticism. If real danger there is any, it lies in the possibility that the enormity of the multi-party threat should block the vision of such a well-intentioned hierarchy as the CPDM possesses, on the one hand, and on the other hand, in the possibility that calls for multi-partism without circumspection could ignore the need for national integration, peace and order and consequently shake the very foundations of this peaceful island in a turbulent African ocean.

That is nobody's wish, not even the CPDM critics'. In fact, not the wish of Cameroonians, as we know ourselves to be. Yet, not to see the challenges would be dishonest, at best. The conscious CPDM militant should have the difficult task of facing the multi-party threat and at the same time looking beyond that same threat. Because if such threat succeeds in blocking his vision and he fails to look beyond it, if the long term future losses all reality to him, then all political mobilization strategies degenerate into spasmodic responses to the alarms of the moment—as some have tended to interpret recent reactions.

Like the Party chairman, CPDM militants ought to bear in mind that it is hard to over-emphasize the importance of pluralism in helping society escape the cycle of growth. As someone said, "the only stability possible today is stability in motion". The masterly, I should have said, fatherly, tone in President Biya's address portrays the understanding that from the ranks of the critics could come not only cranks and troublemakers but patriots and inventors.

The main issues therefore are those of circumspection, prudence and a permanent reference to our most cherished goals of unity, national integration and economic prosperity.

What is important in the present circumstances, however, is that, as Cameroonians, all rightly claiming to justify our individual actions with patriotic zeal, bellicosity should not be a rule but an exception in the advancement of our personal view point. President Biya's latest address has set the tone and ought to be emulated: as Party chairman, he could, in defence of his party, have castigated his critics; as a liberal he did not. He could, as most African Heads of State do, have been harder on those who hold ideas different from his; as a democrat, he simply showed respect for the will of the people.

In respect for the will of the people he said: "I have understood you". This means that if tomorrow the people decided otherwise, he might not have much to alter. Elections into the basic organs of the Party, and the Party ordinary congress are important events announced by the head of state. We, the people of Cameroon ought to free ourselves from our mind-forged manacles and follow Biya whose ability and willingness to address the issue of this, we are so often acclaimed nation.

#### \* Citizens Reject 'Hasty' Creation of New Parties

34000425B Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 3 Apr 90 p 3

[Editorial by Ebokem-Fomenky: "When What Is Good for the Goose Does Not Suit the Gander"]

[Text] The usefulness or, if you like, the uselessness of the much-vaunted wind of change arriving Africa from eastern Europe will, in the end be determined not by how much change it actually leaves behind but mostly by how quickly each African country is capable of giving the fast-blowing winds its own socio-political colouration. Cameroonians are fully aware of this. And, even the greatest of die-hard sceptics should by now be convinced that the majority (I have not said all) of Cameroonians say "no" to disorder disguised in sporadic cat calls for the hasty creation of more political parties in Cameroon alongside the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) which is merely ending a first mandate it got in Bamenda in March, 1985; that they categorically refuse the multi-party panacea being suggested for their most urgent ill, the economic crisis, because, as they have made clear in the various mass rallies organised throughout the country, multi-partisanship would divide and dissipate energies badly needed to wrestle with unemployment and underdevelopment.

From all speeches made, party militants from Buea to Bertoua and from Maroua to Muloundou have recalled in order to acclaim, President Biya's commitment to democracy—which entails the acceptance of ideas different from those of the CPDM—as the ultimate goal of the process begun in Bamenda. But such a process must be the logical outcome of social stability and order and of such political maturity as Cameroonians began to show in the recent party and legislative elections. They are all right; not only because everyone else is saying the same

thing but especially as the lessons of history, the experience of the present and indications for tomorrow can hardly bear good witness to the virtues of multi-party politics introduced hurriedly in other African countries.

If the horrors of multi-party politics of the early sixties no longer convince anyone because they might have forgotten, Zimbabweans are today going back to a one-party system, even as they remain convinced that Zimbabwe will in the future need more than one political party. It is all a question of identifying and differentiating between immediate, short-and long-term needs and goals. If many are today saying that the wind of change might not change much in Cameroon, it is precisely because Cameroonians have matured politically to the point of no longer accepting uncritically all that is suggested as solutions to their problems. Besides, never having been a doctrinal nation in the strict sense of East-European countries, it is somehow intellectually risky to assume that whatever might have happened elsewhere should happen here. And therefore propose revolution as the best solution for our current problems, when infact, we began our evolution right at the New Deal Congress. After all, most of what peoples of those nations hailed as God-given: rigour, moralisation, liberalisation and democracy are the very tenets of the New Deal as enunciated in Bamenda in March, 1985. What do the winds from the East really have to leave in Cameroon, settling as they have done, on grounds that had long handled all that the winds bear?

I am afraid that this time around the promoters of such winds, no matter from wherever they may come will not sit back again to enjoy the spectacle of a Cameroon at war with itself.

#### \* French Sign Six Financial Agreements

34000425C Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 6 Apr 90 p 3

[Article: "French Aid for Cameroon's Development Projects"]

[Text] Cameroon will receive CFA 752 million francs from France, following the signature last April 4 of six financial agreements between Cameroon and France.

The sum of CFA 752 million will be made available to Cameroon through the French Fund for Cooperation and Assistance. The money will be used in financing six different development projects in Cameroon. Areas to benefit from this financial assistance are sports, town planning, training of trainers, the national gas plan and "Credit Foncier".

During the signing ceremony, Cameroon was represented by the Secretary of State for Plan and Territorial Development, Mr Badel Ndanga Ndinga while France was represented by that country's Ambassador to Cameroon H. E. Yvon Omnes.

Expressing gratitude to the French government for coming to our assistance, Mr Badel Ndanga Ndinga declared that one can only know his true friends in times of difficulties. Quoting the Head of State, Mr Ndanga Ndinga said France, "remains a privileged partner of Cameroon".

To Ambassador Yvon Omnes, France has never doubted the profoundness of the links that exist between both countries. He added that in spite of today's preoccupation centred around Structural Adjustment, the future should not be forgotten, and "The future is development", hence this gesture by France to help Cameroon is a way to assist the country in preparing for tomorrow.

### Gabon

#### \* Last PDG Communique Notes Steps to Democracy

90AF0112A Libreville L'UNION in French  
10-11 May 90 p 7

[Text] The Political Bureau of the Gabonese Democratic Party [PDG] met on 9 March 1990 at 1000 in its usual place in Renovation Palace.

Having noted that the PDG, after 22 years of existence, had fulfilled its historic role, the Political Bureau took note of new political desires expressed by the people at the national level, such as at the last, extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the party held in Libreville from 11 to 14 January, which generally reflected these desires. The Political Bureau also expressed concern over the international changes that have taken place.

Therefore, in view of the establishment of a broader kind of democracy in our country the Political Bureau recognized that the process now under way, beginning with this meeting at which a Special Commission for Democracy was established, should be continued and should lead to the establishment of a multiparty system.

The Political Bureau also recognized that the advent of a multiparty system requires serious preparation. That is why, after considering the conclusions of the Special Commission for Democracy, the Political Bureau enthusiastically welcomed the proposal by the president and founder of the PDG to establish the Gabonese Social Democratic Rally (RSDG). This action is in line with the recommendations of the special commission referred to above.

According to the conclusions of this commission, democracy within the RSDG will be guaranteed by the coexistence and expression of different political views. Therefore, the RSDG is an appropriate framework leading to the establishment of a multiparty system, preserving national unity and social peace.

At the national level democracy will be established through a recasting of the institutions of the republic. This process will involve expanding the right to vote in all elections, in addition to:

- The establishment of a Senate;
- Halting the experiment with cheap geopolitics;
- Improving the moral level of the management of public property;
- Redefining the service activities of the social security system;
- Decentralizing the state budget, particularly toward the provinces;
- Rebalancing policies governing housing and transportation;
- Improving the moral tone of public life and adopting a policy of openness in the management of public property.

In addition, the following, fundamental freedoms are recognized as the right of every citizen, now more than ever:

- Individual and collective rights;
- Freedom of expression;
- Freedom of association;
- The right to establish professional associations freely;
- Freedom of the press.

Furthermore, the Political Bureau approved the conclusions of the commission which, in this connection, emphasized the need to preserve the physical and moral integrity of all citizens and respect for public order.

In this spirit and with regard more particularly to the right of persons to travel, the Political Bureau asked the government to abolish the existing requirement to obtain permission for leaving the country. This measure will be implemented by the government, beginning on 1 April 1990.

Then the Political Bureau approved the dates for the convocation of a national conference announced by the chief of state in his message to the nation of 23 February 1990. The meeting will be held in Libreville from 23 to 30 March. This conference will be followed by an extraordinary congress of the PDG. In a forthcoming speech the president and founder of the PDG will provide further details both on the subjects to be considered at the congress as well as on the philosophy and objectives of the Gabonese Social Democratic Rally.

Representatives of all associations of a political kind not belonging to the PDG and, of course, the PDG itself may participate in this conference.

During the sessions of the conference all political associations will be able to express themselves freely and thus will be able to make their contribution to the broad, national debate on democracy that will affect the future of our country. These associations are therefore requested to register, either with Georges Rawiri, the president of the Special Commission for Democracy, or

with the political cabinet of the president, whose offices will be at the Okoume Palace Intercontinental Hotel. Registrations may be made between 14 and 21 March 1990.

Also taking part in this national conference will be the permanent secretariat of the PDG; the members of the Special Commission for Democracy; the federal secretaries and leaders of specialized bodies of the PDG; representatives of civilian society, organized by profession; one deputy per province; the political counselors of the president and founder of the PDG; the senior representative and the political cabinet of the president and founder of the PDG; and representatives of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim organizations.

Regarding the second point of its agenda, after having made a critical analysis of the attitude of the government in dealing with the social and political crisis that our country is going through, the Political Bureau regretted the increase in the number of leaflets which, particularly in Libreville, turn individuals and ethnic groups against each other, at the risk of placing our national unity in question and giving our country an unattractive and even negative image.

On this subject the Political Bureau considered that conditions will exist from now on allowing the authors of these leaflets to express themselves freely and openly, because Gabon must open itself to true democracy, that is, democracy by responsible citizens.

After having discussed at length all of the points included on its agenda the Political Bureau concluded its meeting of 9 March 1990 at 1600.

## Sao Tome and Principe

### \* Former Prime Minister To Run in Election

90AF0091A Lisbon *DIARIO DE NOTICIAS*  
in Portuguese 17 Apr 90 p 13

[Article by Sao Tome correspondent Maximino Carlos]

[Text] The former prime minister and historic leader of the MLSTP [Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe], Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada, is to return to Sao Tome tomorrow to run as a candidate in the first presidential election in which there will be universal suffrage and direct and secret balloting. The election is scheduled for the middle of June.

According to official reports, Miguel Trovoada is thus far the only candidate of the Democratic Opposition Coalition (CODO), which includes the FRNSTP [National Front for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe], ADNSTP [expansion unknown], and UDISTP [Democratic and Independent Front of Sao Tome and Principe].

In fact, a commission is now in Sao Tome (the membership has not been announced) working intensively on



preparations for a large demonstration to welcome the candidate at the Sao Tome and Principe international airport.

Miguel Trovoada's decision to return follows the intensive meetings held in Portugal in recent weeks, with members of the CODO and various national political figures, such as Daniel dos Santos Daio, secretary general of the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Sao Tome, and an influential member of the Contemplation Group; national Parliament deputy Evaristo Carvalho; and Guadalupe de Ceita, one of the founders of the MLSTP, among others, participating.

Trovoada, who is mentioned as a possible winner in the coming presidential election, is believed by political analysts in the capital of Sao Tome to meet all the requirements necessary for an easy victory. In addition to his charisma, he is competent enough to create mechanisms capable of controlling the difficult economic and social situation of the country, and to find alternatives to the 15 years of MLSTP government.

The political parties currently established in Lisbon may move their activities to Sao Tome shortly. This will take place as soon as the political party law, as well as the others designed to guarantee continuity in the reform process under way, have been approved and published.

Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada was born on 27 December 1936 in Sao Tome. He completed his primary schooling in Sao Tome and attended secondary schools in Luanda and Lisbon.

He continued his education at the Faculty of Law in Lisbon, and in 1960, after participating in the organization of the Committee for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (CLSTP), of which he became president, he left the Portuguese capital for Conakry (in the Republic of Guinea), in order to devote himself to the liberation struggle of the people of Sao Tome.

In April 1961, together with leaders from Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, he took part in the institutional establishment of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP).

In 1962, despite the protest by the members of Portuguese delegation, who walked out of the session, he spoke to the Political Commission of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, explaining the domestic situation in the country, and not only that.

In July 1972, together with other officials from Sao Tome, he participated in the conference in Santa Isabel (Equatorial Guinea) at which the CLSTP became the MLSTP. He was elected to the political bureau, and to the post of secretary for foreign relations.

The decolonization initiated after 25 April 1974 led to preliminary contacts and talks in London, Lisbon, and New York between delegations from Sao Tome, which

Miguel Trovoada headed, and representatives of the Portuguese government and the Council of the Revolution.

This activity was to culminate in positive fashion on 26 November of that same year in Algeria, with the signing of the Algiers Accord, which recognized the right of the people of Sao Tome and Principe to independence and well-being.

On 12 July 1975, when independence was proclaimed, Trovoada was installed as prime minister. He remained in that post until April 1979, also serving as minister of foreign affairs and national defense (July to December 1975), minister of economic coordination, cooperation, and tourism (from December 1975 to October 1978), and minister of industry, trade, and fishing (from October 1978 to September 1979).

Accused of being an "enemy of the people" and an "agent of the West," following what he himself termed a "campaign of slander and defamation," Miguel Trovoada, accompanied by his family, sought asylum on the premises of the United Nations in Sao Tome on 25 September 1979. There he was granted international protection. Pinto da Costa's government ordered his arrest "manu militari" in the United Nations facility itself.

His arrest was to lead to discontent on the part of the people of Sao Tome, and it provoked numerous protests from various countries and international organizations. In January 1981, Amnesty International named him "prisoner of the month."

Despite the statements made by President Manuel Pinto da Costa during his visit to Portugal, Miguel Trovoada was released on 12 July 1981, after being detained for 21 months without any formal charges being filed or any trial held. Accompanied by his wife and his three children, he left Sao Tome voluntarily and settled in Paris.

In an interview granted to the newspaper TEMPO in February 1983, Miguel Trovoada urged "a democratic, independent, and truly nonaligned regime" for the country, "one which will reinstate individual freedoms, ensure respect for the rights of man, and promote social justice and the material and moral well-being of the people, in a spirit of peace, friendship, and cooperation with all peoples."

#### **\* Opposition's Efforts To Become Party Viewed**

90AF0254A Lisbon O INDEPENDENTE  
in Portuguese 18 May 90 p 26

[Text] On the eve of Sao Tome and Principe's first free elections, the country's political life is stirred up. The opposition wants to take on the status of a party, and the administration is bolstering its position. Seemingly unaware of all this commotion, President Manuel Pinto da Costa goes so far as to give himself the luxury of about a month's private sojourn abroad.

The statute regarding the right to vote and participate in the electoral census was ratified this week by the Sao Tomean Parliament. Meanwhile, the statute which regulates the existence of political parties lies dormant on the administration's desk. For this reason, some of the opposition forces refuse to remain calm, even proposing, in default of the Constitution, the possibility of establishing their own organization along political-party lines.

This is the case of the Reflection Group (GR), the most influential movement in opposition to Pinto da Costa. Moreover, this desire was manifested at a meeting held Wednesday [16 May] during which discussion centered around the statute and the draft of a political program to be submitted to Congress.

With this action, the GR wants to impress the Sao Tomeans as being a credible alternative to the MLSTP [Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe]. But in this universe of certainties, a few doubts are distorting the picture. Undoubtedly, the most serious is the lack of an agreement on the designation of a candidate for the presidential election.

At the moment, the GR is vacillating between two possibilities. Some support Miguel Trovoada, the candidate of the opposition abroad. Others consider it dangerous for the entire opposition to revolve around a single man. The first solution would involve the GR leader, Guadalupe Ceita who, it appears, cannot tolerate Trovoada.

As Guadalupe Ceita is not one who hides what is on his mind, he did not mince words but came right to the point. "Instead of trading rice between Paris and the Asian countries, Trovoada would find it more advantageous to come to the aid of his country." This was allegedly one of the sallies with which the GR's strong man toasted his former comrade-in-arms.

#### Unity a Must

The designation of the GR's candidate for the Presidency of the Republic will depend particularly on the correlation of forces within that movement. From all indications, this force opposing the MLSTP is dominated by three factors.

One is the former traditional members of the MLSTP led by Guadalupe Ceita. Then comes a group composed of a higher echelon of MLSTP leaders, now dissenters, among whom former Defense Minister Daniel Paio is one of the most influential. Lastly, there are the young cadres who, in 1975, belonged to the Civic Association Pro-MLSTP. The major triumph in this group is the individual who became "the only man in Sao Tome capable of causing the Army to leave its barracks." We are speaking of Major Oscar Aguiar e Sousa, current minister of agriculture and former head of the Ministry of Defense.

The GR will have to overcome its internal differences before pursuing its objectives. And pave the way for harmonious relations with the opposition abroad which will soon be transferring its weapons and baggage to Sao Tome and Principe.

While the opposition is seeking a satisfactory platform, the regime is opening all the valves of democracy. According to sources in Sao Tome, this insensitivity on the part of the administration is quite visible in the news media controlled by the state. This is true to the extent that, after a period of relative openness about three months ago, it is Information Minister Manuel Vaz Fernandes himself who is now using a fine-tooth comb to ferret out all information which could be prejudicial to the MLSTP.

But Vaz Fernandes is not alone. Alda Espirito Santo, parliamentary leader and acting president, is also lending a hand. And it appears that he is not joking, since, according to sources close to the opposition, he has already exercised his talents in a communique from the GR which he did not hesitate to censor. Even when "on vacation," Manuel Pinto da Costa is continuing to make life difficult for the opposition.

#### Zaire

##### Bululu Speaks at Summit on 'Massacre'

LD1906201290 Paris International Service  
in French 1830 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Excerpt] The summit provides the opportunity for the press to discuss some pressing African issues with the delegations. Lunda Bululu, the new Zairian prime minister who represents his country at the La Baule summit, gave a news conference this afternoon concerning the massacre of students at Lubumbashi. His clarification was made after the Zairian parliamentarians' report on these killings was published. Let's listen to Lunda Bululu speaking to Christophe Boissbouvier:

[Bululu] Nobody has proved that there were so many deaths or that there was more than one death. The parliamentarians have even visited the place where the, quote, massacred students, end quote, are allegedly buried in common graves. These common graves were not found. No trace of common graves was found.

The sovereign parliament sent a group of its members to investigate events concerning the nation. Why shouldn't the parliament be believed? Why should someone not believe the Zairian parliament? Anyway, as far as the Zairian Government is concerned, it believes this report; those who do not believe it should present evidence. Why should we believe that only an international commission of inquiry can establish the truth? [passage omitted]

## Djibouti

### Diplomats' Defections in U.S. 'Not Political'

EA1906204990 Djibouti Domestic Service in Somali  
1700 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] The Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has said that the defection of the two diplomats of the Djibouti Embassy in Washington had nothing to do with politics, according to a report we received today from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

The diplomats who defected are (Ali Tahan), adviser to the ambassador, and (Abd-al-Karim Ali Amartaag), who was finance officer at the Embassy. The Ministry stated in its report that (Ali Tahan) was relieved of his post after fighting recently with the first adviser to the Djibouti representative to the United Nations. A disciplinary committee met to reach a decision recently on (Ali Tahan) [words indistinct].

(Abd-al-Karim Ali Amartaag), the finance officer, was accused of corruption, misappropriation and forgery. An inspection committee from the Ministry of Finance was expected to investigate into allegations against him.

The report said that their defection was not political at all, but they wanted to mislead international public opinion and cover up the crimes which they had committed. Their remarks on violations of human rights in Djibouti were baseless. As we know, these two diplomats defected from the embassy last week.

### Japan Grants Funds For New Television Station

EA2106093690 Djibouti Domestic Service in Somali  
1700 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpt] The general secretariat of information signed an agreement today with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency on the construction of a television station with an area of 1,000 square meters. The project, which is estimated to cost a billion Djibouti francs, will enable the Djibouti Radio and Television Service to broadcast national programs. The construction is an extension to the radio and television center and will be completed in 1992. [passage omitted]

## Ethiopia

### Official Returns From Joint Meeting in DPRK

EA2006124490 Addis Ababa Domestic Service  
in Amharic 1700 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] The fifth meeting of the Ethiopia-DPRK joint economic, technical, and scientific commission has reached an agreement that the Gilgel Gibe Project should be completed and be operational by 1991-1992. Tesfaye Mekbib will read the report filed by the ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY.

[Tesfaye] According to the statement issued by Comrade Wole Chekol, member of the Workers Party of Ethiopia Central Committee and deputy prime minister on arrival in Addis Ababa today after attending the joint commission meeting in Pyongyang, the meeting decided that the Haleb boat factory construction project should be operational by 1992-1993 after the necessary equipment has been imported from the DPRK.

He went on to say that agreement had been reached that the Omo irrigation agricultural development project should start its first phase of extensive operations and other areas with agricultural irrigation and development projects should start operating soon. It was also agreed that the irrigation project initiated in Meki and Ziway should be expanded into other areas. It has also been agreed that silk production will be started for the first time in our country.

He said that agreement had been reached to start the extraction of minerals such as gold, iron, and coal found in Welega and Ilubabor administrative areas. He further stated that there was an exchange of views on various trade sectors, and that after lengthy discussions agreement had been reached to further strengthen joint cooperation in the agricultural, water development, industrial, transportation, and technical fields. In his statement, Comrade Wole noted that the two sides had agreed that after the necessary work had been finalized, the Dembi hydroelectric power project should be operational by 8 December 1990. In addition, the water pipes factory already in production in Akaki Town, which has a great bearing on agricultural development, should reach a stage whereby it can produce huge pipes for irrigation. Agreement was reached to further expand this factory.

The meeting also discussed ways for DPRK experts to serve in our country and to cooperate in the country's economic development. After a detailed program has been drafted various experts in the agricultural sector will serve in our country along with their Ethiopian counterparts, and an agreement has been signed to this effect, said Comrade Wole.

### Border Meeting With Djibouti Begins 18 June

EA2006083090 Addis Ababa in Amharic to  
Neighboring Countries 1600 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Excerpt] The third regular meeting of Ethiopian and Djibouti border administrators started today in Dire Dawa [eastern Ethiopia]. The ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY reports that the meeting, which will continue for a week, will assess the implementation of the resolutions passed during the second regular meeting held in Djibouti and any problems arising concerning their implementation, and will initiate new ideas for dealing with these and other issues, which will enable both countries to hold talks at future meetings. [passage omitted]



### Militia Drives 'Bandits' From Gonder Area

EA1906211290 Addis Ababa in Amharic  
to Neighboring Countries 1600 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] Members of the People's Militia of Tseghede Province in northern Gonder Administrative area have completely cleared the town of (Kirans), by destroying a larger number of Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] rebels in an intensive campaign this week.

The administrative area campaign center revealed that in the militia's joint campaign with the people of Kola Wegera and Jena Mora area, they also cleared (Weguar Dilet) and (Dek Abba Dara) areas of bandits. The campaign center added that during the revolutionary campaign, the TPLF leader of the area, who had understood the TPLF's antipeople actions, surrendered to the people's militia. Various weapons and rounds of ammunition as well as valuable property were captured. The people of the area gave full support to the campaign, the campaign center added.

### Rebel Radio Comments on Victories at Shewa, Welo

EA1906222090 (Clandestine) Voice of Tigray  
Revolution in Tigrinya 1530 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] The heroic People's Army of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF], has scored various victories in an offensive aimed at repulsing the Dergue's attempt to gain complete control over northern Shewa, which caused numerous enemy casualties. Listeners, we will give you the details of these glorious victories. [musical interlude].

While the heroic People's Army of the EPRDF was carrying out its lightning attack and annihilating the three brigades of the Dergue's 102d Airborne division on 22 May, stationed at Lemi Town, on the Addis Ababa-Bahir Dar road, the Dergue was conducting a coordinated offensive campaign, by gathering its forces from all areas. The final objective of the offensive was to recapture Alem town, the capital city of Merhabete Province, which is 140km northwest of Addis Ababa. This offensive had a three-pronged attacking front. It was aimed at attacking Were Ilu town, 58 km southwest of Dese Town, then continuing to northern Shewa on the Dese-Alem Town road, and finally capturing Alem Town itself.

On this front, the Dergue deployed the special Army division known as Anbesaw [the lion], five special commando brigades, four brigades of the 8th Army Division, three brigades of the 26th Army Division and one brigade of the Forward Army Division, totalling 19 brigades. They had been controlling most of the Dese-Alem Town road from May, and had advanced to a place 20 km from Alem Town. Similarly, at around the same time, no less than six brigades were mobilized from Jihur and Lemi towns from the south, to capture Alem Town.

After holding the ground in Alem Town, the EPRDF held back the enemy force advancing to recapture Alem

Town, and started an offensive from June. It annihilated the enemy and repulsed the attack completely. In an offensive the EPRDF peoples army carried out on 3 and 4 June, it destroyed the enemy force stationed at (?Jimba) and Guguf, 30km southwest of Dese, and managed to split the major enemy force in two by crossing the road from Dese to Alem town. Immediately after cutting the Dese-Alem town road, our forces advanced to Tebassi, which is 22 km southwest of Dese, and completely destroyed the enemy force dug in there, on 7 June.

In the repeated attacks carried out by our people's army of the EPRDF in southern Welo, our combatants killed 3,825 soldiers, wounded 5,640, and captured 4,226 soldiers. In this battle our combatants put a total of 11,691 [as heard] enemy soldiers out of action.

In the battle many officers were killed, including: commander of the 10th brigade of the 3d Army Division, Major Shiferaw; the commander of the 43d Special Commando Brigade, Major Tumsa; and the commander of the 41st Special Commando Brigade.

Many officers were also captured, including the political commissar of the 8th Army Division, Captain Demise Hundesa and the head of [word indistinct] of the same army division, Captain Abebe Kiflom.

In the battle our heroic Army seized 4,751 light weapons, 179 medium weapons, 19 mortars, four Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, one 14.5mm anti-aircraft gun, two tanks, 14 vehicles, one antitank (?trailer), 79 assorted radio communications sets, four (?Betimun) antitank guns, 58 [word indistinct] weapons. One tank, three vehicles, three Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns and five radio communications sets were (?burned).

As the people's army of the EPRDF was destroying the enemy force around Dese after cutting the Dese-Alem Town road, it completely annihilated seven enemy brigades of the much-vaunted 3d Anbesaw Army Division, and six enemy brigades which had been mobilized from Lemi and Jihur towns towards Alem Town. At the same time the combatants were carrying out defensive actions in addition to the offensive.

In The Alem town defensive engagement, the heroic combatants of the EPRDF inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 4,181 enemy soldiers were killed, 4,943 soldiers wounded, and 1,523 enemy soldiers captured. In the battle, more than 1,272 light weapons, 94 medium weapons, 11 mortars and 10 radio communications sets were captured.

Meanwhile, our heroic army, after destroying the enemy force around Dese and repulsing the enemy's efforts to capture Alem Town, besieged seven enemy brigades of the 3d Army Division, which the Dergue used to boast of, around Kara Michik and Meranya. It carried out an offensive from the night of 16 June and destroyed them completely in fighting which continued all day. Although the 3d Army Division as usual tried to use all other



brigades as cannon fodder and attempted to escape, it could not escape destruction. In this battle, our heroic army killed or wounded 5,213 enemy soldiers and captured 5,943 others. Those captured include: all the commanders of the 3d Army Division, that is, the commander of the Army Division [words indistinct]; political commissar of the Army Division, Major Tariku Bekele; head of [word indistinct] of the Army Division, Major Tamene Tirfe; campaign officer of the Army Division, Major Amberbir; coordinator of the 4th Army Division, Major McLaku Kebede; and others, most of them commanders of brigades, and many more officers.

Also seized were: three tanks, two BM-21's [multiple rocket systems], three 122-mm field guns, four antitank missile seven Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, 31 mortars, two anti-aircraft guns, 105 pistols, 57 radio communication sets, 223 medium weapons, 4,615 light weapons and 32 vehicles of various types. They also burned out two BM-21's, eight tanks, six 123-mm field guns, four Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, one [words indistinct], four anti-aircraft guns and 62 vehicles of various types.

In the Dergue's actions to push the EPRDF out of northern Shewa, from May until 16 June the following casualties were inflicted on the enemy Army: 21,802 enemy soldiers were killed or wounded, 10,622 soldiers were captured. A total of 32,494 enemy soldiers were put out of action.

In addition, five tanks were seized and nine others were destroyed. Forty-six vehicles were seized and 65 others were destroyed. Five Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns were seized and seven others were burned out. Two BM-21 rockets were seized two others were burned out. Three 122-mm field guns were seized and six others were destroyed. Five guided antitank missiles, 61 mortars, 496 medium weapons, 10,638 light weapons and 146 radio communication sets were also seized. All these battles have greatly weakened the overall military capability. [sentence as heard] In the continuous battles the broad masses of Merhabete. Province stood alongside the EPRDF army and helped in collecting the wounded and transporting food supplies to the army. This participation is highly commended.

#### **TPLF Official Meles Zenawi Interviewed**

EA2705131990 (Clandestine) *Voice of the Ethiopian People for Peace, Democracy, and Freedom in Amharic* 0400 GMT 20 May 90

[Part one of four of interview with Comrade Meles Zenawi, member of the Executive Committee of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and secretary general of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), with unidentified reporter—place and date not given; recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Comrade Meles, would you explain the progress of the third round of the procedural talks on peace with the Dergue government?

[Meles] The third round of the peace talks concentrated on the items on which agreement was not reached during the second round, that is: the composition of the delegations to the substantive talks and the agenda items of the substantive talks. At the beginning of the third round both parties presented their previous positions, concerning the first item. The Dergue stated that the TPLF and the Dergue should be the only participants in the substantive talks. The TPLF stated that the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) should take part.

Concerning the second item, the Dergue stated that the agenda items should only deal with the problems in Tigray territory, and the TPLF stated that since the problem in Tigray was part of the general problem in Ethiopia, it could not be resolved in isolation. For that reason, the TPLF proposed that the agenda of the main talks should concentrate on resolving peacefully the Ethiopian problems in general and that the Tigray problem was included in that. These issues have been conflicting factors from the beginning of the peace talks. Therefore, we can say that no new proposals were made by the two parties during the first few days of the third round.

If the Dergue presented anything during the third round, it was just the same old position, which it stubbornly maintained. This position was not only stubborn, but also left no room for more negotiations. As soon as it was clear that the two parties had maintained their previous stands, it felt necessary to stop the official talks and hold unofficial ones to narrow the differences between them.

During the unofficial talks, the observers, the representatives of the Italian Government, put forward several compromise proposals. The main proposal, and the one exhaustively discussed, was the one on the composition of the delegations to the substantive talks. In that regard, the proposal made by the observer was that the two parties should basically accept that the participation of other parties in the conflict was necessary to bring peace to the country, that the substantive talks should begin between the TPLF and the Dergue, that the question of the participation of other parties in the talks should be an agenda item of the substantive talks, and that the two parties should understand that the participation of the other concerned parties would be relevant for peace to prevail.

On the face of it that proposal seems to suggest that the TPLF should withdraw the stand it adopted on these two issues in the first and second rounds, because it would have to abandon the stand it adopted from the beginning on the participation of the EPDM. Instead, that issue would be included in the agenda of the substantive talks.

The compromise proposal also demanded that the Dergue change its previous stand. The Dergue was asked basically to accept that the participation of other opposition forces was necessary to bring peace to the country, and that the participation of the other opposition groups

should be included in the agenda of the substantive talks. Therefore, we can say that the compromise proposal asked both parties moderately to change their stands.

This proposal was discussed extensively at the unofficial meeting, and the two parties were given time to consult their higher authorities. Then, the TPLF accepted the compromise proposal put forward by the Italians. However, since the Dergue continued with its stubborn stand right from the beginning, it did not accept the Italian proposal. So the unofficial discussions could bring no (?solution). Therefore, we were obliged to resume the official talks.

When the official talks began, the Dergue again came up with the old stance, while the TPLF delegation moderately changed its stance and presented a new proposal based on the Italian proposal. Since the Dergue did not accept the Italian proposal, it also rejected our new idea based on the Italian proposal.

Again, it was suggested that the differences be narrowed in another unofficial discussion. The official talks were postponed and the unofficial discussions resumed. Again the Italians came up with another proposal, that is: The two points of disagreement should be discussed during the first phase of the substantive talks and be resolved, and the substantive talks should immediately begin between the TPLF and the Dergue. That proposal indicated that the TPLF should be represented alone in the first phase of the substantive talks, and it did not ask the Dergue to accept the basic idea of allowing other opposition groups to participate in the talks in principle. What the proposal demanded from the Dergue was that it should accept that the substantive talks begin [words indistinct].

It should accept discussion in the first phase of the substantive talks of the issues unresolved in the procedural talks. It also asked the Dergue to accept that, if the items were agreed upon in the first phase of the substantive talks, discussions should be held on how to achieve peace.

On the question how to achieve peace, the TPLF [word indistinct], and since it was ready to accommodate various alternative proposals, it accepted this compromise proposal. However, the Dergue again refused to change its earlier proposal in this regard. Therefore, since the Dergue refused to accept the compromise proposals in the second unofficial discussions, the discussions broke down. Then it became clear that the success of the peace talks was being hampered by the stubborn stand of the Dergue.

After that, the official discussions resumed, and the Italians did some strange things which they had not done before. They stated that the Dergue had come up with a new compromise solution and presented a proposal which was not much different from the Dergue's first proposal. They presented these proposals verbally and in writing.

The new proposal stated that the substantive talks would be held between the TPLF and the Dergue, and completely rejected the participation of the EPDM. Concerning the agenda for the substantive talks, they changed the first proposal they had presented as a solution to the problem in Tigray to a new proposal: as solving the problem at hand [preceding four words in English]. The term—the problem at hand—although it is one step for war in the sense that it does not necessarily concentrate on problems in Tigray territory alone, creates a conflict when we consider what the problem at hand is. The Italians said that this proposal was made by the Dergue, while the Dergue stated that the proposal was presented by the observers as a compromise proposal. The two argued for a while on whose proposal it was. Finally, the Italians said it was their compromise proposal, thereby denying their first statement.

This reveals that either the Italians presented their own proposal as that of the Dergue's or they presented the Dergue's proposal as their own. This indicates that there was an agreement between the Dergue and the Italian Government, which was not known to us. This was irregular. The Italians have done a number of things in their role as observers. Going back to the problem at hand, however, besides asking for the clarification of the term—the problem at hand—our delegation also requested that the proposal on EPDM participation be improved. Since we could not get a positive response to our questions, we stated that we could not accept the proposals put forward. At that juncture, the Dergue delegation started running here and there to (?disrupt) the meeting and stop the peace talks in general.

Our delegation, in its desire not to stop the talks, assessed the situation and presented two alternative proposals. The first alternative was that the substantive talks should begin between the Dergue and the TPLF within two months' time, that the items not agreed on during the procedural talks should be discussed in the first phase of the substantive talks, and they should be resolved then. This was based on the first Italian compromise proposal. If the Dergue did not accept this, the fourth round of the procedural talks should be convened in not more than two months' time. The Dergue rejected both alternative proposals. Instead, the Dergue stated that the two parties had agreed on procedural matters and they could convene the substantive talks. Then it proposed that the substantive talks should be convened. There was an attempt in this statement to indicate that the TPLF had agreed to participate in the talks alone. It was not clear whether the agenda of the peace talks included the general problems of the country or only Tigray regional problems.

The Dergue proposal indicated that if the TPLF accepted these proposals the talks would continue. Our delegation stated that the proposal was tantamount to suggesting the breakdown of the peace talks, and as such, we did not accept the proposals. For this reason, the two delegations could not agree on the agenda items and the continuation of the talks. Thus, a situation arose in

which the peace talks had to be stopped. That was, in short, what the third round of talks was like.

[Reporter] The Dergue government claims that the TPLF participated in the peace talks for propaganda purposes. How true is this?

[Meles] To answer that question, I think it is necessary to examine in depth the proposals made by the two parties in general, and the TPLF in particular. One of the proposals put forward by the TPLF during the first round of the procedural talks was that in order to help the drought-affected people, aid agencies should distribute their food donations through safe passages [preceding two words in English], in areas controlled by the two parties.

At that time, the Dergue rejected the proposal, saying it was unworkable and presented for propaganda purposes. However, after four or five months, when the Dergue had been pressured by internal and international influences, it had to accept the proposal which it had described as unworkable and designed for propaganda purposes.

As soon as the Dergue accepted the proposal, the TPLF took concrete measures to ensure the safe passage of food aid, and therefore the proposal has now been more or less implemented. This shows clearly that the TPLF implements workable and constructive proposals, as long as they are accepted by the Dergue. The same is true of the main issues of conflict in the peace talks. Peace talks held when TPLF proposals have been rejected cannot be fruitful.

That is why we repeatedly demanded that the Dergue should improve its stand. For instance, if we take the participation of the EPDM, the TPLF cannot undertake any useful discussion in the absence of the EPDM. As is known, the two parties are taking part in the war jointly. [passage omitted]

If the talks concentrate only on the problems in Tigray Region, the issue of seeking a peaceful political solution to national problems and changes cannot be raised. The question of bringing democracy to the whole country and resolving the national problem, including that of Tigray, in a democratic and peaceful way cannot be raised in the peace talks. [passage omitted]

Perhaps it may be construed that our recording of the proceedings of the peace talks on tape and broadcasting them to our listeners shows that we have propagandistic aims. But the TPLF did this not for propaganda purposes. It was done to inform the masses who are in the forefront of the struggle. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] We say that the Dergue government walked out of the third round of the procedural talks. Comrade Meles, what do we mean by this in reality? Why did the Dergue government walk out of this meeting?

[Meles] As I stated earlier, the Dergue refused to accept the two alternative proposals put forward by the TPLF. [passage omitted]

They rejected all these. They stubbornly stated that we had to accept their proposals. That is how the walk-out was manifested. Therefore, when we say the Dergue walked out of the peace talks, or that it stopped the talks, we mean that, as I stated earlier, the Dergue rejected all the alternatives which could have enabled the continuation of the peace talks. Thus, it has brought the discussions to a standstill.

The main reason the Dergue impeded the peace talks was that if we proceed to the substantive talks, its antipeace stand would be exposed, not only to the Ethiopian people, but also to the international community, and this will leave it naked. It will lose, both diplomatically and politically. In the current world situation in general, the crisis created by dictatorial regimes has brought about the formation of provisional transitional governments, whereby the people find solutions to their problems through democratic means. This is a widely accepted current international phenomenon, which is being implemented in many countries. [passage omitted]

In addition, the Dergue made some so-called reforms hoping to gain the support of the people and the western world, and as a result, they said they would destroy the EPRDF in a short time. That was their dream. I think this false hope is one of the reasons which encouraged the Dergue to walk out of the peace talks.

[Reporter] Comrade Meles, does this mean there will be no peace talks with the Dergue government in the future?

[Meles] It is the Dergue which walked out of the peace talks. We, for our part, will do our best to achieve peace through peaceful means. Therefore, the continuation or termination of the peace talks should be decided by the Dergue. Since we are ever ready to resume the peace talks, if the Dergue wants to hold successful peace talks they can resume any time.

If, on the other hand, the Dergue wants to resolve the issue on the battlefield, maintaining its warlike stand, the war will continue for some time. However, political observers predict that if the Dergue continues with its warlike stand, its life will be very short.

## Second Part

EA2705220690 (Clandestine) Voice of the Ethiopian People for Peace, Democracy, and Freedom in Amharic 0400 GMT 21 May 90

[Part two of interview]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Comrade Meles, it should be recalled that the EPRDF has now issued a peaceful and democratic transitional program. Why was it necessary to issue such a program now, and what is the basic content and objective of the program?



[Meles] As is known, currently there are armed and unarmed political forces in our country. All claim to have stood for the benefits and rights of the people, and for democracy. They all claim that there was a need for an armed struggle, for there was no democracy in the country. These forces have their own objective of creating a rift among the various forces. It is clear that in a society where there are different political organizations which claim to stand for the people, it is very difficult to sort out the differences between the organizations through dialogue. If I may cite an example: The former crown prince, today's King Ameha Selassie, will always stand for the monarchy. Hence, the difference between King Ameha and those opposed to monarchical rule cannot be resolved through consultations and dialogue. The issue here is: What is the best way to resolve the differences, not through force, but in a democratic way? The EPRDF peaceful and democratic transitional program has provided satisfactory answers for this basic issue. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] How does the EPRDF transitional program view the Eritrean issue?

[Meles] One of the major reasons for the continuation of the ugly wars in Ethiopia is the problem of Eritrea. It is hard to conceive of a stable, peaceful, and democratic transition in Ethiopia without a peaceful and democratic solution to the Eritrean issue. That is why one of the points of the EPRDF transitional program focuses on a peaceful and democratic solution to the Eritrean problem.

The EPRDF had fundamental reasons for pointing to this issue. Primarily, the Eritrean issue should not be resolved in a confused manner when there are other issues to be discussed, but it should be resolved at a time when there is a stable and favorable situation conducive for a democratic and legal approach. To achieve this, the Eritrean issue should be examined after the transitional forum has been finalized and a popularly-elected government established. Then it can be viewed in a legal and democratic manner.

The second point to be considered is that the Eritrean issue or problem can be peacefully resolved when the people are given all the options and a referendum is held in a democratic manner, supervised by international observers. Then the people can decide which option to take, and only when this has been done can the problem be resolved peacefully. [passage omitted]

That is one of the reasons why we say that our program is the only alternative for bringing about peaceful and democratic solutions for our country.

### Third Part

EA2905095990 (Clandestine) Voice of the Ethiopian People for Peace, Democracy, and Freedom in Amharic  
0400 GMT 22 May 90

[Part three of interview]

[Excerpt] [Reporter] Comrade Meles, how far has the EPRDF moved to implement the transitional program it has issued? And what are the results achieved so far?

[Meles] The EPRDF's peaceful and democratic transitional program was issued few months ago. However, the basic ideas contained in the program had been (?considered) earlier by the EPRDF and the founding organizations of the EPRDF. Therefore, the struggle being waged to implement the ideas contained in the program can be said to have been carried out even before the issuance of the transitional program itself.

Even after the program was issued, the EPRDF continued to carry out a great struggle on this matter. The armed struggle being waged by the EPRDF, which is dealt with in the transitional program, is not only aimed at overthrowing the Dergue, but is also to make the necessary advance preparations so that disturbances will not be created.

The main basis for the peaceful and democratic transition is the support and acceptance of the people. Therefore, great efforts have been made to familiarize people with the EPRDF's transitional program, and similar efforts will continue in the future.

In addition, letters have been sent to the various Ethiopian political organizations, be it those which exist in the country or in exile, requesting them to meet and conduct discussions on the issue, and hence we are awaiting a reply. Talks have already started with some organizations on the issue. Discussions have also been conducted with many governments which could make a positive contribution to our country's problem.

It is known that it is the position to be taken by the people that will determine whether the transitional program is implemented or not. This being the case, the EPRDF peaceful and democratic transitional program has received the people's support, which is widening from day to day. This is a very encouraging result.

The tasks undertaken to explain the transitional program to foreign governments have brought about satisfactory results. We have not come across any government which opposes the program. There have been only compliments—that it is constructive and appropriate. As regards the organized Ethiopian political forces, although something will come of the contacts and discussions to be made in the future, there is some truth which can be drawn already from the activities of people who are in contact with the various organizations.

When the Dergue walked out of the peace talks which had been going on with the TPLF in Rome, it is clear that it demonstrated in deed that it will not accept the option of a peaceful and democratic transition. It can therefore be said that the Dergue expressed its position that it would not accept the EPRDF's transitional program. The rightists, that is, the remnants of the former ruling class and defectors, bureaucrats of the Dergue, and

others, and the many (?petty) organizations which represent those who are mostly living in exile, have started to issue statements which show that they have not accepted the idea in principle.

As I explained earlier, the cornerstone of the EPRDF's transitional program is one which says that the people themselves should choose what they want through democratic means, with every political option and without any pressure. The rightists have stated in various ways that they do not accept this concept at all. Some say that since the Ethiopian people are illiterate and do not know democracy, organizations should hold discussions and decide on one objective—that is, an objective to be presented by the rightist forces, and it should not be left for the people to decide. Others, who are afraid openly to put forward their anti-democratic and anti-people ideas, are requesting the forces which could participate in the transition to satisfy various pre-conditions, that is, that organizations should change their aims fully or partially. This shows that they do not accept the basic principle which says that any political organization should not put any pressure on its members.

As regards the Eritrean situation, likewise the idea of peacefully resolving the issue through a referendum, giving all the options to the people to decide democratically what they want, is not accepted by the rightists. They are concretely promoting the idea that, whether the Eritrean people like it or not, they should continue as part and parcel of Ethiopia, that no referendum should be implemented, and this is presented as a concrete position, meaning that the current war would continue and become more intense.

Wavering forces, in particular the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party [EPRP] and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement [AESM], are manifesting a wavering character somewhere between the EPRDF position and that of the rightist forces, and a situation has arisen which shows that they are leaning toward the rightists and that they are becoming the same in deed. On the one hand they try to make out that they accept the basic idea which says that all options should be presented in a democratic way to the people for their decision. Yet on the other hand, there are situations when they support the anti-democratic and anti-people attitude of the rightists.

For example, they say they oppose Mengistu. However, they say that they support the Dergue army and troops, which are implementing the Dergue's policy of war. This was the position taken by the rightists in the Washington demonstration, in which the representatives of the EPRP and the AESM participated, expressing their wish that the country's problems be resolved through the war being waged by the Dergue army. This indicates their anti-democratic and anti-people attitude.

In addition, the EPRP is advocating a position which says that during the transition period, the troops of the different political organizations should be dissolved. As

I tried to explain earlier, this position will not enable the basic issue—what kind of national army should be formed in our country—to be decided freely by the people and implemented by the government elected by the people. Therefore, this is in opposition to the decisive role of the people and will hinder the launching of the transitional forum and create disturbances among organizations during the process of the establishment of the national army.

As regards the implementation of the nationality question, the transitional government should accept that contradictions among nationalities should be resolved democratically by the decision of the people, and the right to self-determination be preserved. Otherwise, the right of opposing nationalities to self-determination will be denied, making the transition in general undemocratic, meaning the neglect of those waging an armed struggle for their national rights and hampering them from participating in the peaceful transition.

These are the issues considered by the EPRDF but opposed by the EPRP. Opposing the right of self-determination for nationalities means hampering the implementation of a peaceful and democratic transition in Ethiopia and opposing the basic principle on the decisive role of the people. In addition, it means promoting the anti-democratic attitude of the rightists.

This position is an additional manifestation of how the EPRP is becoming stagnant at this time and adopting a position which is no different from that of the rightist forces. As regards the issue of resolving the Eritrean problem, the AESM and the EPRP have an official position which says that the Eritrean people should determine their own destiny by a referendum, through peaceful and democratic means. However, these wavering forces are in practice working hand in glove with the rightist forces, and they participated in the Washington demonstration which openly opposed what they promote officially. These and other similar acts show that their position on the Eritrean issue is not firm.

In general, the remnants of the AESM and the EPRP have the character of floating in the middle and wavering, and at this particular time it has become evident that one can see them alongside the rightist forces, and hence it is difficult to see them in isolation. This being the case, the statements they have issued so far show their attitude toward the EPRDF's transitional program to be no different than that of the remnants of the former ruling class and the defectors and Dergue bureaucrats.

As I explained earlier, the issue is one which will be discussed in future with different organizations. The opinions put forward by the rightists and the remnants of the AESM and the EPRP show that the chances of reaching an agreement are slight. However, our readiness to hold discussions on the issue with all organizations will continue as before. During the discussions to be conducted with the organizations and groups which are

said to exert great pressure on the political forum of our country, we believe and we hope that we shall reach an agreement on the issue. [passage omitted]

### Final Part

EA2905155590 (Clandestine) Voice of the Ethiopian People for Peace, Democracy, and Freedom in Amharic 0400 GMT 24 May 90

[Final part of interview]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] The Oromo People's Democratic Organization [OPDO] was formed recently. It has stated in its program that it accepts the EPRDF program and has expressed its wish to join the EPRDF. What is our attitude toward this?

[Meles] In the past 16 years, many national movements have been created in Ethiopia. Of the main nationalities in Ethiopia, one can say there are none which have not waged an armed national struggle in one way or another. This fact should not be regarded as an accident or as the action of a few individuals. What the establishment of such broad-based movements shows is that there are objective conditions in our country leading to the creation of [word indistinct] the movements. This has happened because the ruling government has not eliminated the national oppression and favoritism which were inherited from the Haile Selassie government. The creation of national movements will stop when national oppression is totally eliminated. Unless national oppression is totally eliminated, whether we like it or not, national movements will inevitably be created to challenge it.

When one says that in situations of national oppression it is not possible to stop the creation of national movements, it does not mean that all the national movements have the same political character. Some appear to be mostly destructive, while others play a constructive and revolutionary democratic role. When there are objective conditions which make the creation of national movements inevitable and it becomes impossible to prevent them, the only option for the revolutionary democratic forces is to support those which can perform a constructive role, so that they can be strengthened and promoted. That is one of the basic yardsticks the EPRDF uses in assessing the newly-established national Oromo organization, that is, the OPDO.

As is known, there are many organizations now which claim to stand for the rights of the Oromo people. It is clear that a situation has been created in eastern and western Ethiopia for these organizations to exist. Among the existing Oromo organizations, only the OPDO has said that it stands for the democratic unity of the Ethiopian people and democracy. The struggle which originates in the ugly national oppression of the Oromo people will on the one hand bring about the total elimination of oppression, and on the other, strengthen brotherhood and unity among the oppressed people.

Therefore, it is believed that the creation and strengthening of this organization will play a great role in creating democratic unity among the oppressed Ethiopian people and will eliminate the national oppression of the Oromo people.

It is also believed that it will play a great role in eliminating the danger which may arise due to narrow nationalism and chauvinism, and it will promote and strengthen the democratic option in Ethiopia. Therefore, we will give it our unreserved support.

Apart from the role it will play in eliminating the ugly oppression of the Oromo people, as a member of the EPRDF organization, we believe that it will perform an unparalleled positive role in the creation of unity among the Ethiopian people on the basis of equality and will help to eliminate destructive trends. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] How far has the EPRDF gone to eliminate the threat of drought looming over our people?

[Meles] For our part, we have made unstinting efforts to transport relief aid in any way possible. Although the Dergue's persistent air raids have created great problems, we have managed to transport many thousands of quintals of food aid from the Sudan by night, and this has been distributed to the drought victims. Grain has also been brought from areas where there was a better harvest, and it has been distributed to the victims. This was the only source of aid up until the middle of March, and is still serving as the main source of aid. [passage omitted]

The efforts being made to deliver relief aid to the people by various means can be said in general to have produced very satisfactory results. It is known that since this year's drought is the equal in scale to that of 1977 [Ethiopian calendar for 1984-1985], the international donor organizations have estimated that very many people will die, as usual. Since the donation received this year has been very much lower than that of 1977 [Ethiopian calendar], there was a fear that very many people would die. However, since we have managed to distribute the available aid swiftly and fairly, we have reached a stage at which one can say that no one has died from the drought. The so-called shelter camps, death camps where the peasants were kept after being displaced from their homes and exposed to famine and communicable diseases, have been completely eliminated. It was possible to deliver the aid to the peasants without displacing them.

It is true that very little aid has been received, and it has not been possible to avoid famine. However, a situation which would have resulted in the deaths of many people was avoided. If enough aid had been delivered in time, and the Dergue had not deliberately disrupted the relief efforts, it would have been possible to save the lives of the people, because the Dergue has been driven from the areas. If the Dergue had been in those areas, the so-called shelter camps, which are death camps, would have been set up, the food aid used to feed the army, and the



remainder sold to the [word indistinct] of the Dergue. Hence, undoubtedly the people would have been exposed to a holocaust.

Since we managed to avoid that, we can say that this year's relief aid distribution effort was very successful. In future, too, we will make the utmost effort to prevent not only deaths, but also famine. [passage omitted]

#### \* Finnish-Aided Electricity Project Completed

34000670 Addis Ababa THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD  
in English 16 May 90 pp 1, 5

[Text] Agaro-Bedele (ENA)—The Agaro-Bedele electric light and power transmission lines and substations construction project costing 17 million birr became operational here on Monday.

The project financed by the Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) was inaugurated by Comrade Tekezeshewa Aytenfisu, member of the CC [Central Committee] of the WPE [Workers Party of Ethiopia] and Minister of Mines and Energy.

The Agaro-Bedele transmission system construction project is the third and final phase of the 132 kv transmission lines and substations project of about 300 kilometers starting from Alaba ending in Bedele, which cost altogether nearly 77 million birr, of which 53 million birr was covered by FINNIDA.

Comrade Tamene Wolde-Yohannes, Acting Manager of the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA), states at the ceremony that electricity plays a leading role in the social and economic development of a country. That is why, he said, the Ethiopian government is supporting EELPA by providing appropriate budget and by obtaining cooperation agreements from friendly countries for its electrification campaign programme in the country.

Mr Kalevi Myllylouma, director of FINNIDA, on his part stated that energy and electricity have traditionally been one of the strong sectors in the Finnish development aid. It is a sector where Finland has know-how and experience, he said.

He further stated that FINNIDA has supported other energy projects in Ethiopia by providing over 1,000 transformers and also concessional credit for the construction of a transmission line between Soddo and Arba Minch.

The inauguration of the Agaro-Bedele project witnesses the mutual cooperation between the two countries, he said, adding that the project had not only achieved material results but also permanent contacts for future cooperation.

Besides supplying power to Bedele town, the Agaro-Bedele project is expected to supply electric power to Bedele Brewery almost near completion.

The FINNIDA funded project, the construction of which was started in 1985 by the IVO International Ltd. of Finland, took three phases, of which phase 1 includes the 112 kilometer long, 132 kv transmission line from Alaba through Hosana to Gilgel Gibe.

The second phase was extended from the Gilgel Gibe through Jimma to Agaro which is 106 kilometers long, and the third, 80 kilometers stretch, which is a further extension to the town of Bedele by which the Bedele town is connected to the interconnected system.

The transmission line technology was described as "guyed wooden pole towers" instead of "imported steel towers".

Present during the inauguration ceremony were Comrade Tadeos Harege-Work, Minister of Industry, Mr Erik Brehmer, Charge d'Affairs of the Finnish Embassy in Ethiopia, party and government officials of the Illubabor Administrative Region and other invited guests.

#### \* Decrees Implement New Economic Policy

##### \* Special Decree on Investment

34000669A Addis Ababa THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD  
in English 10 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Text] It is to be recalled that the Council of State Sunday issued a special decree on investment to translate into deeds the new economic policy of the country.

The special decree explains how investment schemes can be conducted successfully, the areas of participation or investors, the benefit that accrue from investment ventures as well as the contributions they are expected to make to the development of the economy, according to the statement by the Council of State released in connection with the decree.

The decree further provides specific details about investment fields that are open to private investors taking into account the country's present stage of development.

#### Council of State Special Decree No. 17/1990 Council of State Special Decree on Investment "Ethiopia First"

Whereas it is believed, after due consideration of the stage of development of the country and the overall world situation, that the adoption of the mixed economy policy to guide the country's economic development direction can help raise the economic development of the country and the living standard of the people;

Whereas it is believed that investments by participants in mixed economy, namely, government organizations, cooperatives, mass and private organizations, Ethiopian entrepreneurs and foreign investors, can immensely contribute to the country's economic development by making available better and wider supply of goods and services and that the operation of investment activities by these sectors on the basis of expeditions conditions



can greatly increase investment generally and promote the country's economic development;

Whereas it is necessary to issue a comprehensive law defining the areas of investment open to investors, the benefits to which they are entitled, the contributions they are expected to make to economic development and the introduction of an efficient investment administration;

Now therefore, in accordance with Article 83(1) of the Constitution, it is hereby decreed as follows:

#### Chapter One - General

##### 1. Short Title

This Special Decree may be cited as the "Council of State Special Decree on Investment No 17/1990".

##### 2. Definitions

In this Special Decree, unless the context requires otherwise:

1. "capital" means money spent on fixed production or service rendering machinery and equipment, building and such other fixed assets as well as the necessary initial working capital;

2. "expansion" means an increase in the volume of production of existing products or services or addition of related new products or services by improving production or service rendering capacity; and "major expansion" means an increase by 50 percent or more of production or service rendering capacity;

3. "foreign investor" means any physical person of foreign nationality or any juridical person registered outside Ethiopia who has invested in Ethiopia in convertible currency or in kind or in a combination of the two, and may include any Ethiopian national residing abroad;

4. "land" means rural land other than peasant holdings on which an investor can carry on agricultural activities and includes waters used for raising fish and others, improvements previously made on the land and permanent works;

5. "peasant holding" means rural land held by producers' cooperatives or individual peasants and includes land used in common by peasants as determined by the Government;

6. "person" means any physical or juridical person.

#### Chapter Two - Objectives of Investment, Investors, and Areas Open for Investment

##### 3. Objectives of Investment

Investment shall have the following objectives:

1. contributions to the economic and social development of the country;

2. conservation and utilization of the natural resources of the country;

3. introduction of science and technology and know-how;

4. raising the quality and volume of products and services;

5. creation of employment opportunities to Ethiopians;

6. generation and saving of foreign exchange;

7. promotion of a balanced inter-regional development.

##### 4. Investors

The following local or foreign investors are entitled to invest, in accordance with Article 5 of this Special Decree, without any limitation on capital ceiling:

1. government organizations;

2. cooperatives;

3. mass organizations;

4. individual entrepreneurs;

5. business organizations specified in Article 212 of the Commercial Code, namely,

a) ordinary partnerships;

b) joint ventures;

c) general partnerships;

d) limited partnerships;

e) share companies; and

f) private limited companies.

##### 5. Areas Open for Investment

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-articles 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, any investor may carry on the activities specified in the Commercial Code.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Joint Venture Proclamation No 32/1989, no private investment shall be permitted in the following areas:

a) defence industry;

b) postal and telecommunication services;

c) air, rail and large-scale shipping transport;

d) radio and television broadcasting services.

3. Investment in the provision of electric light and power, processing of tobacco, banking and insurance, and the supply of potable water activities shall require the prior authorization of the Council of Ministers.

4. The conditions governing foreign investment shall be determined in regulations to be issued by the Council of Ministers.

#### 6. Agricultural Activities Open for Investment

1. The following agricultural activities are open for investment by any investor:

- a) agricultural development;
- b) agro-industry, and
- c) agricultural services.

2. Any investor may invest in one or more of the activities specified in the preceding sub-article.

3. The fact that an investor is engaged in another investment area shall not bar him from investing in the agricultural activities specified in sub-article 1 of this Article.

#### 7. Land Lease Contract

1. The Government may lease land to an investor for agricultural activities under a contract of lease made for a limited period.

2. The rent to be paid by an investor on land leased to him shall be determined by regulations issued by the Council of Ministers.

#### 8. Size of Land and Term of Contract of Lease

1. The minimum size of land to be leased to an investor shall be determined by regulations issued by the Council of Ministers having regard to the nature of the agricultural activities which the investor carries on.

2. The term of the contract of lease concluded between the investor and the appropriate authority shall be determined by regulations issued by the Council of Ministers having regard to the nature of the agricultural activities which the investor carries on.

### Chapter Three - Incentives to Investment

#### 9. Investors Qualified for Incentives

Any investor other than those specified in Article 212(1) (a) and (b) of the Commercial Code, who invests in agriculture, industry, construction and hotel services shall be entitled, subject to the conditions specified in each article, to the incentives provided for in Articles 10 to 13 of this Chapter.

#### 10. Exemption from Customs Duties

1. The first round of the following items imported by an investor into the country to commence a new investment activity shall be exempted from the payment of customs duties, government and municipal taxes levied on imported goods.

a) with respect to agriculture: agricultural machinery with their necessary appliances and parts and the first round of spare parts thereof imported directly by the producer which are necessary for the clearing or final seed bed preparation of land to the harvesting of crops or for separating or sorting out of produce or for raising animals or for separating, preparing or sorting out of animal products as well as for fisheries development;

b) with respect to industry: forklifts, machinery and equipment and their appliances necessary for the production of products and the first round of spare parts of same as well as machinery directly used for the construction of industrial buildings;

c) with respect to construction: machinery and vehicles fitted with equipment for the lifting or pulling of materials and similar equipment, special machinery, equipment and their appliance necessary for preparing construction sites as well as the first round of spare parts thereof imported for construction use by investors engaged in construction activities;

d) with respect to hotel services: building machinery, household articles for use in bars, kitchenware, laundry machines, cooking utensils, table ware, articles for receptions and bedrooms, domestic fire extinguishers and intercoms.

2. The exemptions from customs duties and taxes provided for in sub-article 1 of this Article shall apply where it is ascertained by the appropriate authority that an investor has undertaken a major expansion.

3. Any material exempted from customs duties and taxes pursuant to this Special Decree:

a) shall not be sold or otherwise transferred without the prior approval of the Minister of Finance except where the proper customs duty and tax is paid in respect of it or it is sold or transferred to a person enjoying similar exemption privileges;

b) shall not unless otherwise provided for by another law, be exempt from customs duties and taxes where a material which is similar in price and quality is locally available.

#### 11. Exemption from Income Tax

1. Any investment made in agricultural activities shall be exempt from the payment of income tax as of the commencement of operation:

a) for up to two years where the capital invested is over Birr 300,000 but not exceeding Birr 750,000;

b) for up to three years where the capital invested is over Birr 750,000 but not exceeding Birr 2,000,000;

c) for up to five years where the capital invested is over Birr 2,000,000.

2. Any investment made in industrial activity shall be exempted from income tax as of the commencement of operations:

a) for up to two years where the capital invested is over Birr 500,000 but not exceeding Birr 1,000,000;

b) for up to three years where the capital invested is over Birr 1,000,000 but not exceeding Birr 5,000,000;

c) for up to five years where the capital invested is over Birr 5,000,000.

3. Where it is ascertained that major expansion has been undertaken in respect of the capital ranges referred to in sub-articles 1 and 2 of this Article, income derived from such expansion shall be exempted from the payment of income tax: for up to one year in the case of the capital ranges specified under sub-article 1(a) or 2(a); for up to two years in the case of the capital range specified under sub-article 1(b) or 2(b); for up to three years in the case of the capital range specified under sub-article 1(c) or 2(c).

#### 12. Incentive for Investment in Preferred Areas

1. Any investment in agricultural or industrial activities in areas designated as preferred by the Council of Ministers within the capital ranges provided for in Article 11 hereof shall be exempted from the payment of income tax for one additional year after the period of exemption to which it is otherwise entitled expires.

2. Any hotel service established in areas designated as preferred by the Council of Ministers and which satisfies the standard criteria set by the Hotels and Tourism Commission shall be exempted from the payment of income tax for two years as of the commencement of operations.

3. Any investment in areas designated as preferred by the Council of Ministers made in agricultural and industrial activities shall be exempted for two years from the payment of income tax where:

a) in the case of agricultural activities, the capital invested does not exceed Birr 300,000;

b) in the case of industrial activities, the capital invested is over Birr 50,000 but not exceeding Birr 500,000.

#### 13. Remittance of Funds

1. Foreign investors may remit out of Ethiopia incomes derived from the following in freely convertible currency:

a) any profit from investment;

b) proceeds from the liquidation of an investment enterprise, and payments from the sale or transfer of any right on investment.

2. Any investor may remit out of Ethiopia in freely convertible currency payments in respect of debt servicing and fees or royalties in respect of any technology transfer agreement relating to its investment activity.

#### Chapter Four - Administration of Investment

##### 14. Establishment of the Investment Committee

1. The Investment Committee (hereinafter the "Committee"), which shall be accountable to the Council of Ministers, is hereby established.

2. The Committee shall have the following members:

a) The Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Finance Services ..... Chairman

b) The Minister of Finance ..... member

c) The Minister of Domestic Trade ..... "

d) The Minister of Foreign Trade ..... "

e) The Minister and Head of the Central Planning Office ..... "

f) The Governor of the national Bank .... "

g) The Secretary General of the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce ..... "

h) The head of the office concerned with the matter under consideration ..... "

i) The Secretary of the Committee ..... member & secretary

3. The Committee shall have a permanent office with the necessary staff.

##### 15. Duties of the Committee

The Committee shall have the following duties:

1. decide on applications for incentives submitted through the appropriate office;

2. in cooperation with the concerned offices, study and submit with its recommendation, proposals relating to investment policy and approaches and such other related activities.

##### 16. Meetings of the Committee

1. The Committee shall meet as often as its business requires.

2. The presence of more than half of the members of the Committee shall constitute a quorum.

3. A decision shall be valid if made by a majority vote of those present.

4. The Committee may issue its own rules of procedure.

##### 17. Duties of the Office of the Committee

The Office of the Committee shall have the following duties:

1. receive applications for incentives; submit same to the Committee; and forward the decisions of the Committee to those concerned; and

2. in cooperation with those concerned, collect and compile information on investment incentives and activities open to investment.

#### 18. Issuance of Licenses and Cooperation

1. Any government office vested by law with the power to issue licence, shall give the appropriate decision to the investor within 45 days of receipt of an application for investment.

2. Every government office shall cooperate in the provision to investors of services necessary to undertake their investment activities.

### Chapter Five - Miscellaneous Provisions

#### 19. Carrying on Different Investment Activities

1. Any investor may engage in more than one investment activities.

2. Any investment may have branches.

3. Every investor shall have to obtain the appropriate licence for every investment activity he carries on under this Special Decree.

#### 20. Transfer of Rights on an Investment Enterprise

Any investor may, in accordance with the relevant law, sell, exchange, mortgage, hire, or transfer by donation or succession, his right on any investment enterprise.

#### 21. Investment in the Mining Sector

The conditions governing investment and incentives in the mining sector shall be determined in the relevant mining law.

#### 22. Repealed Laws

The following laws are hereby repealed:

1. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the government Ownership and Control of the Means of Production Proclamation No 26/1975;

2. the Proclamation Relating to Commercial Activities Undertaken by the Private Sector No 76/1975;

3. the Small-Scale Industries Development Proclamation No 30/1989;

4. the Hotel Services Development Proclamation No 31/1989;

5. sub-article 1 of Article 20 of the Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses Proclamation No 47/1975.

#### 23. Inapplicable Laws

The following laws shall not apply with respect to matters provided for in this Special Decree;

1. a) Articles 4, 7 and 16 of the Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation No 31/1975;

b) Article 11 of the Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses Proclamation No 47/1975.

2. Any other law which is inconsistent with this Special Decree.

#### 24. Effective Date

This Special Decree shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Negarit Gazette.

Done at Addis Ababa the 6th of May, 1990.

Mengistu Haile-Mariam President of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

### \* Sales Taxes Codified

34000669B Addis Ababa THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD in English 10 May 90 p 1

[Text] (ENA)—A Sales Tax Special Decree, which brings together over 45 similar tax laws has been issued according to an announcement of the Ministry of Finance.

The Council of State Special Decree number 16/1982 has helped not only to bring the laws together, but also to clarify certain provisions which were considered ambiguous, according to the announcement.

It was stressed by the ministry that the decree lays down a taxation system that is broad and clear and which takes into account the experience of other countries.

The decree creates uniformity, does away with duplication, and make convenient both to the payer and the collector the announcement said. Adding that the charges had been assessed based on the ability to pay and therefore had introduced a greater element in justice in the taxation system.

The Sales Taxes considered in the decree include those levied on the imports, commodities produced at home, and on service within the country.

### \* Business Income Tax Reduced

34000669C Addis Ababa THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD in English 12 May 90 pp 1,3

[Text] (ENA)—The Ministry of Finance yesterday announced that the Income Tax Special Decree No 18/1990 has been issued by the Council of State to amend the Income Tax Proclamation No 153 of 1961 there by reducing the tax rate on business profit.



The statement said that this measure would allow businessmen to increase their working capital, create more job opportunities for citizens and as a result, reduce unemployment.

The advantages of the reduced tax rate would initiate private capitalists to invest their capital in areas of economic development especially in the areas of hotel services and in the development of small-scale industries, the Ministry of Finance said.

The Ministry stated that the amendment to the income tax law in force, which is intended to attract foreign capital, includes as far as business tax is concerned an exemption of the annual income of Birr 300 from the tax, the reduction of the 89 percent maximum business income tax rate to 59 percent under the Special Decree, and also the lowering of 25 percent income tax payable on dividends to shareholders to 10 percent with a change in the new decree from specific to percentage tax rate aimed at making the tax equitable.

It noted that this measure clearly shows the governments intention to strengthen the private economy, its desire to motivate competition and productivity, and, moreover, its interest in the participation of private capital, along with cooperative ownership, in all sectors of the economy without any capital limitation. In general, this special decree, by reducing the rate on business and dividend tax, intends to encourage investors to benefit themselves, fellow citizens and by large the country, the announcement said.

Although the reduction of the tax rate is likely to bring about the decline in government revenue for sometime, the announcement said, it has become necessary to reduce the rate of business and dividend tax in order to give incentive for investment, to create new employment opportunities and to activate the economy by broadening the tax base.

#### \* Trade Licensing Liberalized

34000669D Addis Ababa THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD  
in English 10 May 90 p 1

[Text] (ENA)—The Ministry of Domestic Trade yesterday announced that improvements have been introduced on the issuance of trade licenses that is free of trade restrictions.

Noting that this was in accordance with the new economic policy, the Ministry said that the full and partial ban on the licencing of certain trade sectors had been lifted in line with the Special Decree issued by the Council of State on investment.

It revealed that any Ethiopian can obtain trade licenses to engage in any trade activity in line with the necessary criteria.

The statement also said that the committees earlier set up at local levels to look into trade licence demands had

been dissolved and that the trade licenses are transferable from place to place or could be given to either persons with permanent employment or to societies.

The statement went on to say that according to the new policy it is possible to sell, inherit and transfer to other the licenses.

It was stated that in line with the improved issuance of trade licenses any individual above the age of 18 and whose field of activity required special vocational competence is obliged to present his qualification paper to be allowed to operate a business. Moreover, any Ethiopian can own more than one trade licence and can invest without any capital limitation.

The statement further noted that any individual can open more than one trading shop, or establish branches, and can work in private or in a trading association.

#### \* Shaykh Sees Egypt's Policy Adrift in Ethiopia

90AA0146Z Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM  
in Arabic 26 Apr 90 pp 48-49

[Article by Asma' al-Husayni al-Ghabashi: "Muslim People of Oromia Break the Ethiopian Blockade"]

[Excerpts] Egyptian foreign policy must be overhauled with regard to Africa, that important continent that represents deep-rooted Egyptian interests and a deep-rooted Arab, Islamic presence. This policy is singlehandedly administered and created by Dr. Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs. If we may be specific, it has become evident that, despite Dr. Butrus Ghali's statements regarding firm cooperation with Ethiopia, the ruling regime in that country does not hesitate to threaten Egypt's national security, with its games concerning Nile resources, to threaten Sudan's national security by its support to rebellious Sudanese elements in the south, to threaten Somalia's national security by arming pro-Ethiopian factions, and to threaten the national security of Saudi Arabia and Yemen by rumors of giving Israel military bases in the Bab al-Mandab. Furthermore, Ethiopia cooperates with the Zionist entity and the World Council of Churches, in order to contain Islam in Africa and stop its expansion. In addition to all this, four Islamic peoples are under Ethiopian colonial domination in Eritrea, Ogaden, Tigray, and the Muslim people of Oromia, who are the subject of this article.

#### Media Blackout

The Oromo Muslim people number some 34 million, or approximately one-third of the population of Ethiopia, living over more than 70 percent of the Ethiopian land area. Islam was introduced into Oromia in the fifth year of the Prophet Muhammad's rise, by the companions who emigrated to Oromia (Abyssinia), fleeing from the offenses of the Quraysh [Arab tribe in ancient Mecca]. There are still historic traces in existence today, proving that this area was the home of the first and second *hijrah* [emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medinah].

However, why haven't we heard anything about the issue of the Oromo people before, despite the existence of many neighboring Islamic countries? Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim Ibrahim, chief of the Islamic Oromo Liberation Front, answers our question: "The media blackout is one of the most important ways our enemy uses to isolate us from the world in general, and the Islamic world in particular. That is the reason the issue of the Oromo Muslim people is not well known, even among neighboring Islamic nations. In addition, our area is an internal area far from foreign influence, which could help us to contact the outside world. There is no government, nor Islamic media, to endorse the issue of the Oromo people."

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim Ibrahim added: "The front has made several contacts in order to explain the Oromo Muslim people's issue. We have asked all the Islamic and Arab nations for recognition and assistance, but so far, we have received no positive response, except for certain facilities from some charitable societies and Islamic organizations. It is worth noting that Somalia is the only nation to recognize the front and to grant certain facilities. It is clear that the Arab and Islamic states have reservations, because of their diplomatic relations with the existing regime in Addis Ababa. However, that regime neither values nor respects the diplomatic relations that link it with Arab and Islamic countries, since it has restored its bloody and long-standing relationship with Zionism."

#### Victory...Coming

[passage omitted]

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim Ibrahim, chief of the Islamic Oromo Liberation Front, went on to say: "The situation is developing in our favor, God willing, for several reasons. The most important is the increased awareness among our masses that jihad is the only way to achieve the desired objective. Moreover, the contemporary jihadist movement, especially in Palestine and Afghanistan, has increased our faith and conviction. In addition, there are encouraging domestic factors, including daily victories, people joining the *mujahidin* [fighters for the cause of Islam] in droves, and intense anxiety and fear within the ranks of the enemy, who are armed with the most modern, sophisticated weapons, in comparison with the individuals of the *mujahidin* who possess only very primitive, light arms. This has increased the *mujahidin's* power and faith. [passage omitted]

"The revolution that has occurred in the socialist camp has also affected the situation, along with the inability of Russia and its allies to give material and moral support to the countries in their orbit, including Ethiopia. This has caused Ethiopia to turn to its new-old ally, and resume—officially—relations with the Zionist enemy."

#### One Million Refugees in Somalia Alone

The Oromo front's chief, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim, clarified the reasons for their rejection of the UN program to

send back the Oromo refugees, who have fled from Ethiopia to neighboring countries, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti. In Somalia alone, their numbers have swelled to one million. Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim Ibrahim stated: "We have not refused to return the refugees to their homes, provided that the causes be confirmed as to why the refugees left the country in the first place, traveling on foot for hundreds of miles through air raids, and with border forces hunting them. This migration was caused by political pressures, colonial oppression, brutal repression, murder, looting, pillaging and burning of villages, and confiscation of agricultural lands and property. Fulfilling practices of the Islamic religion was banned, along with prohibitions against religious teachings. Burning of the Koran, destruction of mosques, and the imprisonment of ulema and other notables have also occurred. Therefore, we oppose the program of returning refugees to Ethiopia, because the reasons that compelled them to leave are still present—and will remain, so long as the Ethiopian colonialist regime remains. We consider this program a danger to the lives of the refugees, and a plot against us, because we have had enough experience regarding these matters. In the past year, waves of returns have occurred; under the claim of improved conditions, some refugees returned to Ethiopia. When they reached their homes, the Ethiopian authorities arrested them and forced the men to go to Eritrea and Tigray, while the women and children were sent to work camps. Moreover, the Djibouti government, in agreement with Ethiopia, under the aegis of the UN Office of Refugee Affairs, sent back a large number of refugees. During the return operations, tragic and terrible massacres of refugees occurred, the most important occurring in 1987, when a number were imprisoned in several locked railway freight cars, which were unsuitable for transporting human beings, causing the deaths of large numbers of refugees from suffocation."

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim Ibrahim added: "The enemies of God, the enemies of Muslims, and the agents of imperialism are united and cooperate in every way to liquidate these refugees. The evidence for that is the Somali opposition movement, which attacks isolated refugee camps, and the UN, which cuts off aid to them on the one hand and, on the other, announces the voluntary return of refugees, but does not guarantee the security of those who return! It is strange that the Islamic world stands aloof from this drama, and is absent from the scene."

#### Conclusion

Observers think that the Ethiopian regime is markedly weakened, and that Egyptian foreign policy in Africa is attempting to improve that regime's image and bolster its position. This contradicts the rights of the Islamic people who are subjected to Ethiopian imperialism, and their right to freedom, independence, and the determination of their own destiny.

Unfortunately, Egyptian foreign policy in Africa is drifting and deviating, intentionally or unintentionally, along the course of the Zionist, Crusader policy, aimed at eliminating Islam and burying it in Africa forever. Why don't we hear from Dr. Butrus Ghali?

### Kenya

#### Minister Says New Party Will Not Be Recognized

EA2106094290 Nairobi Domestic Service in English  
0415 GMT 20 Jun 90

[From "The Press Today" program]

[Text] The parliament was told yesterday that the Swedish-based ex-detainee Mukuru Ng'ang'a fled the country, contrary to his claims that he never did so, and that he intended to return in six months' time. This appears on the top pages of the STANDARD and also in the KENYA TIMES, which also adds that the minister for foreign affairs and international cooperation, Mr. Wilson Ndolo Ayah, yesterday said that the government would not recognize a new party allegedly formed by Makuru Ng'ang'a, now in self-exile in Sweden.

### Somalia

#### Siad Barre Receives Ethiopian Emissary

EA2106130290 Mogadishu Domestic Service in Somali  
1700 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Comrade Mohamed Siad Barre, the Somali Democratic Republic president, today received at the presidency Mr. Tesfaye Dinka, the Ethiopian foreign minister and his delegation who arrived this morning in Somalia for a visit. Comrade Siad received from the minister a letter and greetings from Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Comrade Mohamed Siad Barre and Mr. Tesfaye Dinka, who is also a deputy prime minister of Ethiopia, discussed in their meeting matters concerning the further

promotion of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. The president asked the minister to convey his greetings to the president and people of Ethiopia.

Also present at the meeting were Comrade Abdulkadir Haji Mohamed, minister of internal affairs, and officials from the Foreign Ministry, the presidency, and the Ethiopian Embassy in Mogadishu.

### Tanzania

#### President Meets Kenya Foreign Minister Ayah

EA1606160590 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service  
in English 1600 GMT 14 Jun 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam— President Ali Hassan Mwinyi has said that Tanzania was not unnecessarily [as heard] opposed to a multiparty system, but it should not be forced on the people just for the sake of it. He was speaking to the visiting Kenyan foreign minister, Mr. Wilson Ndolo Ayah, who called on him at State House in Dar es Salaam today.

Comrade Mwinyi said Tanzania encourages its people to discuss this subject fully, so that consensus could eventually emerge. Discussions on a multiparty system are going on in Tanzania, as well as in other parts of Africa. The president said that the most important factors that the African states should consider were peace, stability, and progress towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease.

On bilateral relations, President Mwinyi stressed the need for the leaderships at all levels to meet for consultation on matters of common interest.

Mr. Ayah, who is making his first foreign visit outside Kenya since his appointment, said he is hopeful that the relations between the two countries would be strengthened. The Kenyan foreign minister was accompanied to the State House by the Kenya high commissioner to Tanzania, Mr. Kathambana, and the Tanzanian high commissioner to Kenya Ndugu [Comrade] Job Lusinde.



**Burkina Faso****CDR Military Conference Ends 15 June in Po**

AB1906184190 Ouagadougou Domestic Service  
in French 2200 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Text] Following two days of deliberations, the national conference of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, CDR, rounded up their meeting in Po this morning. Participants set up the Central Coordination Bureau, and Captain Blaise Compaore, the Burkinabe head of state, honored the closing ceremony with his presence. Harouna Bazie, our special correspondent at Po, is here to give us more details from the Naouri Province capital:

[Bazie] The head of state met the participants before the closing ceremony to thank them for their initiative which, for some years now, has been a tradition within the army. The chairman of the Popular Front said this is part of the role of the Armed Forces in the development process of the nation. In this period of economic difficulty in a hostile environment, the head of state recalled, the Army should promote national unity and reinforce it and the Armed Forces should be very competent in order to better defend the interests of the people.

On the political level, the participants reaffirmed the need to politically educate members of the Armed Forces, and on the military level, they said emphasis should be placed on the role played by the popular structures to increase the performance of the troops and stressed the importance of the enforcement of discipline and cohesion within the various units of the Armed Forces.

The secretary in charge of the organization of the Executive Committee of the Popular Front, expressed satisfaction with the participants' decision to initiate a reorientation of the militants' political education and to contribute to the military training of the militants. Addressing the Central Coordination Bureau, Major Arsene Bongnessan Ye, called on the members to be more active in order to make the Armed Forces more operational.

It should be noted that the members of the Central Coordination Bureau is composed as followed:

The delegate to coordination, Lieutenant Christophe Tap-soba; delegate to the organization, Adjutant Jean-Gabriel Ouedraogo; delegate to political and civic training, Master-Sergeant Gilbert Some; delegate to security, Master-Sergeant Issouf Dao; delegate to cultural and sports activities, Master-Sergeant Yen Koudoukou Eloi; delegate to finance, police Adjutant Joseph Sawadogo.

**\* Compaore Discusses Domestic, World Issues**

90AF0139A Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE  
in French 19-25 Apr 90 pp 25-26

[Interview conducted by Nacer Mehal with Blaise Compaore, president of Burkina Faso: "Africa Can Pull Itself Together Because We Have the Manpower and the Wealth"; first four paragraphs are ALGERIE-ACTUALITE introduction]

[Text] One usually quotes Rene Dumont when speaking of Africa's peoples and problems: "Africa had a bad start." The confirmation of these somewhat prophetic words is seen in the present and, most certainly, future conversions of a continent which, 30 years after its decolonization, is still seeking its way and development. Traveling deep within the country, in the bush, one reaches a fatalistic equation that rejects violently, most violently, the plans and prescriptions and, in the name of a certain humanism, condemns all the confused theories of the IMF and all the various clubs, cozily raising toasts and eating caviar.... This thought is reinforced by Michel Camdessus, the IMF boss, who recently suggested that "Africa will have to accept and agree to further sacrifices." Does this imply something more than the ghost of the famine that is already killing more than 5 million people every year? Is it necessary to raise the statistical figures to implement the notorious "structural readjustment?"

The burden of the terrifying indebtedness which, actually, has not settled any development problem, has been increased by others, such as the drought in the Sahel and its corollary, desertification. Briefly, the continent is called upon completely to revise its development strategy by relying on its own means, which today have been wasted as much by the global trusts as by the mercantile bourgeoisie. The result is there: social difficulties as the rhythmical harbingers of a broad movement.

In this turmoil, there is one country that seems to face with resolve and serenity its own problems: Burkina Faso. For this enclave, classified as one of the 25 poorest countries on earth, a country that these past few years has been prey to painful convulsions at the top, this is a time of a rallying of social forces in order to face the immediate future. That is what President Blaise Compaore is trying to achieve by rallying around him a patriotic front, the parties that support the economic emancipation process. At the recent congress of this front, the cue word was democratic opening. However, an opening implies legitimacy. Blaise Compaore made the decision: a new constitution to be adopted by referendum within the next six months, in order to organize the institutional structure and the return to a normality, the purpose of which would be to wipe out the trials of the past during which the military, in order to enter the field of politics, had developed the nasty tendency of making use of their weapons...

In the interview that follows, Blaise Compaore explains his ideas concerning the immediate future of Burkina Faso and other topical subjects.

[Mehal] A first question, Mr. President: What point has Burkina Faso reached?

[Compaore] To be sure, Burkina remains on the path of progress, democratization, and unification of patriotic forces for the building of the country. I believe that the last congress of the Popular Front was the crowning of this ambition. This means that in terms of our country the way ahead is clear as far as our ambition and the landmarks to be placed in the pursuit of our revolutionary way leading to a qualitative transformation of our country.

[Mehal] What new ideas have come out of this congress?

[Compaore] I believe that the congress was, above all, an opportunity for us, for our people, for the activists to reassert this anti-imperialist way, which we have chosen since the 4 August 1983 revolution, i.e., a way of dignity, sovereignty, and social progress. Furthermore, in the course of this congress we realized the need to normalize a certain number of relations within our society. Specifically, this applies to better defining relations among the different institutions, and allowing the manifestation of the rights and obligations of the citizens. That was the reason for which one of the major ideas of that congress was the drafting of a constitution.

[Mehal] Will this constitution call for a greater democratic opening?

[Compaore] Let us say that we want to promote the ever greater broadening of democratic and political freedoms. Such is our present ambition.

[Mehal] How long do you give yourselves?

[Compaore] The preparatory commission will be set up in April. It will be given six months to submit its work.

[Mehal] Is there anything new in terms of economic development?

[Compaore] On the economic level, we have always kept our initial choice, which is that the state must be the focal point of the economic movement. The state must define the guidelines, establish the various roles of the actors in the development, whether the forces which are at the disposal of the state or the participation of national or foreign private institutions. From our viewpoint, the state must concentrate economic action on the implementation of a certain number of needs for our people in order to meet its social demands.

[Mehal] Along with this national effort, there also is a regional economic integration that seems to be progressing. Mr. President, what is your analysis of this situation?

[Compaore] Indeed, you are right in pointing this out. We are familiar with a number of difficulties obstructing a specific dynamism, precisely within the community of the West African countries (CDEAO). I believe, however, that these difficulties are, first of all, related to a basic factor, which is the conditions in which we are developing our economies today. For example, in considering the case of our subregion and even that of all of Africa, all of us have experienced over the past 500 years either slavery, colonialism, or neocolonialism, or else unequal trade in international economic relations. In this context, this means that our efforts have been nullified by very unfavorable conditions. Let us add to this that we found ourselves in a situation in which, in terms of management, we have not always been strict in Africa. Let me also add that in the area of reducing social inequalities, which could have involved our masses to a greater extent into the economic struggle, there as well, for the sake of social justice, we have not always been firm. All of this puts us today in a difficult situation. Nonetheless, we believe that, in the face of the blocks that are being set up and the quite clear need for all of us to advance toward economic integration, we must realize that such integration is essentially a political ambition. Today, however, we are facing nationalisms and the desire of the individual countries to continue to safeguard their sovereignty sometimes to the detriment of the surges of solidarity and the development of economic communities. In other words, consequently, politics must predominate in our integration movement. Let us consider the case of Europe: In my view, Europe would not have been able to reach its level of integration had it not set up supranational instruments to watch over this integration movement. In our case, that is what we are short of. We lack such institutions.

Naturally, we have created economic communities but have added to them bureaucratic structures (administrative secretariats, executive bodies, and others), which are incapable of activating the entire system. In my view, it is on that level that we must think and find the means to strengthen our integration by surrendering a little bit of our sovereignty, thus enabling a superior instrument to organize, to plan, and to increase its powers. This is something we are very short of.

[Mehal] What is balance in the area of South-South cooperation?

[Compaore] Today we must acknowledge that on that level we have been unable to determine the potentials to be exploited or demarcate the areas in which we could work together. We have no organized relations with the southern countries, to the right and left of us, which prevents us from extracting maximal benefits for all of us. The few very satisfactory situations vindicate our belief that a great deal remains to be done.

[Mehal] Things are stirring up in Africa. Does this mark the end of an era?

[Compaore] As far as what is taking place today in Africa, it is a normal process, for consciences, as everywhere else, actually, are developing, moving, and the masses are striving toward freedom and progress. As I already pointed out, in terms of management we have not always been strict in Africa. We have not been sufficiently firm in setting up a much more egalitarian distribution of the resources of our countries in terms of these two considerations. It is normal for the masses to take to the streets and act. What is important to note is that the governments will certainly realize that they can no longer govern without thinking about the masses and that it will be difficult to preserve the old systems. This means that a kind of renovation exists and that Africa can pull itself together, for we have both the manpower and the resources. All that is left is to believe in ourselves, to believe that we can organize our own development on the basis of our own resources and with our own knowledge, by letting those we govern speak. The current conditions allow us to follow a new path.

[Mehal] Considering the upheavals in Eastern Europe, what is the view of an African head of state, such as you? Does this mark the collapse of ideologies?

[Compaore] Whether this has indicated or has not indicated the end of ideologies, what we are saying is that this has not put an end to the ever growing desire of the peoples for freedom, dignity, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. What I am trying to say is that this will not put an end to the anticapitalist, to the revolutionary struggles. In East Europe, as actually anywhere else, in Africa for instance, the claims of the people on the street are revolutionary reactions to a system that oppresses, to an internal system that hinders access to progress, food, housing, etc. What is fundamental is that the general movement of the masses toward freedom and progress had been at the very source of the creation of some political structures in Eastern Europe. This movement will never lose the awareness of individuals and nations. We should expect a reorganization in thinking, which will abandon the various mechanisms and plans with which we are familiar but, in general, we think that the trend will always remain one of the struggle waged by the peoples against exploitation, oppression, and inequality.

[Mehal] Mr. President, let us go back to the OAU [Organization of African Unity], in facing the economic challenge. All prescriptions have failed. Would there be, in your view, another one?

[Compaore] It is true that today for us in Africa it is difficult to obtain the resources that we need for our development. However, as I already pointed out, Africa has still a chance based on its potential and its manpower. Consequently, we must think of our development without any intellectual reference as to what the West or the North, could do to help in our development. We must conceive for Africa a development that would be based first on our own possibilities, our own realities, taking properly into consideration each individual

country as well as the already established economic blocs. Certainly, possibilities exist of finding ways for coming out of this situation, if we believe, if we think above all of the fact that the problems are within us. Therefore, it is not a question of waiting for others in the West or the North to supply us with resources for our development. We should avoid plans formulated abroad, which we wanted to duplicate and which eventually were exposed as traps, for it is a question of a rhythm, of an organization for the production process that does not fit in the least our historical context.

[Mehal] The OAU has to play a role in this connection. Should it be shaken up?

[Compaore] The OAU must truly provide quite clear guidelines in the major areas in order better to encompass problems of cohesion and self-centered development. We should not wait for the West and for a system of interests and profits. Europe also has its own millions of unemployed, which it is unable to place. I do not see how it would be able to provide more means than it has already provided for our support.

[Mehal] The haunting and grave problem of indebtedness remains. What could its solution be?

[Compaore] Rescheduling does not settle anything and it is a certainty today that we cannot pay this debt. This will be dragging on for a while. I think that in the years to come the lenders will eventually understand the need either to forgive or, in any case, to reduce a substantial portion of this debt, which has essentially benefited the North more than the South.

[Mehal] On another topic, Mr. President, your country will be the host of the Black People's Institute. What are the tasks of this Burkina Faso initiative?

[Compaore] We think, first of all, that it is a question of a cultural project. The black world is a dimension of humanity, which has existed, which exists, and which is making its contribution to world civilization. However, this is a contribution that is not always known and that does not help us to become part of civilization. Therefore, we are planning to promote understanding on the cultural and civilization levels and rely on our own resources in order better to organize our life within civilization and make others understand the interest that we have in allying ourselves with other cultural blocs, such as that of the Arab world, the European world, and so on, as part of the general movement of peace and solidarity among people.

## Cape Verde

### \* Continuing Political Reforms Viewed

90AF0134A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 27 Apr 90 p 53

[Article by Fatima Azevedo: "Reforms in Cape Verde: The Bone of Contention"]



[Text] On 16 April 1990 in the city of Praia, the Movement for Democracy, which has recently been organized in Cape Verde, issued a communique expressing some concerns related to the results arrived at by the National Council of the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde] at its latest meeting.

According to the communique, there is no sense of the established prioritization, that is, of having a law of political associations approved at the May session and of approving the Law of Political Parties nearly four months before the legislative elections. In fact, the PAICV has proposed the approval of the Law of Political Parties in September/October and the holding of legislative elections in February/March of 1991.

The Movement for Democracy considers the proposed schedule to be an "electoral strategy, which shows the lack of transparency in the process of political opening, which is the reason that we do not accept it."

Although it rejoices in the election of the president through direct and secret universal suffrage, the movement says that it is opposed to the election of the president before the legislative elections are held, because, the movement's communique says, "it does not seem reasonable to call upon the electorate to choose a president of the Republic to exercise a mandate of several years when the voters do not know the nature and extent of the powers which will be conferred upon that president, since the ANP [National People's Assembly] which will be chosen in these legislative elections will have the power to revise the Constitution."

The Movement for Democracy says in its communique that the PAICV did not explain if, how or when, it is going to dissolve the political police, thus giving up control of that state-run department which it now has at its service; whether the structures of the PAICV and its satellite organizations are going to continue to be fed by the general state budget up until the legislative elections; and whether or not it is going to go ahead with reforms and with the institutionalization of measures that will guarantee impartiality and neutrality to the state-controlled news media organizations.

The Movement for Democracy is the first movement formed internally, a very short time ago, and it has presented a political statement in which it has declared itself to be opposed to "the anti-democratic basis on which the PAICV is planning to organize the upcoming legislative elections."

The National Council of the PAICV, meeting a short time later in Cape Verde's capital city, would come, then, to propose the schedule for the upcoming meetings and the election of the president of the Republic.

The PAICV convention, which is scheduled for 25 July through 28 July, will have as its main objective the approval of the general bases of the party's program and revision of the statutes. This is in addition to the debate on reforming the political system and revising the

Republic's Constitution, as well as writing an electoral platform for the upcoming legislative elections. In the area of revision of the statutes, the convention will also have to weigh a proposal to abolish the party's structures in the defense and security forces.

Meanwhile, instructional meetings are taking place in the various services and with the professional classes.

The role of journalists in state-run organizations during the current phase was the topic of a meeting between news media personnel and the overseeing minister, David Almada. On that occasion, those attending were informed that a commission headed by the director-general of the news media, Claudio Furtado, was studying the new editorial policy that is being enacted, regulation of antenna rights, and use of the news media organizations.

#### Reviewing Land Reform

The Basic Land Reform Law will be reviewed when its turn comes during the ninth legislative session of the National People's Assembly, which will get down to work on 22 May.

The bill to revise the Basic Land Reform Law in Cape Verde was considered two or three weeks ago by the Council of Ministers, and will be discussed and approved by the National People's Assembly.

Preparation of the above-mentioned bill arose from the need to adjust some of the guidelines of the basic law "with the goal of paying heed to the lessons learned from the experience of applying this law over the six years that it has been in force, by the removal of constraints and difficulties that, to a certain extent, were hindering the full realization of the law's stated objectives," according to the communique from the Council of Ministers with regard to this matter.

With this goal in mind, and under a proposal from the National Commission on Land Reform, the government understood that it should pay attention to the following particulars:

- Reformulation of the mechanisms and general guidelines that govern the transferral to the State of other people's farm properties which exceed the threshold of intervention, in accordance with the country's real possibilities.
- The definitive abolition of partnerships, except in cases in which the small land owner who falls within the threshold of intervention is 60 years old or older, or is an invalid, and does not have within his household any other source of income.
- Nontransferral to the State of irrigated rural farmland, or farmland that is a mixture of irrigated and unirrigated land, which is being rented out to tenant farmers, with an area exceeding the threshold of intervention, when such lands are the exclusive property of widows, minors, or invalids who have no other source of income other than the land.

- The possibility that an emigrant can rescind the rental contract with the original length of time, or of any of said contract's renewals, as soon as he declares that he has returned to the country permanently and plans to make farming his main livelihood.

Furthermore, the bill solves the matter of the safeguards for coffee growers. These guidelines are abolished, as well as the transferral of profitable ownership during the owner's lifetime, due to the incapacitation of the owner, to any of his heirs, by the guarantee of assignment to the bequeather of the land of a lifelong annual pension which will be at least the equivalent of one third of the net yield of the plot of land bequeathed.

Under the heading of defense and preservation of the environment, the upcoming session of the National People's Assembly will likewise analyze and approve a bill that will designate the chain of uninhabited islands, both large and small, off the country's coast as an "ecological reserve."

Access to and use of these areas will be the subject of a special law, according to a decision made by the Council of Ministers.

#### \* Increased Trade Links Sought With South Africa

90AF0181A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
9 May 90 p 5

[Article by Antonio Caeiro: "Cape Verde Opens Itself Up to South African Trade"]

[Text] Cape Verde and South Africa are taking the first steps toward the establishment of trade relations, while signs that the government in Praia has taken a liking to President de Klerk are multiplying.

Worried about the "growing marginalization of Africa" and the "tendency of Europe to reduce its aid to the Third World," Cape Verde's leaders have pinned a great deal of hope on the political evolution of South Africa, which is the greatest economic power on the African continent.

According to what an official Cape Verdean source told the news agency LUSA, a South African trade delegation will soon visit Cape Verde, repaying the recent visit made to South Africa—for the first time—by a mission from Cape Verde.

At the invitation of the South African Government, a trade delegation from Cape Verde, led by the director-general of the archipelago's largest public firm, visited Durban, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Capetown during the last week of April.

The delegation also included private entrepreneurs, among whom were representatives of Cape Verde's two trade associations.

"Considering the political evolution of the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, it is to be judged that there are some good prospects of developing trade and industrial activities between entrepreneurs of Cape Verde and South Africa," says a communique that was released on Friday [4 May] by the state-run supply company whose director-general, Orlando Mascarenhas, led the Cape Verde delegation.

Orlando Mascarenhas is also a member of the national council of PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde], and it was in that party's official newspaper that the first reference to the South African invitation appeared nearly two months ago, when the response to it was still being "pondered."

Officials of Cape Verde's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contacted by the LUSA news agency, declined to comment on the political significance of the entrepreneurs' visit, but in diplomatic circles in Praia, the visit is viewed as a sign of an opening toward South Africa.

"The interest is mutual... South Africa also needs to arrange partners in western Africa," commented one Western diplomat.

In spite of the fact that the two countries do not have diplomatic relations with each other, Cape Verde has never closed its airports to South Africa, and the Johannesburg-Frankfurt-Johannesburg route of South African Airways (SAA) continues to make a stop at Amilcar Cabral International Airport on the Island of Sal.

In 1985, before the United States prohibited the landing of South African airplanes on its territory, SAA made more than 30 weekly stops at the Sal airport, providing Cape Verde with one of its most important sources of currency.

In the trade area, however, relations between Cape Verde and Pretoria have always been insignificant.

The only exception is the Morabeza, the archipelago's largest hotel, which used to be frequented almost exclusively by SAA flight crews, where, according to the words of one Cape Verde businessman, "even the toilet paper came from South Africa."

For Cape Verdean diplomacy, the time for armed struggle in South Africa "has already passed," and Prime Minister Pedro Pires himself, who met with de Klerk at the celebration of Namibia's independence, stated that he was available to "help reinforce the foreign prestige" of the South African president.

Silvino da Luz, Cape Verde's minister of foreign affairs, recently stated to the LUSA news agency: "We understand that the South African nationalist movements may want to push for total victory, but we want to alert them to the danger of painting de Klerk into a corner."

Cape Verde's leaders continue to state that they are "members of the African family," and that, as such, they will not act on their own by establishing diplomatic

relations with South Africa, but they admit that "if the fundamental interest of the people of Cape Verde can dictate a different attitude, we can think along those lines."

"We are studying the political evolution in South Africa very carefully, and, at the appropriate moment, we will know what Cape Verde's official position should be," Silvino da Luz went on to say.

Since businessmen are often far out in front of politicians, it is predictable that relations between Cape Verde and South Africa will soon take on new dimensions on the diplomatic level too.

### Ghana

#### 22-Member Libya Delegation Arrives for Meeting

AB1706224990 Accra Domestic Service in English  
1800 GMT 17 Jun 90

[Text] The fourth session of the Ghana-Libya permanent joint commission for cooperation opens in Accra tomorrow. The session will examine all aspects of economic cooperation between the two countries, with emphasis on trade. A 22-member Libyan delegation is already in Accra to participate in the session. The delegation is led by the secretary of the People's Liaison Bureau and international cooperations, Mr. Jadallah 'Azzuz al-Tahli.

Speaking to newsmen at the airport, he said although most countries have the political will and determination and further economic cooperation, they are faced with structural problems which are gradually being removed. Mr. al-Tahli said the session will also evaluate the performance and the implementation of existing bilateral agreements and explore how best future accords can be implemented.

While in the country, the delegation will call on the chairman of the Provisional National Defense Council [PNDC], Flight Lieutenant Rawlings, hold discussions with top government officials, and visit Aluworks and the Cocoa Processing Company, both at Tema.

The delegation was met on arrival by the secretary for education, Mr. K.B. Asante, and the secretary for health, Nana Akuoko Sarpong.

#### Rawlings Receives Message

AB2206101890 Accra Domestic Service in English  
0700 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] The chairman of the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council], Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, has stressed that the strains imposed on Africa by an unfair international economic order calls for collective self-reliance. He noted that African countries are facing a lot of hardships as a result of inequitable trade practices being perpetrated against them by the developed world. The only way the continent can tackle the

problem is to increase cooperation between African states. Chairman Rawlings was speaking when he received Libya's secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison Bureau and International Cooperation, Mr. Jadallah 'Azzuz al-Tahli, at the Castle, Osu. Chairman Rawlings told Mr. Al-Tahli, who is leading his country's delegation to the current session of the Ghana-Libya permanent joint commission that Ghana is desirous of trading with all African countries, adding that through this the imbalance in international economic order will be removed.

On Ghana-Libya relations, he said that it is important for both countries to strive to increase economic cooperation. He called on the commission to remove all bottlenecks which might thwart collaboration between the two countries. Mr. Al-Tahli said there is a wide scope for trading between Libya and Ghana. He especially mentioned timber and nontraditional export products as areas which could be explored. The leader of the Libyan delegation said some progress has been made in forging trade links and the current session of the commission will focus on problems that have hindered trade between the two countries. Mr. Al-Tahli, who also delivered a special message from Brother Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi to Chairman Rawlings, said Ghana and Libya have the political will to forge ahead in cooperation. Their trade links should, therefore, be a model for South-South cooperation. Among those present at the meeting were a member of the PNDC, Captain Kojo Tsikata; the deputy secretary for foreign affairs, Dr. Mohamed ibn-Chambas; and Ghana's ambassador to Libya, Colonel Jeff Asmah.

#### Czechoslovak Official Begins Three-Day Visit

AB2206093090 Accra Domestic Service in English  
1800 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] The deputy foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Vera Bartoskova, has arrived in Accra on a three-day visit to Ghana. Dr. Bartoskova, who is on a two-week African tour, will also visit Kenya, Namibia, The Gambia, and Nigeria. She told newsmen at the Kotoka International Airport that despite the political changes taking place in Czechoslovakia, the country's foreign policy remains unchanged toward Africa. The deputy minister said her country would continue to support the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid movements in their struggle until apartheid is abolished. Dr. Bartoskova noted that (the) goodwill visit is to assure African countries of Czechoslovakia's continued support for their just struggle for economic emancipation. She was met on arrival by the deputy secretary for foreign affairs, Dr. Mohamed Ibn-Chambas.

#### Meets PNDC Officials

AB2206095490 Accra Domestic Service in English  
2100 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] The deputy foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Vera Bartoskova, who is on a three-day visit to



Ghana, has called on the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] member responsible for foreign affairs, Captain Kojo Tsikata, in Accra. Her visit to Ghana is the last leg of a two-week African tour which has already taken her to Namibia, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria.

Briefing newsmen, Dr. Bartoskova said her visit has given her the opportunity to explain the current changes in her country. She said the changes are systematic and assured African countries of Czechoslovakia's continued support for the struggle for justice and the eradication of apartheid. Dr. Bartoskova said following the changes, Czechoslovakia intends to introduce an open market economy and has offered guarantees to foreign investors.

She said the main aim of her visit is to explore new possibilities for expanding mutual and economic relations between the two countries. It is hoped the Ghana-Czechoslovakia permanent joint commission for cooperation will be established soon. She pledged her country's continued assistance to Ghanaian students to study in Czechoslovak universities.

Later Dr. Bartoskova called on the secretary for education, Mr. K.B. Asante. She said because of the impressive performance of Ghanaian students in Czechoslovakia, Ghana will always be given preference in the distribution of scholarships to African countries for higher studies. She announced that Ghana will be provided with equipment for technical schools under a barter agreement to be signed tomorrow. The Czechoslovak minister said in spite of mutual relations between the two countries, no educational agreement has been signed to cement these relations.

Replying, Mr. Asante said a draft agreement is almost ready for signature. He told the visiting minister that following the educational reforms, Ghana needs more middle-level technical personnel. She will therefore welcome an increase in the number of scholarships for technical students.

#### **\* Cooperation of Local Organizations Urged**

34000733A Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*  
in English 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Awal]

[Excerpt] The Lawra District Secretary, Mr. Raymond K. Maaldu has cautioned district assemblies not to regard the Unit Committees being inaugurated throughout the country as rival groups.

Rather, he said, the putting in place of the Unit Committees is yet another measure to buttress the government's democratisation process.

He said the Unit Committees are expected to work closely with the district assemblies to accelerate development at the grassroots level by identifying local priority needs and evolving strategies for their achievement.

Mr. Maaldu made these statements when he addressed the first ordinary meeting of the Lawra District assembly for this year at Lawra on Tuesday.

The District Secretary also touched on efforts being made to preserve the environment. He therefore asked assembly members to step up education of the people on the need to support the government's afforestation programme by establishing woodlots. [passage omitted]

#### **\* Problems of Decentralization Program Noted**

34000733B Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*  
in English 16 May 90 p 2

[Text] The district assembly concept aims at concretising the active involvement and participation of the people at the grassroots. However, before the people could meaningfully take part in decision making, they have to have access to informed and learned ideas about issues.

This kind of animation could come from civil servants. But after one year of the operation of the assemblies, some of them have not got [as printed] the full complement of personnel to man the decentralised units.

In areas where the decentralised departments are functional, there is still the question of where the allegiance of the civil servants lie, although heads of department are supposed to serve on sub-committees of the assemblies. Some of them have not accepted the fact that they have a responsibility towards the districts and still look up to their head offices in Accra for directives on their daily schedules.

In other areas, despite the fact that the departments have been put in place, personnel have refused to report for duty in the districts.

The result is that certain issues that could have been easily handled at the district level have to be referred to the regional and national offices for answers and this does not only waste time but undermines the efficiency and effectiveness of the district administrations.

Therefore the committee that has been set up to resolve the relationship between the centre and the districts by way of functional decentralisation must act as early as possible to give impetus to the authority of the district assemblies over their civil servants.

It is not uncommon in the civil service to post new people into the rural areas where they are expected to take independent decisions whilst experienced and talented administrators are concentrated at headquarters.

That kind of phenomenon is not in the interest of effective and sustainable grassroots democracy that we are nurturing for ourselves. We have to blend talented and gifted people who are highly experienced with inexperienced ones at all levels of national endeavour so that no district would be left behind because of the inefficiencies of administrators posted to their area.

The importance of the decentralisation programme is to stimulate both human and material development at the local level on an equitable basis and the provision of the full complement of public servants is one way of giving direction to the mobilisation of ideas of the local people to encourage them to assert themselves and employ their resourcefulness to change their environment qualitatively.

**\* Opposers of Boundary Demarcation Warned**

34000733C Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 5 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] Miss Doris Ocansey, a member of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), has warned assembly members against inciting the electorate to break the law over the demarcation of electoral and district boundaries.

She said those who do this would be held liable for any consequences and drastically dealt with.

Miss Ocansey gave the warning during a meeting with members of the Sene District Assembly of Kwame Danso in the Brong Ahafo Region on Monday.

In an apparent reference to the controversy over Konkoni electoral area which is being claimed by both the Atebubu and Sene Districts, Miss Ocansey noted that the demarcation of electoral areas and creation of new districts were purely for administrative convenience.

This, she added, is in line with the government's commitment to ensure that every area of the country is covered administratively.

She said the exercise should not affect the allegiance of the people to their traditional rulers.

Miss Ocansey observed that the demarcation exercise and the new political structures are part of the democratic experiment.

Assembly members should, therefore, educate their people to show maturity when they identify problems and assist in resolving them amicably instead of fighting over them. GNA

**\* Bauxite Company To Increase Exports**

34000733D Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 29 Mar 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Text] The Ghana Bauxite Company Limited plans to increase its exports from about 400,000 to 500,000 tonnes a year under a short-term measure.

The company will ultimately reach an annual production of one million tonnes, Mr C.V. Tamakloe, Managing Director of the company, announced at the just-ended seminar for trade union leaders and management representatives of the mining industry in Ghana at Obuasi in Ashanti.

"With the support from the government coupled with the motivation currently in evidence, the company is confident of success in achieving this objective," he said.

Mr Tamakloe said last year, 374,646 tonnes of bauxite was exported representing an increase of 25 percent on the previous year's export.

With the rehabilitation of the Western Railway Line, under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), he said, the Ghana Railway Corporation's performance in hauling bauxite improved year by year.

He said increased sales by Ghana Bauxite Company provided opportunities for replacement of some equipment.

Mr Tamakloe said the replacement did not only prevent the closure of the mine but it also enabled the company to record continuing improvement in exports for five successive years.

Last year's export, for instance, was a record in 15 years, he said.

Mr Tamakloe said feasibility studies are in progress to convert bauxite waste products into brick and tile production.

On housing, he said, the company has embarked on a C230-million building project to provide additional accommodation to the junior staff.—GNA

**\* Ports Authority Profit Up Sharply in 1989**

34000733E Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 30 Apr 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Article by Kofi Yeboah-Agyemang: "GPHA Improves Operations"]

[Text] The Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) made a total of C5,440,002 billion pre-tax profit for the 1989 fiscal year from its operations at the Tema and Takoradi Harbours.

The GPHA recorded C1,443,423 billion profit in 1988.

Total cargo traffic passing through the two ports increased by eight percent from 4,453,703 tonnes in 1988 to 4,808,325 tonnes in 1989.

These are contained in a report on the performance of the GPHA for 1989.

According to the report, Tema port handled 68.9 percent and Takoradi 31.1 percent, which shows in both areas an increase of 13.2 percent above GPHA corporate plan projection for 1989.

The report indicated that out of the 3,310,822 tonnes of cargo handled at Tema representing a 9.4 percent increase over the 1988 figure of 3,026,125 tonnes, imports constituted 83 percent of total traffic, while exports took 17 percent.

Takoradi port in the same period of 1989 handled 1,497,503 tonnes representing 4.9 percent increase over 1988 figure of 1,427,577 tonnes.

Out of this, exports accounted for 1,045,089 being 69.85 percent and imports 452,414 tonnes 30.2 percent.

The bulk of the traffic was mainly bauxite and manganese, with clinker cocoa and timber constituting the other part.

A total of 46,003 TEUs (units of containers) were handled at the Tema port, showing an increase of 7.3 percent over the 1988 figure of 42,879 TEUs. Out of these 23,555 TEUs were imported with 21,873 (92.9 percent) stuffed and 1,682 (7.1 percent) empty, while 22,448 TEUs were exported. These were made up of 6,203 TEUs (27.6 percent) stuffed and 16,245 (72.4 percent) empty.

The Takoradi port handled 6,030 TEUs in 1989 as compared to 4,715 TEUs for 1988, an increase of 27.9 percent.

At the Tema port 844 vessels called in 1989 as against 799 in 1988 with The Takoradi port handled 6,030 TEUs in 1989 as compared to 4,715 TEUs for 1988, an increase of 27.9 percent.

The report indicated that the two ports have recorded remarkable improvements in cargo traffic passing through the ports over the past five years, having slumped from a total of about 5.5 million tonnes of cargo throughout the 1970s to its lowest of 2.2 million tonnes in 1983.

According to the report, the improvements could be attributed to the port rehabilitation programme which has brought in a number of modern cargo equipment and other facilities.

#### \* Egypt in Joint Agricultural Cooperation

34000733F Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 15 May 90 p 9

[Text] Ghana and Egypt are to intensify cooperation in the agricultural sector within the framework of the Joint Permanent Commission for cooperation signed last year.

This was disclosed by Commodore Steve Obimpeh (rtd), Secretary for Agriculture on arrival at the Kotoka Airport in Accra on Sunday, quoting a communique signed after a six-day visit to Egypt.

Commodore Obimpeh, who led a three-member government delegation, said areas to be given priority by the two countries include joint agro-industrial ventures, dairy and meat production.

The two countries will exchange information on cotton, fisheries, irrigation, soil improvement techniques and step up training programmes between them.

Commodore Obimpeh said four Egyptian experts are expected soon in Ghana for discussion on the projects lined up to be implemented while three more experts in cotton production, management and seed breeding are to be attached to the Ghana Cotton Company.

Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture are also expected to visit Egypt to draw up a programme for the training of Ghanaians in agriculture and fisheries development.—GNA.

### Ivory Coast

#### Alassane Ouattara on Economic Recovery Program

AB1306205590 Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN  
in French 8 Jun 90 pp 20-23

[News conference held by Alassane Ouattara, chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Economic Recovery Program, at the Hilton Hotel, Abidjan, with unidentified foreign and domestic reporters on 1 June]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [FRATERNITE MATIN] Do you believe that the state's public finances will be balanced after your program has been implemented?

[Ouattara] We had a deficit of 215 billion CFA francs in 1989, excluding our debt service. For 1990, the program provides a slight surplus of 23 billion CFA francs. Thus, over one year, we will reverse the trend by nearly 230 billion CFA francs.

We think that is important, especially when the 1989 deficit showed that government had lived above its means. We spent more than we had.

Thus, we resorted to external and domestic borrowing. As a result, banks and firms suffered. You remember how difficult it was to cash a check at several local banks in December and January. We want to prevent such a situation from recurring in 1990 by balancing expenditures with revenues and setting aside fresh money from forthcoming loans to pay part of our arrears.

This is a coherent program. First of all, we must balance our budgets and make sure that we do not spend more than we have. Finally, the international community must help us revive our economy through the above-mentioned measures.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] In the new sociopolitical context created by the multiparty system, how will the Ouattara plan be conducted? Will this new political direction not reduce the plan's chances of success?

[Ouattara] The multiparty system is a political act. I believe that the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally [PDCI-RDA] pointed out that its actions are in accord with Article 7 of the constitution, along with appropriate clarifications. The parties were formally recognized on 31 May. We are, therefore, in a situation of a democratic



opening up. The economy should be managed against this background, within the context of a national consensus. What is important here is to make sure that people are aware of the fact that the responsibility of each one of us is involved.

This is a situation in which we must all be responsible. We must manage our economy in accordance with our external and domestic constraints. I would not like to comment further than this. We are dealing with a new situation. Mentalities have to change and adapt to that situation. Indeed, the multiparty system should strengthen economic and financial management.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Do you not think that alternative plans may become necessary?

[Ouattara] Ivory Coast is not the sole culprit in bringing about this situation. The external factor has had a notably negative impact on economic and financial activities during the last years. We should make great efforts from within. That is what we are doing right now. But in addition, the external factor should imperatively improve.

As for the plan itself, it is a program of stabilization and economic reorganization. Therefore, there are two phases. Presently, we have started the stabilization phase. I said on this issue that we will bring our expenditures within range of our revenues. This phase will be carried out through 1990 and end in 1991. But as of 1991, we will have to start showing a surplus in our balance. This means we have to generate more internal resources that will contribute to the revamping of the economy. We cannot solely depend on external aid to overcome the crisis.

Now, what should our next step be? If this first phase is a success, in November and December, we will draw up medium and long-term programs with the international organizations over a three-year period (1991, 1992, and 1993). It is at this moment that we will start implementing the real economic recovery program. It will give us the opportunity to examine every sector of our national economy in detail. In doing so, we will be able to solve the problems of competitiveness and all the problems relating to the lack of productivity in some sectors. We should be able to alleviate the weight of the state on the national economy and on the citizens. This would mean that we are then starting to implement the phase that consists in mitigating the burden of the state on the national economy. We can do this by reducing its shares in various enterprise, or taxes. If this medium-term plan is adopted right from the beginning, then we will be able to tackle the external problem, that is, the external debt.

We already have begun a series of contacts that will enable us to solve this problem over a three to four-year period, including commercial bank debts as well as official debt. In a few years time, we must be able to balance our finances and have some fresh cash in order to reorganize all the financial sectors and have the

necessary resources and use what we are producing. We have the best infrastructure on the African Continent.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Do you not think that it is necessary to reduce factor cost in order to increase the competitiveness of our economy?

[Ouattara] Setting up an economic recovery program is a fundamental issue. Many people will tell you that our economy is not competitive. But what is competitiveness? In a few words, it means that factor cost (the cost of electricity, water, labor, taxes, etc...) is very high. I like doing things precisely. We set up a series of subcommittees including the subcommittee on competitiveness chaired by Lamine Diabate, who is working on this with the World Bank. This committee is working very hard to make proposals.

We already have several proposals on the liberalization of the economy. We will first of all liberalize trade. Then we will tackle the issue of the cost of energy, water, capital, etc.... Therefore, this is a fundamental part of our program. However, what must be done is to base the economic recovery on better competitiveness and a better productivity in our economy. This means we should get down to work. We have to work in this country. We have to work more in this country in order to produce more. Without hard work, any attempt to revamp the national economy will fail. I will periodically submit reports on the results of our work.

As I said during the presentation of the program at the National Assembly, this economic recovery program concerns each and everyone of us. It was drawn up by the government, and it was presented to the National Assembly, which approved and adopted it. The implementation of this program is a capital issue for all of us. We should all be involved.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Why was privatization not included in the plan?

[Ouattara] We have seven subcommittees which have been working under the supervision of the Inter-Ministerial Committee. There are seven technical subcommittees, among which is the subcommittee on revenue, which is in charge of assessing government revenues. The committee on government expenditures oversees all sectors. This will enable us to have a better view of public demand. We have a subcommittee in charge of sectoral loans (loans for farm, energy, water projects, and so on) working in close cooperation with the World Bank and African Development Bank. We also have a subcommittee working on competition. It is important for the medium term of our economic recovery program.

We have a working group on privatization. I have suggested to the head of state that this group and the committee study all matters concerning privatization. No state enterprise can be sold without us looking into the matter to see that government interests are guaranteed.

We will set up principles. We are not going to privatize indiscriminately. That is why no provision on privatization has been included in the 1990 program. We want to make sure that a certain number of criteria are met: what companies should be privatized, under which conditions, to whom they should be sold, and so on.... The subcommittee is working on it. By November-December, we will, I hope, achieve concrete results. Then, from 1990, we can say that in the next six months we have, for example, 10 state enterprises, public national companies, EPN's, that we are going to sell. We put them on bid. It will be open and very clear.

The sixth working group is on the social effects of the adjustment program. This is very important: We must make sure, in implementing the stabilization policy, that the poor are protected. This group, which has been working on the social effects of the structural adjustment program under Abdoulaye Sawadogo's chairmanship, has already made a certain number of suggestions approved by the World Bank. Thus, we will take the poor into account in the implementation of this program. We will make sure that the social aspect of the program is taken into account. Finally, there is the working group on external financing, which will try to secure the financial support of the international community. Thus, I can tell you that the Inter-Ministerial Committee has not been the only one at work. Subcommittees have also been working regularly. Any agency outside the administration that exhibits poor management will from now on be included in the national budget. We are going to audit them. We will make sure that all resources are transferred to the budget before settling any account.

Concerning revenue statement: If we proposed bills to the National Assembly on how to improve tax collection, it was because taxes are not deducted from incomes. It should be the other way around. All the measures that were adopted the other day provide for tax deduction from incomes as much as possible. In this case, we are sure to generate revenues for the budget.

Economic policy cannot be implemented overnight. It is a permanent process, but—and I insist on this—this process can only work with the support of the citizens. We must understand that it is a national duty to pay taxes, customs, tariffs.... This is how other countries achieved development. In a few countries in which I have lived, no citizen can think of not paying his taxes at the end of the year. When he does not receive his tax return form, he calls the revenue service for it. In this country, we tear it up when we receive it. This must change.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] In implementing the recovery program, will you not be obliged to devalue the CFA franc—even at a moderate rate?

[Ouattara] The CFA franc is the only convertible currency in the developing world. It is a regional currency in West and Central Africa, and it is healthy. How can you then expect me to devalue it? I have no reason for such

a devaluation and I will not devalue the currency. But the decision does not rest with me. It can only be made by the whole financial community, and the French Government's stand is that the CFA franc will not be devalued. That is the political aspect; but as the governor of the Central Bank, and therefore technically responsible for the management of our currency, and as a former director of the IMF Africa Division, I wonder what purpose a devaluation will serve. [passage omitted]

[FRATERNITE MATIN] What will become of your program in the event of a change of government?

[Ouattara] There will always be a government in Ivory Coast, even after 1993. But whatever the government, it should organize itself in order to cope with the crisis. The committee was set up by the president of the Republic because of the serious financial situation confronting our country. We have made a series of recommendations, and I hope their implementation will be followed up. So there is no contradiction. But I did not say the work of the committee will extend until 1993. I indicated that our mission will comprise three phases: a drafting phase, which has just ended; an implementing phase, which has now begun; and the follow-up. Economic policies are indeed drafted on a medium-term basis. I indicated earlier that we will hold negotiations with international institutions toward the end of the year (October-November) for a comprehensive program extending from 1991 to 1993. But we want this program by November-December. We will therefore have to make every effort to implement it with utmost rigor.

Concerning immigration, the issue of residence permits is presently the subject of heated debate at the National Assembly. Some assemblymen think that the proposed rates are low, but we have told them that the measures are reciprocal.

In France, a residence permit costs Fr1,000, that is, 50,000 CFA francs, and is valid for 3 years. That is what we want to implement in Ivory Coast. We have therefore endeavored to carry out a thorough study, taking into account the financial aspects of the program while still conforming to our international commitments. This is because international law prevails over national laws. We are not going to violate the clauses of the various treaties that we have signed in the context of multilateral organizations: We are a law-abiding state.

The fight against unemployment depends on the level of economic activities. The construction of Ivory Coast has been based on unrestricted liberalism, a fact which the government has always reaffirmed. The president is profoundly attached to this policy, and we will continue to be a liberal and open country. There is no question of driving anyone out, whomsoever, but we must carry out a census to determine our population and its structure. We need to know how many foreigners reside in Ivory Coast, their nationalities, and so on. Any well-organized country does this. [passage omitted]

[FRATERNITE MATIN] What do you think of the idea of a single currency in Africa?

[Ouattara] A single currency is a good thing. It is an ideal to which we subscribe. We hope it will be instituted under good conditions. But the creation of a common currency should be phased in gradually. That is we should create one common currency for West Africa, one for North Africa, one for Central Africa, and so on. Then we will end up creating a single currency.

But as I have said before on different occasions, there is no question of me associating with a country whose economy is mismanaged. The CFA franc will not be associated with a melting currency, a currency whose value falls every day.

Such a currency is a sign that the economy is improperly managed and superficially reorganized and that measures are being taken piecemeal.

If the management of the economies in West Africa as a whole evens up with the economies of the West African Monetary Union [UMOA] member countries, then there is no objection. In fact, the UMOA treaty stipulates that the Central Bank is open to all the countries of the subregion. I said earlier that we have the only convertible currency in the developing world, I rule out any move to make the currency inconvertible. I have a healthy and credible currency. So, if we want to come together, this should be done on a healthy and credible basis. We should work toward this. [passage omitted]

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Everything seems to show that the IMF is waging war on African countries?

[Ouattara] It is rather the contrary. The IMF, the World Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, the European Investment Bank, the European Development Fund, the African Development Bank, etc., give states relief. An adjustment program is meant to try to live within one's own means. Many developing countries are not able to do this, essentially because we are poor. When you cannot do it, then you need somebody to help you do it. The IMF, the World Bank, etc...bring resources as well as technical advice that they give to such and such a state to enable them to balance their accounts. [passage omitted]

And if we did not have the external resources the adjustment would be more difficult: Because that would have meant that it is not only 130 billion CFA francs we would have to disburse, but rather more than 1,200 billion CFA francs.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Does the program take into account the various claims made by some socio-professional groups?

[Ouattara] We are in a law-abiding country where trade unionism is accepted. There are procedures; there is a labor code, and everybody has the right to strike and make claims. The state also has the right to say I do not have the means to satisfy your claims.

We negotiated a program under very difficult conditions. As you can recall, a month or two ago we were talking of reducing salaries. We came out of that. We have a program where the inflation rate is going to fall, etc.... This or that socio-professional group wants its working conditions to be improved beyond what would have happened with the reduction in salaries.

But I explained to the president of the Republic that we do not have room to satisfy financial claims. However, trade unions have the right to make claims. We are a law-abiding country, and each one of us should continue to have this in mind. One can go on strike, but one should not prevent others from passing. We must avoid disorder. The strike is a recognized trade union right, but for goodness sake, leave those of us who want to work to do so. That is all we are demanding, and I think a majority of the people share this point of view.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] What are the resources at your disposal to effectively implement your program?

[Ouattara] Will Governor Ouattara have the resources for an exhaustive implementation of this plan? The real resources are the government; the outfits are there on the spot. The president of the Republic has been kind enough to concentrate all the economic bodies in the hands of a committee of which I have the honor to be the chairman. This committee meets regularly, at least once a week and works on this all important dossier. The mission assigned to this committee is in three phases: the drafting phase, which has just finished; an implementation phase, and the follow-up.

In the implementation phase, we will scrutinize both the public and private sectors in regard to their economic and social aspects.

We will examine administrative problems at the level of each ministry and the organizations under their authority in order to assess the possibility of restructuring them. Similarly, we will examine a number of grievances submitted to the head of state by socio-professional groups. The program is comprehensive and, therefore, concerns cabinet members. Each ministry is expected to cooperate for its effective implementation.

Better still, it is not the concern of the government alone. It is the concern of each of us Ivorians. It is not necessarily by a decree that a program can fully be implemented. It requires faith.

We should understand that we are confronted with colossal constraints and that we have avoided a virtually catastrophic situation, which we must overcome. We must understand that these measures should be vigorously and timely implemented to the letter. I therefore count on my compatriots' cooperation to achieve this. [passage omitted]

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Does the Ouattara Program comprise more rigorous measures of control and sanctions?



[Ouattara] In most developing countries—including our country—these notions of control and sanction do not exist and have not been applied. Let us take the example of the banking system. We will control their operations and apply sanctions. A monitoring commission has already been set up within the UMOA with its headquarters in Abidjan.

The commission will be inaugurated on 1 August. Its mission is to inspect all banks of the Monetary Union at least once every two years. After verification, sanctions will be taken including even the possible dismissal of managers.

We must conform to the practices in modern societies. I said earlier that we are virtually the most modern country in Africa. But there are practical things that we do not do. So there is the need for control and sanctions. Sanctions should come a priori and a posteriori. That is before and after. We will audit the Departments of Customs and Taxes, the Treasury, the Autonomous Fund, the Sinking Fund, and the National Social Welfare Fund, with the view to reorganizing them. But afterward, there should be periodical inspections followed by sanctions.

Such sanctions can include the dismissal of those found guilty of mismanagement. We will progress toward better performance by doing this.

[FRATERNITE MATIN] Does the Ouattara Program provide for the creation in the short term of jobs for young people?

[Ouattara] I would like to tell our young compatriots that this program is theirs, because if we continue at the same pace as now, without the support of the international community, we will get into an impasse. Now, the older ones already possess a job, a house, and so on. So, who will lose more? It is the youth.

We will, more forcefully, create jobs more designed for the youth. We will propose measures on age limits in the civil service. [passage omitted]

We should succeed in solving this problem. But we cannot solve it by doing nothing to reorganize our economy. So I appeal to the youth: This program is truly yours. Because if it fails, there will be unemployment and a financial crisis.

## Liberia

### \* LNPC Now Exporting Petroleum Products

34000732C Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER  
in English 20 Apr 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Mr. Mark Wolman, president of the Liberian National Petroleum Corporation (LNPC), has disclosed that his company has begun exporting petroleum products to several West African countries, including Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Senegal, Togo and Nigeria.

He said LNPC has an adequate supply of products to meet the demands of the Liberian market and, as such, the corporation has initiated plans to supply the West African region.

Speaking in an interview in Monrovia, Mr. Wolman said LNPC has already set up two storage depots in Monrovia and supplies Sinoe, Grand Bassa and Maryland Counties.

He said LNPC, established nearly a year ago, currently competes with establishments in the Ivory Coast in supplying petroleum products to the region. Mr. Wolman expressed optimism that with the level of proficiency of his workforce, LNPC will become the first integrated Liberian oil company in West Africa.

According to him, the fully Liberian company has a workforce of 350 with only four permanent expatriates.

Mr. Wolman also disclosed that LNPC is undertaking a three-phase rehabilitation of facilities here, with the first phase costing \$6.8 million for the repair of damaged tanks, pipelines, jetties, pumps, as well as improvement of fire and other safety measures at its terminal on Bushrod Island.

Phase two of the project, which he said is estimated at \$20 million, involves the rehabilitation of the refinery plant in Gardnersville to enable it become operational early next year.

He said phase three of the project will include the improvement of petroleum products to ensure the availability of various types of gasoline products for specified vehicles and other usages.

Mr. Wolman said with the level of investment undertaken by the LNPC since April 1989, as well as the leasing of LPRC facilities for a ten-year period, it may take over five years before the corporation can begin to reap what it has sown.

### \* Taiwan Rice Shipment Part of Technical Aid

34000732B Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER  
in English 17 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by S. Togba Slewion: "Taiwan Gives \$4m Rice"]

[Excerpt] A consignment of 220,000 bags of rice valued at about \$4 million has arrived in the country as part of the Taiwanese government's technical assistance to Liberia.

According to a release from the Planning and Economic Affairs Ministry, proceeds from the sale of the rice, which arrived aboard the "M/V Carmel," will be used to fund various development projects in the country.

Presenting the consignment at the Freeport of Monrovia yesterday, the Ambassador of the Republic of China accredited near this capital, H.E. Kan Dunn, said the

consignment of rice is a goodwill gesture of his government aimed at improving the lives of the Liberian people. [passage omitted]

**\* Serious Annual Decline in Investment Reported**

34000732D Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER  
in English 27 Apr 90 p 10

[Text] The National Investment Commission (NIC) has reported a serious decline in investment in the country over the past year.

In its annual report for 1989, the commission noted that "the number of applications received during the period under review (1989) declined by 64 percent from the number of applications received during the last reporting period."

The commission says, "The decline is responsible to the unfavourable conditions in the (Liberian) economy."

The commission indicated that its performance in 1989 fell short of that of 1988 in terms of volume of project applications received, project applications approved and projects implemented.

The beginning inventory of projects in the pipeline, according to the NIC, showed 14; while it received 13 applications for investment incentives, totalling 27 pipeline project applications in 1989. The commission pointed out that this figure reflects a decline of 64 percent from the number of applications received in 1988. "The decline is responsible to the unfavourable conditions in the economy," the commission insisted.

The Investment Commission said a total of 10 projects were approved for investment incentives during the period compared to 14 projects approved during 1988. It said only four out of the ten projects approved are being implemented compared to six out of 14 for the last reporting period, noting that a cumulative implementation record of ten projects implemented during the reporting entails a total investment outlay of \$9.1 million.

The NIC said, however, that in spite of these statistics of less favourable performance which are reflective of the prevailing conditions in the economy, there is sufficient justification to look at the future with some degree of optimism.

Justifying this statement, the commission said the meaningful policy directions of the government, which include self-sufficiency in food production, private sector development with emphasis on indigenous entrepreneurship development, the development of fiscal discipline and efficient financial management in government, are policies whose implementation has already begun to generate positive signals.

According to the commission, this has also generated positive investor responses. "It is our conviction indeed that these positive investor response signals will go a long

way to compact themselves as springboards for a giant "take off" to economic recovery," the commission added.

Meanwhile, the National Investment Commission has advanced a five-point recommendation to government aimed at enhancing its operation. They are:

*The revised Investment Incentive Code now before the National Legislature should be speedily ratified in order to minimize the likelihood of the "wait and see" attitude of our partners-in-progress which has been the commission's experience in recent times.*

*The 50 percent freeze on the level of investment incentives to enterprises should be revised since, in fact, such a freeze has not created the desired result of effectuating increase in revenues.*

*In an effort to remove the prevailing impediments to smooth processing of investment applications, it is our recommendation that the processing of investment incentive applications be centralized at the NIC.*

*That the government of Liberia does everything possible to provide the necessary logistics in terms of vehicles and other necessary facilities to ensure the effective and efficient operation of the NIC.*

*Finally, in order to ensure the monitoring of the activities of investment incentives contracts for recipients, all import entries for items required for import by the enterprises under investment incentive contracts be submitted to the NIC for scrutiny and approval prior to processing of such entries by the Ministry of Finance.*

**\* Editorial Urges Talks With Taylor Forces**

34000732A Monrovia THE MIRROR  
in English 23 Apr 90 p 3

[Excerpt] Tuesday, April 24 will make it four months since rebel forces under the command of Charles Taylor invaded Liberia through Nimba County. And so for four long agonizing months, fighting between government troops and rebel forces has raged. Lives and properties have been destroyed in the process with nearly half of Nimba's total population scattered in neighboring countries as well as elsewhere in the country. Indeed, for four bitter months, Nimba has been converted into a virtual war zone.

Today everybody is caught spellbound and perhaps confused as to finding the best possible way to arrive at an amicable resolution to the current war. The fact that Charles Taylor and his group have survived to last four months in battle with government forces is enough to lead to the conclusion that the situation is quite a serious one. Latest reports have it that the conflict is no longer confined to Nimba County, but is escalating into other areas.

We are convinced that the situation can be brought under control if some hard decisions based on sober and

rational thinking are taken. One of such decisions is to reach Charles Taylor, even if it is felt that his action is unconstitutional. Granted that Taylor wants to take power through unconstitutional and violent means, it should not be ruled out that he could be representing a constituency which may not necessarily be present in the country.

Arguments have been advanced that Taylor represents nobody. Granted. But how can somebody who is representing nobody fight an existing government to this time? Is it possible that Charles Taylor is thinking that he is engaged in a futile battle; a rebel without cause? Quite impossible. Let us not be deceived.

The time to act is now. It would be counter-productive to continue ignoring Taylor. It would also be catastrophic to continue counter-acting violence for violence especially to the detriment of people. This war must not be permitted to keep going on. Liberia is a small place and a stranger to mass violence in greater proportion as we are currently experiencing.

We wish to reiterate our call on humanitarian organizations, friendly governments and international organizations to intervene in the Liberian crisis so as to end the suffering of the people especially those of Nimba County.

It is our strongest conviction that any conflict, however violent, can be resolved at the conference table where the parties to the conflict express their grievances and then finally come to a compromise. This is why we feel that talking at both ends of the crisis should begin because it is the only way that mediation can take place. We do not think it makes sense to attempt to forge dialogue between somebody and nobody. [passage omitted]

#### \* Legislature Approves 1990 Fiscal Budget

34000522A Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER  
in English 6 Apr 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] The 1990 budget of Liberia has been approved by the National Legislature.

The budget, which is over \$450 million, was approved yesterday with several rectifications and recommendations by the joint Ways, Means and Finance Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate, which has been discussing the budget for about a week.

The joint committee, headed by Lofa County Senator Abraham Kollie and Bomi County Representative James Z. Holmes, recommended \$69 million for development and increased budgetary appropriations for the Judiciary, and the Ministries of Education and Health, among others.

#### \* Nimba Mine Venture Needs Major Investment

34000523A Monrovia BUSINESS DIGEST  
in English 6-9 Apr 90 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] Notwithstanding the crisis in Nimba, the Government of Liberia is determined to exploit the iron ore resources in the country through bilateral and external cooperation.

Consequently, Finance Minister Emmanuel L. Shaw has said 62 million dollars is urgently needed to effectively carry out the activities of the Nimba Mining Company (NIMCO), a major joint venture between the governments of Liberia and Guinea.

According to Minister Shaw, who is Vice Chairman of NIMCO, a French company, BNGC is to shortly provide a contribution of one million dollars while a British company in England (name not disclosed) has also agreed to make available another one million dollars towards the funding of the project.

Minister Shaw who was speaking recently at the end of a three day 2nd Initial Board meeting at the Unity Conference Center in Virginia noted that NIMCO expects to raise the balance of \$60 million from international donor agencies and individual participation from Liberia and Guinea.

He explained that though the Nimba International Mining Company should have began operation in 1992, it had to start earlier than that because of the pullout of LAMCO from Liberia, adding that by readily taking over the role of LAMCO, many workers had regained employment.

He pointed out that work at the company's site will officially begin in December this year so as to achieve the company's intended purpose. [passage omitted]

### Niger

#### General Saibou Addresses CSON Closing Session

AB2006212690 Niamey Domestic Service in French  
1900 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Address by President Ali Saibou, chairman of the National Movement of the Development Society [MNSD], at the closing session of the second regular meeting of the Council of National Orientation [CSON]; in Niamey, 16 June—recorded]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, members of CSON, and Cabinet ministers, we are now at the end of the second regular session of the CSON. During the deliberations, we examined major social and economic issues with the necessary serenity and democratic spirit which has always characterized deliberations within this body. The relevant items on the agenda prompted fruitful discussions based on our respective experiences. This session was permeated with objectivity and realism. It enabled us to find solutions suitable to domestic realities with a



view to broadening democracy in our country and achieving the welfare of our people.

Ladies and gentlemen, this session provided us accurate current information on the realities of our environment. It enabled us to lay the foundations of policies to be adopted by the Movement and government bodies in the face of the current turmoil.

Indeed, in this fast-changing world, triumph can be achieved only through organization and innovation. At least this is the current truth. Therefore, this meeting helped us find concrete solutions to solve our country's major problems. The measures originally adopted are suited to our social, cultural, and economic realities, as well as to our historical and political context. They show, needless to say, the determination of the MNSD, our political organization, to broaden the democratic spectrum in our country.

The decisions made by this body must be seen as the expression of our movement's determination to help, through the active and militant participation of all social forces of the country, in economic restructuring and recovery. These two objectives are national priorities which call for greater realism and determination in the conduct of public and administrative affairs.

Any official of a political-administrative body, mass organ, or socioprofessional association must be imbued with the same determination and adopt a responsible attitude in the face of the current problems. Recent experience calls for realism because it has shown that difficulties have led to political and economic deadlock in a few countries. This was caused by lack of realism on the part of the leadership or people in their approach to solving their problems.

Ladies and gentlemen, members of CSON, our deliberations show the profoundness of our discussions. Through them, we have made high-level political decisions, including the revision of the Constitution and National Charter so as to broaden our political base and implement the enlightenment, information, and training program for MNSD cadres and militants.

As far as defense and security are concerned, we deplored the recent events in the north for which some people have found pleasure in speculating on a death toll, despite our statements and readiness to answer any questions from anyone. These events call for greater vigilance and patriotism and the need to think over the political and administrative structures in the area so as to make it easier for our repatriated countrymen to be socially integrated.

At the political level, the council supported the need to rehabilitate the Development Bank of the Republic of Niger so as to make it operational as soon as possible.

Our ruling body also set up an ad hoc commission comprising CSON members to revive dialogue with our industrial relations partners, and to create the conditions

for sustaining it. This is definitely a wise and militant move which confirms our belief in the virtue of dialogue and consultation in the search for solutions to problems of general interest, particularly those of an industrial character.

I would like to make special mention of the positive clearheadedness of our socioprofessional organizations, whose leadership demonstrated during this meeting an encouraging realism and high sense of responsibility. I hope this move, conceived by our ruling body, will enable permanent consultation and dialogue between government institutions and the industrial relations partners in the interest of Niger and of its people.

The turbulent period through which we are passing calls for greater sacrifice. I therefore appeal to the sense of good citizenship of all, asking you to support and supplement the sacrifices being made by government in order to safeguard the gains of our people. I hope that through consultation and solidarity—both virtues of Niger—we will demonstrate our faith in the building of our motherland.

Ladies and gentlemen, members of the CSON, the conviction with which each of us embraced the decisions that we made enjoins us to make a sustained effort to implement them. I would like to pay tribute to our supreme ruling body for its political maturity and the clearheadedness of its decisions. It would also be appropriate here to congratulate the MNSD militants for the warm reception accorded the joint government-MNSD mission which has just ended a tour of the hinterland.

Our people demonstrated the consistency of the MNSD and of its leadership organs. Thus, as we enter the rainy season, I urge our brave farmers to work harder, for this is the key aspect of our development effort. To the private business concerns—whose contribution is important, since it supplements that of the public enterprises in ensuring a lasting rehabilitation and revival of our economy—I call for strict compliance with the rules and regulations in line with our legislation.

What is required today is to unite the energies and brains of all Niger's social strata so that, together, we may pull our country out of the crisis. We are duty-bound to do our utmost in order that prosperity and well-being for our people result from our concerted action and involvement. But, this will be possible only if everyone demonstrates a sense of realism. This sense of realism, which I have just mentioned, implies not only intellectual honesty but also political courage. For it involves seeing things as they are, and not as one would like to see them.

Indeed, at this time when our country is going through sociopolitical changes, we should be realistic in our behavior. For as a population expert once put it: There is no human problem without a solution, since that solution is in us. However, finding it, defining it, and applying it requires a particularly intensive effort, since it involves an effort of the conscience—or should I say a real awareness of the existing situation.

May the conclusions of this session, therefore, guide everyone toward real awareness. It is on this note of hope that I formulate the wish of a bumper harvest for our country. While wishing you all a safe journey back home, I declare closed the deliberations of the second regular session of the Higher Council of National Orientation of the MNSD. Thank you!

#### **CSON-USTN Meeting Ends; Communiqué Issued**

AB1506164590 Nian.ry Domestic Service in French  
1200 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Communiqué issued following meeting of officials of the Higher Council of National Orientation [CSON] and Federation of Trade Unions of Niger [USTN]; Niamey; 15 June 1990]

[Text] After analyzing the situation in the country, a situation marked by industrial actions and social disturbances harmful to the nation's development, the second regular session of the Higher Council of National Orientation has set up an ad hoc committee to create the conditions necessary for a frank and responsible dialogue between the sides in conflict. This ad hoc committee chaired by Brigi Raffini, chairman of the National Development Council, CND, includes: Colonel Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou, Captain Abdourahmane Seydou, (Sale Shaibou), (Laouali Danhazoun), Boubé Oumarou, Yahaya Oumarou, Sandi Yacouba, and (Bagan Essessa), all CSON members.

This committee met with the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions of Niger on 14 June 1990 at 1600 at the Congress Hall. The USTN delegation, led by Comrade Laouali Moutari, included the following comrades: Rabiou Daouda, Moussa Mohamed, Issouf Saibou, Djaouga Abdou, Ali Moussa, Abdoulaye Saibou, Arouna Namagare, Ali Djibrila, Brah Oumarou, Bello Abdoulaye, Oumar Allassane, Ekade Aboubakar, Kadiri Kanda, and Sahabi Barmou. After presenting the objectives set for the ad hoc committee by the CSON session, the CND chairman stressed the CSON's desire to establish a productive dialogue between partners.

The CSON members stressed the following points:

1. The need to restore social peace in the country;
2. The need for consultations between partners before making major decisions concerning the running of the country's affairs;
3. The hope that the events that have occurred will serve as a beneficial lesson for all in the nation's interest;
4. A common willingness to build the country;
5. The need to reach concrete results in the Niger people's interest;
6. The urgent need to sign agreements with the IMF and the World Bank;

7. At the international level, the need to channel efforts of all the sons of the country to implement a number of principles for economic recovery;

8. Tolerance and understanding of all to strengthen the young Niger democracy;

9. The need to end the social unrest, source of problems and instability which is harmful to national reconstruction efforts;

10. The CSON's willingness to do everything possible to favor the establishment of a social consensus;

11. Niger, a country already confronted with natural calamities, cannot tolerate the dangerous evil of discord among its sons, whose efforts should be joined toward the same ideal of peace and progress.

Taking the floor, the secretary general of the USTN, Comrade Laouali Moutari, traced the origin of the events which landed us into this deplorable situation. The USTN delegation stressed the following points:

1. Release of fellow citizens, trade union leaders, students, pupils, and other people who were detained for striking and organizing unauthorized meetings.
2. Cessation of every action of intimidation of workers following the strikes on Monday, 11 June and Tuesday, 12 June.
3. Access to the press by all the sons of the country, notably trade union organizations, in conformity with the regulations in force.
4. Cancellation of the prohibition by the chairman of the Niamey urban community preventing the exercise of the right to organize meetings, and all other regulations of that nature.
5. The principle of frank negotiation over all the points which have been the subject of the strike notice between the government and the trade union federation.
6. The principle on the debate on the country's socioeconomic situation.
7. Resumption of negotiations with the liaison commission for normalizing the situation in schools.

The meeting remarked a convergence of views on several important points and decided to bring about a detente in the social climate by concluding a first agreement. Thus, the release of all the persons arrested was obtained concomitantly with the cancellation of the protest march slated for Friday, 15 June 1990. The meeting recommends the resumption of frank negotiations on all the issues at stake in the shortest possible time.

The meeting retained the principle of restoring permanent dialogue between the government and social partners on the major problems of national interest, notably those affecting the social sector. The meeting stressed the urgent need to favor the establishment of a climate of

trust between all the sons of the nation in order to reinforce Niger's position regarding its partners. The meeting expressed satisfaction with the atmosphere of serenity and confidence that characterized the proceedings which permitted positive results, demonstrating a readiness to continue the dialogue between the social partners.

Issued in Niamey on 15 June 1990. Thank you.  
[applause]

### Nigeria

#### Strong Protest to CSFR on South Africa Ties

AB1606123690 Lagos Domestic Service in English  
0600 GMT 14 Jun 90

[Text] The Federal Government has reacted to the decision of Czechoslovakia to establish a consulate general in South Africa by the end of this year. Diplomatic correspondent, Joseph Azoro, reports that the reaction is contained in a statement issued in Lagos yesterday by the Ministry of External Affairs.

[Begin Azoro recording] The statement disclosed that the Federal Government has summoned the charge d'affaires of the Czechoslovakia Embassy in Lagos and lodged a strong protest against the decision to establish diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. The charge d'affaires was told that if the decision to establish relations with apartheid South Africa was based on an announcement made by De Klerk regarding the partial lifting of the state of emergency by his government, such decision was premature. The statement argued that the partial lifting of the state of emergency had not addressed the core issue of dismantling of apartheid. The charge d'affaires was made fully aware of the concern and seriousness with which the Federal Government viewed attempts to encourage apartheid South Africa to continue with this evil system.

The statement reaffirmed the policy of the Federal Government that, while it welcomed recent domestic developments in South Africa, the Pretoria regime should not be rewarded nor should sanctions be lifted until there was clear evidence of irreversible change in South Africa's policy of apartheid.

The statement reminded Czechoslovakia and the international community that the Pretoria regime was yet to abide by the content of OAU Harare Declaration. The declaration called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees and refraining from imposing any restrictions on them. Others are the lifting of the ban and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons, the removal of troops from the townships and an end to the state of emergency. [end recording]

#### Protocol Agreement Signed With Yugoslavia

AB3005080090 Lagos International Service  
in English 1030 GMT 29 May 90

[Text] Nigeria and Yugoslavia have expressed satisfaction with the results so far achieved in the implementation of development projects between the two countries and agreed to encourage specific proposals submitted by partners of the two countries in different fields. The two countries also agreed to step up their bilateral cooperation in specific areas such as energy, water management, and hydrogeology, pharmacy, medicine, and technology, meteorology, and chemical technology, ship building and tourism as well as agricultural and food processing industry.

This was made known in Belgrade by Chief Iyema Ita Eyema, Nigeria's minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs, and Mr. Steven Santov for Yugoslavia while signing a protocol agreement between the two countries. To this end, all Yugoslav technicians taking part in the proposed joint researches expressed their readiness to engage in technical and business cooperation such as consultant services, drawing up of preinvestment and other studies, and project execution.

In addition, the two countries agreed to facilitate contact between the relevant institutions to enable them [to] establish cooperation in the various fields, while resources needed for the realization of the cooperation will be provided by the institutions. Yugoslavia had earlier restated its intention to increase its oil import from Nigeria in a bid to correct the current imbalance in trade between the two countries. The next session of the Nigeria-Yugoslav joint commission will be held on a date to be agreed upon.

#### \* Foreigners, Citizens Said To Collude for Fraud

34000651A Lagos THE GUARDIAN  
in English 22 Apr 90 pp 1-2

[Text] Unknown to most Nigerians, their compatriots have helped foreigners to stab the country in the back.

Exploiting lapses in law enforcement, greed on the part of some police, customs and immigration officers and selfishness of top managers in sectors of the economy, expatriates declare spurious production levels.

Customsmen turn a blind eye, immigration officers fail to enforce the expatriate quota, and senior Nigerian employees keep mum on fraudulent expatriate remittances. Some executives of commercial and merchant banks are accomplices. Central Bank officials remain indifferent.

In the steel industry for instance, senior management sources said the Nigerian Machine Tools Industry (NMI) at Oshogbo which is now shopping for N800 million would have cost N60 million to complete in 1979 when the contract was signed with the Hindustan Machine



Tools Industry (HMI) of India, if the Nigerian signatories had taken greater care for their country.

Officials said the problem with the Oshogbo Machine Tool Industry today has its origin in the 1979 contract.

The document they said gave the Hindustan Machine Tool of India, 10- years (1979-1989) to complete the industry and hand over to Nigerians. Indians also occupied senior management positions, including that of the chief executive, chief accountant and marketing executive.

There were no Nigerians to oversee or understudy the Indians who turned this lapse on Nigeria's part into an economic advantage for their home machine tool industry. They were said to have paid less attention to completing the Oshogbo industry since this will lend its dependence on India.

Officials said the Oshogbo industry became a market for India's HMI which was even suspected of dismantling its own out-dated machines for the Oshogbo industry.

There was a celebrated instance where machines ordered for shipment to Nigeria were in old calibrations instead of the metric system. No Nigerian inspected the imports.

Sources put the blame on the signatories of the contract for allowing the Indians an unhindered 10 years stay pointing out that the orientals took charge of their own machine tool industry just one year after the Soviets built it.

The result of the lapse is the non-completion of the Oshogbo Machine Tool Industry which, apart from the staggering N800 million needs an additional N8 million to reactivate an imported power generating plant discovered to have been refurbished by unscrupulous exporters.

At the Nigerian Railway Corporation, sources disclosed that it would have taken the Ajaokuta Steel Mill \$ 300 million in 1984 (about N300 million) to modernise the rail tracks. This was at a time when one naira was the equivalent of one dollar. But officials of the corporation insisted at the time in giving the contract to a Romanian company at a whopping N3 billion.

The cost would just have been a mere 10 percent of the modernisation budget.

THE GUARDIAN gathered that those who were pushing for the modernisation to be contracted out, frustrated the railway plans because they failed to convince the Finance Ministry on why Ajaokuta should not handle the project.

Indian industrialist Ashok Girglani who was deported last week, reportedly failed to pay tax on illegal monetary transfers because he was advised against the payment by his Nigerian business colleagues.

Official sources failed to name these Nigerians but said Ashok Girglani transferred 300 million CFA to London and Geneva, against Nigeria's foreign currency transfer regulations, but considering that he had over 298 Nigerians in his employ, Girglani was asked to pay tax on the money a generous offer which he turned down, claiming the money was capital and not income.

Girglani was said to have ignored the directive to pay the tax because his Nigerian business associates told him to ignore the security men whom they said were junior officers.

THE GUARDIAN also gathered that Girglani was very close to the police and had actually employed their services to arrest Mr Sekouba Dambele—his money courier—who made away with over 120 million CFA he was supposed to illegally take out for him.

The police were said to be more interested in arresting Dambele and recovering the money than in knowing why the Indian industrialist was using him to siphon away money instead of using the official forex market.

Currently, four immigration officials are on the run because they took N30,000 to provide Sekouba Dambele with a Nigerian passport. Sekouba who is a nephew to the deported Malian envoy wanted Nigerian travel documents, which he acquired with the assistance of their officers.

THE GUARDIAN investigation team was also surprised with the influence some expatriates (particularly Asian manufacturers) wield in the customs and immigration departments. The nation, THE GUARDIAN discovered is losing revenue from excise duties because customs officials undervalue manufacture production levels.

Although indigenous Nigerian manufacturers are said to be interested in this trick, investigations showed that customs officials have more confidence in their expatriate accomplices than Nigerians, because of high pay offs and confidentiality.

This deal is carried out by the manufacturing company understanding their production capacities.

They therefore pay duties based on their declared production capacities, while the revenue accruing to the company from the undeclared production quota is shared with customs officials.

This is said to be one of the reason the level of capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector is difficult to ascertain.

Two big South Asian manufacturing firms in Ikeja, Lagos, have perfected ways of cheating the government in connivance with their Nigerian counterparts.

They also cash in on the low duties charged on spare parts and machinery by opening huge credit lines for the importation of spare parts.

It is alleged that no imports are made when huge amount of money is remitted, as the money is simply credited to their accounts in their home countries.

In some cases, they vote huge sums of money for the importation of particular items, but only to end up buying goods such as umbrellas, textiles and cars.

Their Nigerian accountants who are usually keen on feathering their own nests, help them sweep secrets under the carpet.

Clearing and forwarding agents in line with companies import managers are also known to be colluding with expatriates to bring in contraband with assistance from ports and customs officials.

For instance, large consignments of granulated sugar imported into the country by a Lebanese bottling company, were cleared as additives for soft drink and later sold in the open market.

Yet the plant managers, cost accountants, financial controllers and quality control supervisors of the company were aware of the development which THE GUARDIAN learnt has been going on for a long time.

The company in question, still resells large quantities of sugar in the open market, with its Nigerian officials turning a blind eye.

Sources said proceeds from this activity are never declared anywhere as revenue accruing to the company, since it has no relationship with manufacturing venture. Besides, tax on the profits made out of the sales is also lost.

A senior bank official explained that the expatriates have been instrumental in the servicing of numerous accounts of Nigerian bank executives in other countries.

This, he said, is done by allowing more credit transfers to the expatriates foreign accounts, while happy, expatriates reward the 'kind' bankers in foreign currencies.

In most cases, agreements among bankers would be to use the money in buying houses for them and this spurs them to carry out more "unauthorised" financial deals.

Sources at the Federal Ministry of Finance told THE GUARDIAN that to exceed the remittance level of 25 percent of net earnings to expatriates, some expatriates collude with bank executives and claim that they are running a joint account with their wives who are not gainfully employed.

This affords them the opportunity to repatriate more funds from their wives purported salaries which are non-existent.

The officials of commercial banks and the supervising Central Bank are said to have been less eager to stop these foreigners since most of them are friends to the expatriates.

Since the expatriate remittance was reduced from 75 percent to 25 percent three years ago, this act became commonplace.

An accountant with one of the expatriate firms told THE GUARDIAN that the biggest deal comes through the allocation of expatriate quota to companies.

While listing their expatriate quota requirements, accountants, marketing executives and purchasing executives are listed as engineers of rare specialties because the guideline on expatriate quota favours foreigners employed in these fields.

After a very brief stay in the companies, these officials are then re-assigned and given sensitive accounting and commercial positions to perpetuate their obnoxious intentions.

Men of the immigration departments are shying away from such revelations. A source close to the immigration department told THE GUARDIAN that it is the duty of the immigration officers to monitor the activities of expatriates with the aim of ascertaining whether they are actually doing what they were supposed to do.

A customs official who spoke to THE GUARDIAN alleged that his moral objection to the illegal and nefarious practice had resulted in his being posted to a border town and later to the office where he was assigned administrative duties.

#### **\* Editorial Endorses Death as 'Price of Treason'**

3400066.34 Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN  
in English 4 May 90 p 1

[Text] The heinous treason committed by the bunch of hoodlums who organized the aborted rebellion of 22/4/90, holds some object lessons for the nation's survival. First is that the level of awareness and political consciousness today in the country makes it impossible for any handful of persons to gang up and foist their distorted perceptions on the national life.

Indeed, from the moment of their broadcast, it was obvious that what the rebels had planned was to cause unparalleled civil chaos. The announced splitting up of the Nigerian state pointed up the rebels' bigoted and twisted vision. So also did their insolent directives that, tens of millions of citizens move to their "newly created countries" within seven days. All this betrayed their warped, drunken psychosis of the absurd.

But more ominous was the rebels' unrelenting harping upon religious, ethnic and sectional themes. In their ill-fated broadcast, drawled out in drunken incoherence and amazing illogic, the rebels had sought to drag market women, journalists, students and several other interest groups into their dastardly treason. It was a devilish stratagem. Mercifully, it failed.

We see the failure of this stratagem as traceable to two key factors, which hold vital lessons for any future gang

of hoodlums seeking to disrupt the national life. First is that, following the unrelenting efforts of the Babangida administration in educating citizens on what to expect from the transition programme, a general awareness has developed throughout the nation today, that the Babangida administration should be the last military administration this nation would have.

Next is that the administration had kept faith with the transition programme, and that the nation was indeed at the critical juncture of registration of party members into the two parties when the hoodlums staged their rebellion.

Thus, this dual combination of created awareness, on the need to have democratic rule, as well as the tenacious pursuit of this goal, by the Babangida administration, made citizens see no reason whatsoever in coming out in their thousands to hail the so-called "successful" ouster of the Babangida administration. Rather its call was met with irritation and apathy.

It is noteworthy however, that the very success of the present administration in both the creation of awareness on the transition programme and in its pursuit, has created very powerful enemies now pursuing the avowed goal of not stopping at anything, just to ensure that the transition programme is disrupted. The aim of these enemies no doubt, is to drag the administration's efforts in the mud as evidence that the administration is no better than previous ones.

In Africa today, any gang of disgruntled elements and mindless traitors who storm the seat of power, fraudulently describing their move as a revolution, and they themselves as revolutionaries, as claimed by the rebels and traitors, are invariably the scum of both the society and the military. Mostly, using religion, ethno-centric sentiments, exploiting the gullibility of the people, causes havoc, destructions, killings, and desecration of the society. But a revolution is the emergence of a society from a quantitative change, to a higher qualitative political and economic order.

Within this analysis, the transition programme to a Third Republic is unalterably the re-emergence of Nigeria as a powerful, stable, progressive and dynamic order, from the two ignoble and disastrous first and second republics. To sabotage this genuine revolution constitutes the greatest treason which must be met with supreme punishment.

Obviously, a good number of those who constitute such powerful negative force come from some past administrations, who had helped bring the nation to ruins. Evidence of this is available in the direct involvement of some civilians in a coup in the nation for the first time, at a deep level. It is also this evidence that must convince skeptics who had before now scoffed, whenever officials talked about sabotage and unrelenting efforts to undermine the transition programme.

Now also, the nation has come face to face with one ugly example of the real source of confrontational posturings against the Babangida administration. We wonder where all the civil libertarians and those other misguided representatives of foreign so-called human rights groups hid themselves on the morning of the rebels' heinous treason.

Thus, former governors who in recent times have insisted that the spirit of rebellion was alive and well in the nation; pardoned initiators of a previous rebellion who stride around the nation making provocative statements, and newspapers and other media, which fanned the embers of sectionalism and disunity before the aborted rebellion: all these in their different ways no doubt helped solidify the rebels conviction in their false and ignoble mission.

However, we view as a special disservice to this nation, the action of those newspapers and other media who, even after the rebellion had been crushed, were bent on manufacturing inflammatory "news" and whipping up such artificial news to ridiculous proportions.

We see as underlying such inflammatory publications, a tacit support for the rebellion. This no doubt puts such publications at the same level as the act of rebellion itself. Consequently; we think it extreme moral fraud, that is the same publications that are now calling for "considerate" handling of the same hoodlums. And this, after the rebels had exposed the nation to international ridicule, with their distorted motives, drunken incoherences, and downright illogic, not to mention the heavy loss of lives of innocent Nigerians, soldiers and civilians alike.

Such calls for "sympathy" in this tragedy are, in our view, acts of extreme and unpardonable subversion. This is why a stop must be put to all such calls. Happily, the federal military government has restated its unswerving resolve to pursue the path of justice. We see no better course. The careful and very thorough investigations now afoot, must lead to unwavering justice. All those who are found guiltless must be let off, no matter their seeming relationship with the rebels.

On the other hand, all those found guilty must, we repeat must, face the swift and full weight of the law.

The price of treason, as well as misprision of treason, is death.

#### **\* Government on Human Rights Respect for Rebels**

*34000663C Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN  
in English 8 May 90 pp 1, 3*

[Text] The panel set up by the Federal Government to investigate and try suspects, shows the Babangida administration's respect for justice and human rights, the Managing Director of New Nigerian Newspapers Limited, Sidi Ali Sirajo has said.



Speaking yesterday on the BBC Network Africa Service in an interview with Mr Marcus Ferguson, monitored in Lagos, Sidi Ali Sirajo said that in most third world countries, the heinous action of the rebels would have earned them summary execution within 24 hours.

He said it was a mark of the great respect which the present administration in Nigeria had for human rights and civil liberties which caused the setting up of the present panel to thoroughly investigate each case and ensure that fair and just decisions were taken.

Sidi Ali Sirajo said those civil rights organizations and members of the media calling for mercy and pardon for the suspects, were doing the suspects great disservice, since such calls already presumed the suspects, guilty.

He said that the rebels who conducted the insurrection of April 22 were a gang of hoodlums, who have no binding motives of ideology, religion or politics, but were motivated each by his selfish personal desires.

Sidi Ali Sirajo told the BBC that the rebels were anti-democratic forces, who wanted to disrupt the transition to civil rule programme which had been pursued tenaciously by the Babangida administration from the setting up of the political bureau, through the Constitution Drafting Committee, the Constituent Assembly, initial elections at the local government level, registration of two grassroots parties, and the just concluded registration of members into the two political parties.

Sidi Ali Sirajo said that it was this painstaking efforts to return the nation to constitutional democratic process which the rebels wanted to disrupt, and which made democratic forces round the world send solidarity messages to President Ibrahim Babangida.

He enumerated some of such messages, including those from President George Bush of the United States, Mrs Margaret Thatcher of Britain, Russia's Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, and a host of other world democratic leaders.

He said this demonstrated the level of seriousness with which Nigeria's transition to civil rule programme was regarded by democratic forces world-wide.

Sidi Ali Sirajo told the BBC that the credibility of the Babangida administration was evident in the apathy and open hostility which the masses showed to the rebels call for them to join in the rebellion.

He said it was now necessary for the media to exercise restraint and maturity in publications, to avoid pre-empting the due process of law and hampering investigations, because the mere fact that two weeks after the crushed rebellion no suspect has been executed, demonstrated the determination of the federal government to be fair in the trial of suspects.

In response to another question by the BBC on the arrest of some journalists, Sidi Ali Sirajo replied that no nation the world over would tolerate inflammatory insinuations and reckless and false publications and misinformation

at such a critical and grave situation, where the head of state has come under artillery fire with massive structural and human destruction.

He said journalists, like all Nigerians, are subject to the laws of the country and must therefore not take liberties of the respect for human rights by the Ibrahim Babangida administration, to initiate chaos and anarchy.

He further pointed out that such false reports by some publications had resulted in embarrassing eminent citizen who have now resorted to law suits.

#### \* Public Ponders True Mission of National Guard

34000648C Ikeja NEWSWATCH in English  
23 Apr 90 pp 13-14; 16- 18

[Article by Anietie Usen. Words in italics as published.]

[Text] Hit squad. Killer guards. Private army. Super police force. Storm troopers. Gestapo. *Securitate*. These are just a few of the nicknames given the National Guard, Nigeria's newest security agency, first made public seven months ago by President Ibrahim Babangida in a speech to mark the fourth anniversary of his coming to power.

Apprehension is mounting. The public is scared stiff. Even the police, the military and other security agencies are worrying and grumbling, almost aloud. The myth, the mystique and the hullabaloo surrounding the super guards appear to have unwittingly turned everybody already into a battered and bruised victim of the new guard, even before a single National Guardsman steps on the street. Strongly-worded articles and memoranda have arrived newspaper houses as well as Dodan Barracks, the seat of power, carpeting the whole idea and those who conceived it. Some workers' unions have demanded that the idea should be dropped. The SUNDAY NEWS, in an editorial a few weeks ago, took the matter up. "We appeal very strongly to President Babangida to disband this National Guard with immediate effect. It is absolutely dubious, it is absolutely dangerous and entirely uncalled for..." Not less than five newspapers have written similar editorials in the last few weeks.

But almost unmindful of and unhindered by widespread condemnations, top government and security officials speaking for the first time on the issue since Babangida first dropped hints of the guards told NEWSWATCH last week there was no going back on the new security agency. The draft decree on the National Guard is already before the president for scrutiny, amendments, presentation to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, AFRC, and signature. Contacts and trips have so far been made to several countries, including Italy, to study the structure, logistics, mode of operation and functions of their national guards. A similar trip to the United States was being arranged by Dodan Barracks last week.

Tucked away in their new second floor office at the Cabinet Office at Tafawa Balewa Square, Lagos, and working round the clock to complete the ground-work for the take-off of the security force were Patrick Koshoni, retired vice-admiral and chairman of the Internal Security Reorganisation Committee, ISRC; Victor Pam, retired deputy inspector-general of police and "head of the National Guard desk," as well as Adamu Dyeres, a colonel; Jim Egbele, navy commander; and Emmanuel Ombu, a group captain; who are representatives of the army, navy and air force respectively in the ISRC.

This is in addition to Anthony Ukpo, a colonel and principal staff officer to the president, who is co-ordinating the guard project from Dodan Barracks. Said Ukpo, a former governor, on the widespread disdain for the National Guard: "Those who are worried about the National Guard are honestly doing so out of ignorance of the role it is supposed to play. Let me make it clear that the National Guard is not a hit squad, it is not a private army nor a clandestine force. Instead, it is a regular uniformed force that will fill the crucial missing link now existing between the functions of the police force and the army." In a similar vein, Koshoni told NEWSWATCH the National Guard idea is "completely opposed to these ludicrous concepts being published for public consumption." Said the former chief of naval staff: "When I read these things in the papers that the National Guard is Babangida's private army, I laugh myself hoarse. Nothing could be further from the truth." It was the first time Dodan Barracks and the ISRC would break their silence over the controversy.

Babangida, while announcing the government's decision to set up the paramilitary force, told the nation that its functions would consist of: quelling violent disturbances; dispersing, suppressing and controlling violent crowds and demonstrations; regular patrol of Nigeria's borders and providing assistance during disasters. What became rather disturbing for the public was the additional news that the novel force would not function within the control of the armed and police forces, but would instead be controlled exclusively by the president. The motive of such a force immediately became suspect, more so given the penchant of military rulers in Africa to turn themselves into presidents-for-life. This suspicion persists. "These people (the Babangida regime) are very unpredictable," Amos Komolafe of the University of Lagos said last week. "What are they going to do with a para-military force now, if they are not nursing the idea of perpetuating themselves in power after 1992?" he asked.

Fred Onyeoziri, a writer, came up with a longer list of questions: Why wouldn't the new force be made part of the police? Why should the personnel of the force be given special treatment... (such as) generous remuneration, better pension and superior equipment? Why should they be selected or recruited and promoted by the presidency? Would this not make them personally loyal to the president? More important, why should the timing of its formation coincide with the transition programme?

Said Onyeoziri: "If you are a citizen who values freedom and human dignity, you must feel uncomfortable (about these developments). It is dangerous to encourage any state security agency to develop personalised loyalty to any other public officer because when the defence of the officer's interest diverges from the defence of the public interest, the agency would become a ready tool (in the hands of the officer) for subverting the public interest in preference for the interest and power of the leader... My fear is that such a force can become a terror to the citizens...and if I were the president, I would almost not certainly need such a force."

The National Guard has also been looked upon as the answer to the frequent take-over of government by soldiers. Babangida himself may have contributed directly to this thinking by publicly stating his desire to ensure that the coup that brought him to power would be the last for Nigeria. One of those who share this view is Stanley Macebuh, a prominent Nigerian journalist. Said Macebuh in his SUNDAY TIMES essay last month: "It seems to me that, short of people's militia, our best insurance against the arrogance of the military (is) a properly armed National Guard that could serve as a counter weight against a regular army." This supposed role for the elite guards, NEWSWATCH investigation shows, has not been taken kindly by soldiers. Said one senior officer: "Some soldiers are not quite excited about this National Guard simply because they assume that, if the guard turns out to be super force, as it is speculated, it will steal the thunder from them."

Yet, another area of concern about the fledgling force has centred on what many consider a "duplication of its functions" with the normal duties of the police and other security organisations. Not a few think this will create unnecessary rivalry, bad blood and a sort of "in-built insecurity" in the security system. For one, many police officers argue that the mobile police force (created in 1962) is still charged with almost all the functions assigned the National Guard, such as suppression of civil disorders and rescue operations during natural disasters. Similarly, the immigrations department is charged with the function of border patrol. Said a senior police officer at Kam Selem House, Lagos: "My feeling is that it is dangerous to establish a security outfit that can undermine the authority of the police."

Besides that, most police officers appear to feel that the money that would be sunk into establishing what they called "a parallel force" could be otherwise properly spent in equipping and putting the police in a better shape to do its work. Said a deputy commissioner of police who wished not to be named: "The whole issue of the National Guard is an attempt by government to paper over the many problems of the police force... I believe that is a wrong approach because the right thing, as we have said on many occasions, is to transform the existing force into a functional, well-equipped corps of motivated men and women." He asked: "Are they saying that the National Guard will be able to perform their duties in the absence of basic equipment and facilities?"

The National Guard, it would appear, is fighting its first serious battle, even before it comes into legal existence: with the public, with the press, with the police, with the army and other security organisations. Aliyu Atta, the inspector-general of police, on his part, prefers to maintain a cold distance from the new para-military force. "That's a matter for the presidency," he is often quoted as saying. In Yola last month, while touring the zone three command of the force, he ventured to say more. "The National Guard will not be different from the mobile policemen," the NATIONAL CONCORD reported him as saying. According to Atta, cops who are supposed to form the nucleus of the guard are to do so "tentatively for three years" after which they will choose between the new outfit and the force. Atta's statement, NEWSWATCH gathered, was aimed at assuaging the feelings of mobile policemen who have been clamouring for a transfer back to the regular force, to "protest attempts to compulsorily draft them into the special squad."

On the army side, Oladipo Diya, a major-general and general officer commanding 3 Armoured Division, has been trying to calm the nerves of his men about the special guard. He told his men in Jos two weeks ago that the National Guard is "not a vote of no confidence in the army." During the last chief of army staff conference in Lagos last January, attended exclusively by senior officers, NEWSWATCH learnt, Ukpo had to deliver a paper on the National Guard. NEWSWATCH was not told what was the reaction of senior army officers who listened to the speech.

The confusion and nervousness about the squad appear, from NEWSWATCH investigations, to stem largely from the paucity of information on the new security force, which has tended to give suspicion a free rein. Last week, in the midst of the controversy, Koshoni, Ukpo and Murtala Nyako, chief of naval staff, insisted in exclusive interviews with NEWSWATCH that Babangida's government has what Ukpo described as "the best of intentions" in setting up the guard.

That may be true but Nigerians have learnt, most of them the hard way, to doubt his game plan, suspect his deft, feigning moves and mark him closely; a function of his "Maradona-style" of governance. What he did to the Political Bureau report, the Constituent Assembly report, the National Electoral Commission, NEC, report on political party registration and the unprecedented power game of sacking the AFRC, the highest ruling body, tend to keep everyone on his toes, making even his best intention appear like a booby trap. But is the National Guard a trap?

Information pieced together from interviews with Koshoni, Nyako and Ukpo, among others, confirms that the AFRC began work on sharpening the security apparatus late in 1988. Soon, the AFRC was to set up an internal security committee which was headed by Nyako. Ukpo was the secretary of the committee. That committee itself was a result of public agitation about the porous

security in most parts of the country, which gave armed robbers, smugglers and other criminals a free rein. The security committee, NEWSWATCH was told, took a close look at the various security agencies in the country to see ways of safe-guarding lives and property. Said Ukpo: "We argued a lot about the police force, which was in response to unrelenting complaints by the public and the press about them (the police) and we discovered that there was a missing link, a vacuum when it comes to the ability of the police to perform certain types of functions in maintaining order..." the committee made a number of recommendations, one of which was the re-organisation of the police force, which the AFRC approved.

Another committee, also within the AFRC, was set up to implement the Nyako committee recommendations and, specifically, to restructure the police force. Ibrahim Alfa, then chief of air staff and AFRC member, was the head of the committee while Ukpo continued as secretary. The Alfa committee ended up giving the police the same zonal or command structure as the army. The committee was still busy with that vital assignment when trouble struck. The SAP [South African Police] riots of May 1989 engulfed the country. The security council and the AFRC were "shocked" to find out that the police in Lagos could not control rioters. The army had to be summoned to the streets with their tanks less than three hours after riot broke out.

Bringing out the army, according to Nyako, became "very worrisome" to the government. It made the government more determined to set up a special force that can perform a quick intervention role. The ideal kind of force that was decided upon, said Koshoni, was "a force tougher than the police and a bit softer than the army." Nyako explained the reason for such a force: "In the military, we are not taught to use rubber bullets. Our mode of operation is to shoot and kill. You never shoot to maim or scare. So, unless you want to shoot and kill, don't bring soldiers into the picture because we are not supposed to fight students or workers, we fight enemies in defence of our country's territorial integrity. So, we felt we should set up an intermediate force like the National Guard which can divorce the military completely from ever being called upon to deal with internal security problems."

In addition, Ukpo said the National Guard was recommended for a role at Nigeria's borders because of constant harassment of Nigerians by some neighbouring countries. "You know, international law stipulates that you cannot locate the armed forces within a certain kilometre to the border of another country, for the obvious reasons that you can just wake up one morning and decide to invade the next country. So we debated, took a look at other countries and said okay, the National Guard can also come in handy in patrolling our borders," Ukpo said. But what about the customs and immigrations? "They are not as effective when it comes to checking illegal crossings... The ministry of internal affairs even has a border patrol unit which has tried its



best but we hope to transfer the unit also into the National Guard," Ukpo said.

The draft decree on the National Guard shows that the president, with the approval of the AFRC, will serve as chairman of the governing council of the crack force. Other members of the council are the chief of general staff, chairman, joint chief of staff, the attorney-general of the federation, the minister of internal affairs, the commandant of the National Guard and two persons to be appointed by the president. The responsibility of the council, according to the draft decree, would comprise "the formulation of policies and the general administration of the National Guard" in areas of appointments, promotions and discipline.

The functions of the squad, as listed in the draft decree, consist of "suppression of violence, dispersal of violent crowd, patrol of borders, provision of assistance during disasters, low-level counter insurgency operations, joint operation with the military in environment of low-key conflict and assistance to civil authorities during any form of emergencies. One area of conflict, common, for instance, in the National Guard of the USA, which the draft decree has not touched on is: What happens if a state or a local government authority, say under a partisan political atmosphere, disagrees with the deployment of the guards in its areas of jurisdiction? Who decides when a demonstrator or strike is "violent" enough to attract the guards?

According to the draft decree, the president can "confer powers of arrest on specific officers" operating within an area of conflict. This provision, NEWSWATCH gathered, is necessary because the National Guard, unlike the police, "will not be empowered by law to make arrests. The power of arrest, if necessary, resides with the president, "subject to other provisions of the constitution." The draft decree also says that the commandant, who will be appointed by the president, will be responsible for the day-to-day running of the squad. NEWSWATCH was told that Pam is not the commandant of the squad "as has been reported" but merely heads the National Guard desk in the ISRC. Pam's credentials in quelling riots, which include the election violence that engulfed Ondo State in 1983 and the Maitatsine religious riots at Burutu and Gombe, however, stand him in a good stead as the likely first commandant of the squad when it is legally established.

Nuhu Aliyu, retired police commissioner who was also reported as boss of the National Guard, is out of the picture. A veteran of many riots, including the 1983 election violence in Oyo and the 1986 Ahmadu Bello University, ABU, Zaria, riots, which he commanded, he, according to Ukpo, has not been involved at all with the new squad. Mohammadu Gambo, the national security adviser, is similarly not involved in the setting up of the guard. Koshoni said he has a "separate briefing and terms of reference." He also said that reports that the National Guard is a carryover from Sunday Adewusi's

pet idea is false. "We haven't looked at anything from Adewusi. Not one bit....," he said.

Despite the view from government quarters that the country needs a force like the National Guard "because the country is growing and becoming more and more sophisticated," many may continue to worry about the possibility of the guard falling into wrong hands: the hands of a megalomaniac, who cannot tolerate opponents or bear to fail elections. The experiences of national guards or their equivalents in some countries seem to justify this fear. Jomo Kenyatta, late Kenyan leader, says some reports, once experimented with something akin to the National Guard. It was popularly called Ngoroko Squad. A para-military force, it was supposed to combat cattle rustlers from neighbouring Ethiopia and Somalia. It had direct access to the president and was run outside the existing security administration.

A few years later, Ngoroko became uncontrollable. It was neither a cattle rustling squad nor a complementary force to the police and other security agencies. It was actually a political police established to perpetuate the dominance of the Kikuyus. At the end of the day, its main functions were "assassinations and torture of real and imagined opponents of Kenyatta. In one of the panels Daniel Arap Moi, Kenyatta's successor, later set up to investigate the terrorist squad, it was revealed that the squad actually arranged to have him (Moi) assassinated during the night of Kenyatta's death, in order to pave the way for a Kikuyi to succeed Kenyatta. The revelation, reports said, led to the escape of the squad's boss to Sudan. Togolese president, Gnassingbe Eyadema, is reported to be running a similar private army "peopled by bearded, violent men with high cannibalistic reputation." Haiti's Papa 'Doc' Duvalier also ran a notorious squad called the Tonton Macoute, which struck terror among Haitians until Duvalier's demise.

But there are reputable national guards as well. Italy has the *Carabinieri*, which is under the ministry of defence. Its functions are the "prevention and suppression of crime." It performs these functions often side by side with its regular sister-police force, the *Pubblica Sicurezza*, which is under the home secretary (internal affairs minister). Koshoni's committee has already visited Italy, stayed among the *Carabinieri*, understudying their operational concepts, training, logistic regiments, deployment, etc. The American National Guard, numbering some 386,000, is organised for rescue operations and "quick integration into the active army." They operate side by side with the army reserve, numbering about 222,000 in performing their functions.

The option open to Nigeria, said Nyako, is to establish a reputable National Guard that will guarantee "peaceful existence" for a country as highly populated and big as Nigeria. As he put it: "To think that we are setting up a National Guard to prevent coups now or in future is out of the question. The best way to prevent a coup is to run a good government, run a bloody good government."

**\* Lagos State Proposes To Ban Firms Using CFC**

34000619 Lagos *THE GUARDIAN*  
in English 31 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Text] Lagos State is urging the Federal Government to take a practical step to shield Nigeria from global warming—the so-called greenhouse effect—by disciplining some local industries. The lobby is trailing latest studies on the subject which dismisses claims that the earth faces a danger of over heating.

The Lagos option, presented in a position paper read yesterday by one of its government officials, proposes that industries using chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) as raw materials for the manufacture of aerosols and cooling systems be banned. It also wants industries wishing to obtain licences, using CFC as raw materials base as well as those not encouraging mechanical pumps for spraying to be forced out of business.

Before now, the wide belief has been that once chlorofluorocarbons are released into the atmosphere, they find their way to the upper stratosphere where they react against the ozone layer by boring a hole through it. This not only increases the level of free chlorine in the stratosphere, but exposes the earth to direct dangerous radiations from the sun, from which it is protected by the ozone layer, increasing prospects of ailments, especially skin cancer.

A 1988 study by the United States Environmental Protection Agency had painted a gloomy prospect for the world if the industrialised countries continue to manufacture goods from CFCs. It projected a 10 percent depletion of the ozone layer by the middle of the next century.

But a new satellite study of world temperatures, released two days ago, punctures a hole in this projection as it found no evidence of the global warming trend.

The report was jointly conducted by scientists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the University of Alabama. It showed through a series of satellites launched in 1978 that there was neither a warming nor a cooling trend in the global temperature over the past 10 years.

Although the scientists say it will take 10 years to draw a firm conclusion, they are satisfied that satellites are far superior to land-based instruments which are not able to measure temperature over the oceans and other vast remote regions.

Lagos State, meanwhile, is insisting that the clamp down on industries manufacturing goods with CFC has become imperative to ensure a clean environment.

According to the director of Environment in the State Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning, Mrs Celina Peters, the damage to health is often as a result of uncontrolled industrial practices, including:

- wrong siting of industries;

- industrial accidents;
- production and consumption of some damaging man-made chemicals;
- use of fossil fuels, and
- poor waste management.

She was concerned, she said, that in Lagos, the three main sources of hazardous wastes include the hospitals, chemical industries, and cement factories.

Industries that abound in Lagos, Mrs Peters said, "discharge solid, gaseous and liquid wastes with reckless abandon," and warned against its adverse consequences, especially with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency prediction of a 10 percent depletion in the ozone layer.

Her words: "The cost resulting from adverse environmental and health changes would be enormous such that investment in prevention could be worth many times less than would later have to be spent to repair damage caused by the waste."

The chief executive of Nigeria's Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), Dr Olu Aina, shared Mrs Peters views, and urged environmental scientists to seek solutions that would end the spread of the desert, deforestation, soil and coastal erosion, water and air pollution as well as energy and food shortages.

**\* Ship Carrying Toxic Waste Raises Alarm in Lagos**

34000652 Lagos *SUNDAY TIMES*  
in English 22 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Timothy Okorochoa]

[Text] An alarm rang out in Lagos last week over the presence on Nigeria's territorial waters of a ship carrying toxic wastes.

The first warning came from the Ghanaian Ports Authority, which informed its Nigerian counterparts of the movement of the ship, M.V. River Majidun, suspected to be owned by a Nigerian judging by its name.

The ship plans to discharge parts of its cargo at three ports in Ghana, and the rest at Apapa.

As a result of the warning from Ghana, the NPA [Nigerian Ports Authority] headquarters in Lagos, through its director of operations, alerted its Western zone, comprising Tin Can Island and Apapa Ports, to seize the ship and stop the discharge of its cargo, if it berthed.

Titled: "Hazardous Wastes Cargo on Board, MV River Majidun," the message said: "This is to inform you that information at our disposal has it that 'MV River Majidun,' has on board class-one hazardous wastes cargo for the ports of Sekondi, Takoradi, Tema in the Ghana and Apapa in Nigeria.

"You are hereby requested to get the ship detained and stop the discharge of the cargo until it is cleared."

It was not immediately known whether the ship had berthed but industry sources disclosed yesterday that the vessel left the shores of Europe in February with more than 1.5 million metric tonnes, of "class one" cargo, suspected to be radioactive components.

According to the sources, the ship has been prowling the West African coast, looking for where to discharge the deadly cargo but was prevented due to the "Dump-watch" strategy among West African countries.

The sources said the vessel had been in the high seas for some time, looking for a discharge point but information about its movement among the various ports authorities in the region worked against it.

The co-ordinator of the NPA (Western zone), Mr Adebayo Sarumi, could not be reached on Friday. He could not see any reporter because he was "treating some vital issues."

In 1988, some Nigerian students in Italy exposed the dumping in Koko, Bendel State, of 8,000 drums (containing 3,500 metric tonnes) of chemical wastes at the back-yard of an unwary 65-year-old Mr Sunday Nana who died a few weeks ago.

The chemicals, which included polychlorobiphenyl (PCPB), methyl melamine polyurethanes, dimethyl and ethylate formaldehyde, were shipped into the country by an Italian businessman, Mr Gian Franco Raffaew, aided by some Nigerians. [sentence as published]

Italian authorities were compelled by the Federal Government to evacuate the materials as well as undertake to detoxify the dump site.

Besides, the Federal Government promulgated a decree which made the dumping of toxic waste an offence punishable by life in jail.

Also, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), worried by alarming rate of toxic dump incidents in the subregion, set up what it called "Dump-watch."

#### \* Media, Human Rights Groups Stand Criticized

34000663B Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN  
in English 5 May 90 p 1

[Text] Given that the nation was pitched against the forces of sheer evil in the abortive rebellion of 22/4/90, we find it gladdening that the Federal Military Government is moving methodically, and with painstaking attention to detail, in its efforts to unravel all the incomprehensible paradox of that black Sunday.

We say this because, it is all too easy to take for granted, the efforts which have led to the steady arrest of suspects in connection with the crushed rebellion. Indeed, we see the constant and progressive arrests of the suspects as a mark of high re-awakening, and a demonstration of dedication to duty by the forces of law and order.

More remarkable still, is that the thoroughness of the on-going exercise has been further reinforced by the setting up two days ago, of a panel which would "investigate, interrogate and compile a comprehensive report" on the crushed, senseless insurrection. This is as it should be.

Given the above, we consider recent comments calling for "fairness" in the trial of the arrested suspects as ill-advised. Right from the start, the Federal Military Government had made it clear that despite the level of high treason and wide scope of human and structural destruction of the aborted rebellion, "fairness and justice" would attend all proceedings leading to conviction or otherwise of the arrested suspects. This is indeed a remarkable adherence to the principles of justice, unheard of anywhere in the third world, where such situations almost always call for summary execution.

Indeed, military authorities found it necessary to point out, just two days ago, that they had actually abridged usual procedures, by "going out of the way to establish an investigation panel." Which is what makes us agree entirely that at this point, demands by subversive elements parading as human right groups, were equivalent to "putting the cart before the horse." Certainly, those so-called human rights organizations now demanding the release of suspects were, "not being fair to such suspects since they are already assuming, that these suspects are guilty, hence the demand that they should be released."

Secondly, we would like to place it on record, by asking which of the bereaved families of the numerous casualties have been visited, condoled, or sustained by the so-called human rights groups and their international mentors and instigators. It is therefore necessary that all these so-called human rights groups, civil libertarians, and their international mentors avoid ruining the case of those whom they seek to defend. It is instructive that, during the last briefing of newsmen this week at Dodan Barracks, the authorities had put two tasks before the media. The first is that of giving adequate publicity to the list of wanted persons, "so as to facilitate their early arrest."

More important however, was the task and warning that the media should avoid the publication of rumors and falsehood. Without any doubt, such sensitive times as these call for, not only the ethical need for responsibility, but also the need for restraint in the media. Sadly, the way some publications and media practitioners have gone on lately, would seem to support even the weakest of the multitude of strong and credible arguments, which the Honorable Minister of Information Prince Tony Momoh, has put forward as making the Media Council Decree in this current form, inevitable.

These are not ordinary times. Citizens in general, and the press in particular, must be alert not only to assist the authorities in getting to the root of the recent desecration of our national life; every possible effort must be made



by all, to ensure that nothing is done to suggest that the nation can condone or forget, the heinous crime committed against it on 22/4/90 by the forces of darkness, and sheer evil. As Mr President has quite correctly pointed out, the Nigerian nation is bigger and more important than any individual or group of individuals in it.

In conclusion, the NEW NIGERIAN believes without any equivocation or reservation whatsoever, that the first duty of any government is to maintain the security of the nation for the people. To compromise on the security of the nation because of misguided sentiments, premeditated opportunism and cynical attempts to white-wash forces of murder and high treason, is to abdicate the legitimacy to govern. We therefore, maintain our stand that those involved in the callous act of wanton killings and destruction, should be dealt with, without any fear, favor or sentiments, whatsoever, from any quarters.

**\* New Oil, Gas Prospects Termed Good**

34000739C Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN  
in English 18 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Bala Mohammed]

[Text] There are about seven river basins in the country where prospects for oil have been found to be reasonable, the Minister of Petroleum Resources, Professor Jibril Aminu has said.

These, he said, include the Sokoto and Chad basins where drilling had already started.

According to him, the Upper Benue Basin in Gongola State and the Anambra Basin, also appeared to have the promise of oil and were being considered for exploration activities.

The minister who was responding to questions on oil prospecting during a visit to the NEW NIGERIAN newspapers yesterday, listed the Lower Niger, the Lower Benue and the Dahomey basins as other areas for future exploration.

He said exploration started in the Chad basin because there was oil in all the countries surrounding the Lake Chad, adding that the authorities in Niger Republic, Cameroun and Chad were already drilling oil in the basin.

"so unless we are monumentally unlucky, there should be oil in Nigeria. That is why they are doing it, and the direct exploration service of the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company] had been drilling holes," he said.

Professor Jibril Aminu said drilling cost a lot of money, but assured that his ministry would rededicate itself to expand activities in the basin, and explore more basins.

He stressed the importance of prospecting for oil not only for national consumption, but also because its supply throughout the world "is shrinking fast and nations that used to easily make 10 million barrels per day now find it difficult to make more than seven."

On the Finima liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, the minister said new chairman and managing director had been appointed and that the ministry had given assurance to its technical partners that "we will respect our own side of the shareholders' agreement."

He said provisions had been made for the preliminary works which, he said, had already started.

He added that a new village had been built for the inhabitants of the old Finima who have already started moving.

Professor Aminu said efforts were also being made to secure market with reasonable prices.

He said the ministry already had teams of its officials now in parts of Europe and North America in this regard.

"I think unlike all other previous efforts by Nigeria to get the LNG going, this time we mean business. And we hope to make it a reality," he said.

**Senegal**

**\* Opposition Rally Urges Elections, Diouf Ouster**

90AF0208A Dakar SOPI in French 20 Apr 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Ndiogou Wack Seck Abdou Salam Diop: "Rally: SOPI Alliance Starts the Struggle Again"]

[Text] While Jean Collin's friends throughout the country mourn (in unprecedented silence and calm) the political demise of their father and godfather, the opposition continues to occupy the political field and deploys itself vigorously.

On Saturday 14 April, the SOPI Alliance [Senegalese Democratic Party-Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] once again demonstrated its ability to mobilize and occupy the political field when it held a consciousness raising and information rally on the Parca-Mazout square in Colobane. The rally was chaired by Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, the people's president-elect, and Abdoulaye Bathily, general secretary of the LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party].

Despite the austerities of the month of Ramadan, despite the torrid heat and sand blowing winds, the rally once again drew a record crowd. Already in the first hours of the afternoon, the square was filled with militants who had come from all over Dakar to show their continued support for the ideals of SOPI and their eagerness to get rid of Abdou Diouf and his government.

Around 1600, Maitre Wade, the people's president-elect, arrived at the rally accompanied by Abdoulaye Bathily and other high officials of the two SOPI Alliance parties. They were greeted by thunderous applause from the jubilant crowd whom the singer Mada Thiam rocked with her melodies.

After that, the two leaders presented trophies to the valiant SOPI combatants who defended the people's cause and in particular played a leading and most important role in Collin's departure. Trophies were thus presented successively to SOPI Alliance women, to the UJT and MDJ [expansion unknown] youth, to the group of lawyers who defended SOPI militants, and to the newspapers FAGARU and SOPI.

After the presentation of the "SOPI Alliance Oscars," speakers took turns on the podium to convey the message of the "Cadre of 9." What fascinated most the militants and sympathizers who had answered the Alliance call in large numbers was the quality of the speeches and how packed with content they were.

The first to speak was Khalifa Diakhate of the LD/MPT youth; in a few words, he summarized the essential. "The essential is that we are waiting for our leaders' cues. Say the word, we shall do it! We want clear and frequent watchwords. We are at our dear leaders' disposal to flush out the PS [Socialist Party] hooligans who spread vandalism in the country. Let all the young join the People's Resistance Committee. We are ready!"

Speaking for the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] women, Adja Moumy Samb assured in a lyrical and patriotic outburst: "We recognize the worthy children of our country. We, women, are making an appeal and calling Ablaye Wade to witness. We are tired. Ablaye won the elections, but Abdou Diouf took over power by force. That is why we ask all of you to take to the street every time the word goes out. Collin's departure is not enough; we did it and it's over. What we want now is Diouf's departure. We do not want Abdou Diouf; down with him; enough is enough; let's take to the street, let's fight; strike! strike! Abdou Diouf is down; let's strike him together; Abdou Diouf is a dying man."

Then it was Talla Sylla's turn to speak for Senegalese schoolchildren and students. Talla's speech was mostly directed at Djibo Ka, the new minister of national education, whom he challenged concerning the problems at the MEN [Ministry of National Education] and the government's incompetence in managing National Education. "The MEN and the MES [Ministry of Higher Education] are merged or separated whenever it suits the government. We are tired of these horse-betting types of combinations: ministers change but problems remain. Djibo Ka has come; he should know that we have known him to be a traitor since 1968. He has the right, the time and the ambition to be a traitor, but he should know that we, the school children and students, cannot be manipulated, cannot be corrupted. We are preparing a document in which we raise all the issues that concern us:

from scholarships to grants and the material and teaching conditions in which we work. There have been 10 deaths at the university in two years, through the fault of COUD [expansion unknown] officials. That is unacceptable. The COUD owes 155 million [CFA—African Financial Community—francs] to the Principal Hospital, and that penalizes the students. Enough is enough! Djibo should know that things can't go on like this. He would be well advised to take our suggestions more seriously!"

Mr. Diallo, representing the OST [Workers Socialist Organization] was quite blunt in challenging Abdou Diouf: "The greatest vandal in the country, that is Abdou Diouf. How, then, could his country not be a country of vandals? If he is out to create disunion between the people and the opposition, he is kidding himself. He is the one who causes unrest in the country. We, the opposition, are the ones who ousted Jean Collin. Besides, we are not interested in Collin, or Djibo Ka, or Abdou Aziz Ndao, or anyone else. What we are interested in, is that they should all get 'the hell' out of here. Let's join the People's Resistance Committee and let the final battle start!"

After that, it was Mamadou Diop Decroix's turn to confirm, in the name of AND/JEF [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy]: "The time has come to act rather than talk. And success will be easy, all the more so because we are dealing with a coward who is so afraid and dead to shame that he does not hesitate to organize the celebration of our independence without the people, 100 m from his palace bunker, so that he can flee if he is in any sort of trouble. He who claims to have the people's support, how come he dare not celebrate the 30th year of our independence among jubilating crowds? The word for the moment is to wipe out the PS, to overthrow Abdou Diouf. Considering the determination of the People's Resistance Committee, Abdou Diouf will flee or end up in jail. Let all workers get ready for the general strike that we are organizing."

Speaking for the PLP [People's Liberation Party], Maitre Sourang pointed to an event of essential importance, which caused some to speak of a "problem threatening the Cadre of 9." All newspapers mentioned a split among the 9. According to Maitre Sourang, "that's normal; any creation is difficult, but we shall tackle it and find a remedy." Before that, he had mentioned Jean Collin's greed, saying that Collin chose to quit the PS when he was ousted from power by the patriotic opposition. "This shows that he had been there for 43 years with nothing but his own interest in mind. Birds of a feather flock together. They are all like that in the PS, all sore losers."

Mbaba Guisse of the LD/MPT, an outstanding orator, a "political animal" par excellence, was a great hit thanks to the soundness of his views. "On Collin's departure," he said, "Wade and Bathily will give you explanations. But can we talk about Senegal without talking about Collin? That man knew and could. The wind that swept

the baobab will not allow a mere sapling like Diouf to stand; that is a tautology!" Then Guisse put his finger on the source of the trouble: "The people complain that they are not given watchwords. We need some for each rally; precise orders that the militants must apply. But a watchword must reflect the current organization. You do not send out a watchword at any time in a political situation. The organization is not ripe yet. Talking is easy, but are you ready to follow Wade and Bathily to the palace? Who agrees?" he shouted to the audience. All hands were raised, forming a forest. "Therefore," he ended, "let's no longer allow the police to take away our militants under our very eyes."

Maitre Ousmane Ngom, chairman of the PDS spoke to thank the crowd of militants who, he said, "in spite of the wind, the dust, poverty, daily cares and problems, and shortages of everything, massively answered the call of their party." Maitre Ngom then drew the attention of the militants, who had come in large numbers, to the fact that the date of the rally coincided with that of the battle of Badr (17th day of Ramadan), and he went on: "The blessed month of Ramadan must not be an excuse or a pretext to rest in our struggle against oppression and injustice; the greatest victory ever won by Muslims (at the battle of Badr) was won during this month of Ramadan; the prophet (PSL) and the Muslims did not stop the fight to fast, nor their fast to fight. They did both and beat the enemy. Therefore, for us, there can be no question of stopping our struggle or our fight"; and quoting a verse from the Koran, Maitre Ngom declared: "God does not change a people's lot unless that people fight to change it," and he went on: "We have faith, the people are with us, truth is on our side; therefore, let's go on fighting until we reach the last milestone of SOPI, i.e., the departure of Abdou Diouf."

Deputy Boubacar Sall, general secretary, national coordinator for the party, spoke after him; with his characteristic style and outspokenness, he said: "The Senegalese are brave; they scrupulously observe the fast of Ramadan, often without knowing whether they will find a bite to eat when the time comes to break the fast; fathers, mothers, heads of households watch powerless as their families struggle with social problems, lacking everything, even for day-to-day expenses"; and he went on: "Abdou Diouf is incompetent. Under Senghor just as with Collin, he just follows docilely behind his masters; he has never known how to make a decision." From now on, he added, "the political scene shows the outlines of two sides; the dividing line is clear: on one side, rational patriots who struggle for change and the good of the people; on the other side, traitors and enemies of the people. With our leaders at our head, we shall increase the pressure to hasten the departure of Abdou Diouf."

After that, it was the turn of Abdoulaye Bathily, general secretary of the LD/MPT, to speak to the crowd of militants: "the event," he said, "is Collin's departure; but, no matter what some may assume and how they may explain it, the original cause of this departure is the

determination and mobilization of SOPI Alliance militants and democratic forces, in particular the youth and women. Collin is gone, but the problems remain: rice, electricity, water cost a lot; starvation is here, social problems, health, the school system crisis, all these problems remain unsolved. Therefore, the fight goes on." Bathily then dwelt at length on the case of LONASE [Senegalese National Lottery], which lost 4 billion, of which 2 billion were embezzled. Its general manager financed Jean Collins' support meetings and his friends meetings, in Mbacke, Tattaguine; throughout the country; millions were spent on meetings in support of Jean Collin. So far in 1990, 3,000 workers have been laid off Bathily stated; by the end of June, another 6,000 will lose their jobs.

Finally, addressing the youth, who had come in massive numbers, Abdoulaye Bathily said: "Jean Collin's reign, which lasted 10 years, represents the darkest page in our history; elected by no one, he had more power in this country than even the Damel of Cayor; it's a shame, a national humiliation. Now that Collin is gone, we must go on and continue the general mobilization around the watchwords of the nine parties that demand Abdou Diouf's departure and the organization of free and democratic elections. There is no other way to get Senegal out of this situation. All the government does is talk about our pluralism; that's old hat; what the people demand is the organization of free and democratic elections. We are convinced that the Senegalese people have rejected Abdou Diouf and the PS."

Then, the host of the rally introduced Maitre Wade, the people's president elect, in these terms: "Senegalese, the president of the Republic!" Maitre Wade came forward and ascended the podium, his arms lifted in the V of victory. The crowd followed suit; the square became a forest of V's. Standing, the large crowd listened in religious silence to the youth anthem.

Then, after greeting and thanking the SOPI militants and supporters for mobilizing and participating in the various events organized by the opposition, which were successes because that was the first time such events took place in Senegal, [he said] that demonstrating is a right; any group of citizens who feel wronged or dissatisfied with their government's policy have the right to take to the street and demonstrate; in this respect, he mentioned the Senegalese of Paris who recently organized a demonstration in Paris to demand the departure of Abdou Diouf; this took place under supervision of the French police, who accompanied the demonstrators.

And Maitre Wade added: "We know why Abdou Diouf cannot agree to a demonstration by the opposition: it is because he is afraid of international opinion. If we have no representation, or if we do not represent anything as he said, why is it that he cannot agree to let us demonstrate. But we shall continue our demonstrations until he resigns." Speaking of damages and vandalism, Maitre Wade drew public opinion's attention to this campaign of disinformation and the battle for public opinion led



by the government and the media in its pay to discredit the opposition. "You won't find vandals," he emphasized, "in the offices of opposition parties." And, pointing at the Socialist Party building, he stated: "Vandals are gathered in this building, where they are recruited, armed and paid to commit and carry out nasty jobs, which afterward they try to blame on the opposition. Fortunately," Maitre Wade added, "the independent press did not fall for it; but that will not stop us. The Dakar region governor confided to one of our officials that even the authorities know that the vandals do not belong to the opposition."

Then, speaking about the confiscation of liberties by the government, Maitre Wade raised his voice: "We shall not allow Abdou Diouf or anyone else to interfere with our constitutional liberties; freedom of reunion is something sacred." Speaking again about Collin's departure, Maitre Wade stated: "It has been said that, before his departure, Collin asked Bassirou Ndao to give him all the LONASE funds, and he left with the cash; if this should prove true, the opposition shall lodge a complaint against Collin for misappropriation of funds; now, IMF and World Bank recipes can hardly enable Abdou Diouf to save the country, because neither of the two institutions can give him the people's support and hope, which he needs so badly. Let's spare the people's suffering. If Abdou Diouf has any patriotic feelings and any shame left, he must agree to submit to the people's will."

Concerning the forthcoming celebration of Labor Day, on 1 May, Maitre Wade announced: "With our militants, our workers, we shall take part in the 1 May parade. We shall also organize demonstrations to demand access to the radio and TV for the opposition; we shall go in front of the Ministry of Communication and in front of the presidency; that is our right; we must wrest it and we shall wrest our rights; we have responsibilities toward the people and we shall fulfill them." Maitre Wade also talked about the general strike that will be advocated by opposition parties, and he concluded: "I do not wish to have recourse to extreme solutions. To oust Diouf, we have several means. This is why we are proceeding gradually in what we are doing." Therefore, the opposition's struggle and fight to oust Diouf have only just begun.

#### \* Wade's Connection With Le Pen Assailed

90AF0208B Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
24 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial by Babacar Sine: "Wade's Logic"]

[Text] Yesterday, with good reason, LE SOLEIL disclosed the scandal: "Maitre Wade is going to talk with the Renaissance Circle," a club well known for its organic ties to the French and European racist extreme right. That this sad operation should take place in the Senate does not make any difference. As for me, I was far from surprised. Who would be, knowing Wade's cold logic, devoid of any democratic qualms, turning everything to account as long as it leads to power.

In short, the logic is typical of the man, who does not trouble himself with principles, much less with political ethics. A "liberal," self-styled anticommunist, he will open wide the doors of the SOPI Alliance [Senegalese Democratic Party-Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] to the communists, as long as the operation is "politically profitable." He makes us believe that he is a "convinced" democrat, but cares little about the respect owed to republican institutions. He is prepared to devastate them in the name of a so-called urban guerrilla.

He calls himself the defender of the immigrants' cause, but he will take sides with the worst enemies of our brothers who have immigrated to France, with Le Pen and his gang, as long as he can hope to gather foreign support at all costs.

Abdou Diouf, on the contrary had Le Pen's trip to Dakar cancelled, after his tour of Ivory Coast and Gabon!

Well, if Wade's logic, thus "consistent" through and through, Machiavellian and essentially aimed at gaining power, is a moral aberration—because, in this case, the end will justify all means—it is a logic of paradoxes that must challenge the conscience of all Senegalese whatever their biases may be.

Does this man deserve to be given some day the Senegalese people's confidence and to preside over their destinies? Assuredly, this is a major issue that touches on Maitre Abdoulaye Wade's very political reliability.

Certainly, when it comes to politics, one cannot entertain illusions and believe that it is all pure, or even pure of all Machiavellism (Machiavelli was one of the greatest political theoreticians of all times), but is that reason enough for Maitre Wade to push things so far? Is that reason enough to indulge in such political perversion?

Consequently, how can anyone start a democratic dialogue with that man? Democracy is more than a political system; it is also a mode of behavior, better: the practice of virtue, when virtue means respecting one's fellow citizens.

#### \* Emphasis on Political Freedoms in Action

90AF0208C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
30 Apr-1 May 90 p 1

[Editorial by Alioune Drame: "Criticism of Weapons"]

[Text] Expert at confused thinking, a certain Senegalese opposition has gotten us so used to the most baffling paradoxes that we stopped keeping track of them, leaving it to the critical minds and common sense of the citizens to sanction them.

However when this opposition, devoid of memory and wont to make the most unexpected mixes of ideas, totally ignores political ethics and pushes back the limits of

plain morals, we must raise a protest against this extreme behavior toward the nation.

Indeed, how could we take seriously people who continue to deny the dazzling evidence and tangible reality of Senegalese democracy when they themselves, through their actions, movements, statements and writings, are material evidence of it? Then, as if lobotomized by ridicule, they decree a "crisis" and proclaim themselves Beninese-Gabonese so they can ask for a "national conference."

We could talk at length on the lameness of arguments and lack of imagination that seem to be abundantly shared by all those who belong to this fringe of our political work force. But we shall be content to recall a few principles.

Our democratic system, based on a full-fledged multi-party system and the respect of human rights, was not imposed on us by a third party. On the contrary, it was a deliberate choice made by President Abdou Diouf when he came to power, at a time when he could have chosen from a wide menu of governments ruling in Africa.

Rejecting the party-state and its corset, refusing the single or unified party suggested by Wade, the chief of state then freely and sincerely chose the system best adapted to the spirit of the Senegalese people.

Need we recall that, at the time, several of those who are now bowing to internal and external pressure saw nothing wrong with putting our country beyond the pale of fashionable Africa. Then came the east winds acclimated under the tropics, and proved us right. And how!

Yet, without any triumphalism whatsoever, without claiming the paternity of anything, Senegal relentlessly pursues its experiment while still insisting that it "cannot be exported." However, we follow with much interest the developments taking place around us.

It is therefore quite simply grotesque that some perennially discontented, professional candidates to the presidential race, feeling the weight of years, should try to impose on us the organization of a national conference.

We all know that the "national conference" recipe can have no object but to lay the foundations for democracy in a country. This is what happened in Benin, then in Gabon. Zaire, when its turn came, decided to experiment with a limited multi-party system of its own make.

In Senegal, where 17 parties—and the list is not exhaustive—evolve in an adequate institutional framework, democracy has long outgrown the gestation, first-words and first-steps stages, even the middle-age crisis. All that is behind us. Thanks to the political determination of the initiator Abdou Diouf, we have reached the time to consolidate and increase what we have already irreversibly achieved.

Instead of flogging long-dead horses, the nihilistic opposition would do better to take a critical look at its

weapons, play by the rules and convince people that it can act responsibly. It would be particularly attractive if it had an alternate platform.

That would be the way to protect our democracy against the belated demons—subversion, vandalism and other shady schemes—on whose altar the power hungry insist on immolating it.

The enemies of freedom are sufficiently known in Senegal; there is no need to point the finger at them. Their latest political blunder, which they are not ashamed to parade, would suffice to pin them down: they maintain without batting an eyelid that Benin and Gabon are ahead of Senegal in the conquest of democratic areas. We must admit that in this case it is not adversity [sic] speaking, but a quite different feeling which we prefer not to mention.

When it comes to democratic dialogue, whose virtues they seem to have suddenly discovered, these people should at least remember that President Abdou Diouf has been calling for it for a decade. All his political actions are geared toward such a dialogue.

In this case, too, part of the opposition, always the same, is blocking the road and obstinately persists in imagining an electoral dispute, calling for riots and encouraging violence.

Enjoying the privileges of a democratic system while trampling under foot its laws and regulations, the proponents of this negativistic line multiply their attacks to make people believe that there is a political "crisis" in a country where all institutions work normally and where the government has powers, which it uses unhindered. The judicial power is working with full independence. And so does the legislative power, with full freedom.

What should we add, except that no one is as blind as those who don't want to see. Unfortunately for them, it is not our role to treat cases of political pathology.

In the exclusive service of Senegal, we are and shall remain behind President Abdou Diouf, who personifies our sovereignty and is the clearminded leader of our progress in all fields. He is accountable only to his people, who have regularly reaffirmed their full confidence in him.

Thanks to him, our country, the initiator of the African Human Rights Charter, remains the beating heart of democracy in Africa. A label of which all the children of this nation should be proud.

#### \* Tension Mounts in Conflict With Bissau

90AF0209A Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
20-26 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Tidiane Kasse: "Three Each"; first paragraph is WAL FADJRI introduction]

[Text] With three trawlers in the hands of the Guinea-Bissauans and three on the Senegalese side, balance is achieved. But the conflict between our two countries is only getting more complex.

The conflict between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau is increasingly turning into a "trawlers" war. Last development to date: on 11 April, the Senegalese Navy stopped and inspected a Soviet fishing vessel operating in the zone in dispute under a Guinea-Bissau license. The protest memorandum sent to Dakar by the Guinean Government indicates that, when it stopped the ship, the Senegalese Navy fired over 70 shots, 40 of which hit the ship, wounding two people. The Senegalese Navy, for its part, indicates that it merely had to fire warning shots to prevent the ship from fleeing. According to the Guinea-Bissauans, the trawler *Orleonok* Cirn 8331 was "in Guinea-Bissauan territorial waters" when it was stopped, and what happened is "a violation of its national sovereignty and international law, which is not consistent with the spirit of friendship and neighborly relations between our two countries." We should say that fishing was rather good for our Navy since two other ships (Koreans operating in Guinea-Bissau) were also stopped for inspection the same week.

This is therefore another example of the incidents that have occurred in the zone under dispute since the beginning of the year. On 31 December, the Guinean Navy stopped and inspected four ships belonging to the *Adrien Michel* company, thus opening the hostilities in the zone under dispute. For a long time, Bissau refused to release the 76 sailors detained on this occasion, and it also imposed a fine estimated at about 1 billion [CFA—African Financial Community—francs]. The amount was out of proportion with the charges made, and it seemed to denote on Bissau's part a tendency to harden its positions in the border conflict which opposes us. The release of the sailors detained, expected since February, was just completed when the last two were released earlier this month.

### Means of Pressure

As for the *Adrien Michel* ships, they are still detained in Bissau. This, of course, represents a huge loss of income for the man said to be the largest shipowner in Senegal. As Mr. *Adrien Michel* told us (see *WAL FADJRI* No. 198), the ships seized are his most efficient ships and their prolonged idleness could jeopardize his company. And this has been going on for over three months now. Meanwhile, according to sources close to the *Adrien Michel* company and quoted by AFP, the Guinean authorities have reduced the fine (in appellate court) to 400 million francs. This amount must be paid by the end of April; otherwise the ships will be definitively confiscated by the Guinean party.

But actually the problem seems to have more to do with the current power struggle between Dakar and Bissau than with financial matters. With the ships of the *Adrien Michel* company, Bissau has the acquired means to apply

pressure in connection with the conflict. The Senegalese, therefore, now have the means to counter any escalation in this respect. Anyhow, this seems to be far from the "passing cloud" in our relations with our southern neighbors, which Abdou Diouf mentioned in his speech of 23 August. Especially since Dakar did not in the least appreciate the forceful tone used by President Vieira in his 1990 New Year speech, when he rejected the verdict of the Geneva Court and asked Senegal to start new negotiations.

The unsettled conditions that thus prevail in the zone under dispute are most unwelcome for shipowners, especially because the zone abounds in fish.

### \* Associations Urged To Defend Citizens' Rights

90AF0209B Dakar *WAL FADJRI*  
in French 20-26 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Abdou Sow: "To Your Rights, Citizens!"]

[Text] Always the central stake of struggles among political factions, the citizen seldom gets to have his say and to express himself except in the context offered to him by existing machineries. But these are reducing machineries, unable to express a message other than the one for which they have been programmed. The opposition party, for instance, is unsuited to express anything but a crude call for the destruction of the regime it opposes. Likewise, the ruling party develops a similar approach, just as devoid of any nuance.

But the citizen whose adhesion to a given cause or a given political approach is sought is seldom satisfied with unqualified points of view. He may challenge a political regime on some issues and not on others, just as he is free to adhere to one-half of an alternative government platform. Unfortunately, political parties—whether in power or in the opposition—never pause to consider this trait that is so characteristic of the Senegalese mind. They all want the citizen to approve their choices "as is," and they expect him to back up his approval with his vote, membership in the party, etc. And no political leader will ever think for one moment that his political bureau or his central committee may be wrong and that the citizen may be right.

Just consider the street fights that started again in the past few months, and you will understand that, once again, the citizen is excluded from certain processes which, to a large extent, commit him. Because it is again in his name that political violence is triggered: by the government when they mean to protect civil rights and liberties; by the opposition when they mean to conquer these rights and liberties.

But then who cares about the citizen, his wishes, his desire for justice? The parties have their platforms, their opponents, their allies and their objectives. And the citizen—who is not an abstraction but a person made of flesh and blood—seldom finds much in common between what he wants and what a political party wants.



At times when this miraculously happens, the political machinery still has precedence over the individual. The individual is then used, manipulated for all sorts of causes and never given a chance to influence the course of events: he is recruited as a member of the Association of the Friends of Jean Collin, enjoined to speak up and proclaim the good cause until, as a result of some political deadlock or other, support for Jean Collin is no longer quite recommended to the many individuals who were mobilized for the task. Does the opposition want to organize a march? Any fellow will do, but they will not be given a chance to express reservations.

In view of the blindness shown by politicians of all parties, it is urgent for the citizens to find a way to organize themselves into bodies that will not be doomed, by their nature, to engage in power struggles. We are not calling for the creation of new political parties, but associations that will make it their business, precisely, to show that citizens have something to say—something that should count more than anything else—on how the country is run.

It is easy to imagine a citizens collective that, after the plundering of the Red Cross, could have officially taken the case to court; this would go beyond the sterile denunciations of some and the hypocrisy of others. We could list endless examples to illustrate how such organizations could intervene very usefully: political violence, endless vandalism, election rigging, radio and TV programs, the state of Dakar streets, illicit enrichment, the price of electricity, etc., offer a vast field of intervention to any organization that would care solely for the citizens' interests, their rights and the respect owed to them. Such a body should be set up in order to escape the absolutism of the politician approach which is that of all parties.

Obviously, there is a considerable risk that such associations could be taken over and manipulated for political purposes, especially considering that—since they are not looking for power in the sense of being at the head of a government—they are good vectors to mobilize public opinion. Therefore, it is on this field that the struggle must take place, to enable civil society to assume its share of responsibilities in the fate of the nation. Otherwise, it becomes irresponsible to complain while leaving the field open to a political class, no matter what their current contradictions may be, that never doubt for a moment that it is their job, and no one else's, to take over the field and lead the masses. Now, after the disgrace of the former minister of state, if there are still people naive enough to believe in the so-called mission of "nation builders," they are free to retain their naivete. The truth is that one need not be politically organized into a party to be quite active politically. Now that all certainties are crumbling throughout the world, it would be criminal to leave to politicians alone the task of making choices for all Senegalese.

The extreme complexity of the world requires that anyone should be able to express himself at any time on

especially thorny issues. The only tentative solutions to the crisis experienced by the school systems in the past 10 years or so came from the famous General Conference on Education. The conclusions of their work were not implemented, because of the state's manifest ill will and also because of the citizens' inadequate social watchfulness in making sure that the recommendations made at the end of the conference were implemented.

If it is urgent today to confront citizens with their responsibilities, it is because they will increasingly be the victims of choices they did not approve, choices that will be implemented at their expense. This is true of political violence as well as reorganization plans. One last example: in the April issue of *LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE*, an international bank with a subsidiary in Dakar was introduced thus: "Among its activities, the laundering and recycling of dirty money"; question: do citizens have the right to know whether there is a link between these very special activities and the quite common Senegalese practices of misappropriation of public funds and illicit enrichment? A strong association would have the nerve to demand an answer.

#### \* Presidential Expenditures Hit in Budget Crisis

90AF0209C Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
20-26 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara: "Finance Law: 'Austere, Me?'; first paragraph is WAL FADJRI introduction]

[Text] With a total of 500 billion [CFA—African Financial Community] francs, the 1990-1991 budget establishes an increase of 9 billion over last year's total. Austerity in the increase, so to speak [sentence as published]. Enough to drive the opposition to start talking once again about ill-shared sacrifices, its main targets being the budgets of institutions such as the presidency and the Assembly.

During fiscal year 1990-1991, the presidency of the Republic will operate with a budget of 8.5 billion of our francs. This is the figure contained in the budget bill that our deputies will examine before 12 June (when the current session ends). The current expenditures of the presidency include at least 3.5 billion for equipment, which thus takes up a larger part of the budget than any other chapter. This is easy to understand, as the presidency does not handle only office equipment and vehicles. The largest item is the presidential fleet, consisting of the *Pointe de Sangomar* and the *Fleche des Almadies*, which must be regularly overhauled and maintained, not to mention their cost when not in use. All this will take up at least 1 billion francs.

The leaders of the "SOP" alliance, in particular Abdoulaye Bathily (for an account of the meeting, see page 3 [not shown]) found this excessive and denounced this lifestyle that they feel is not in keeping with the austerity called for by the government and used to justify layoffs, voluntary resignations and other restrictions now imposed on the Senegalese. Is there a double standard

when it comes to bearing the brunt of the crisis? That is what the opposition has been saying all along. The discrepancy between the government's political professions of faith and what they are actually doing has always tended to support that view. And what else do we have to expect from the 1990-1991 budget?

Apart from this chapter, there is still the famous slush fund, which is the subject of so much talk. Even though the budget bill never alludes to it, everyone agrees that the "Special Expenditures" chapter sounds like the place reserved for political funds (another name for the slush fund). With only 580 million francs, special expenditures for 1990-1991 seem to have been reduced by half, although they could tap the "Miscellaneous" chapter, which exceeds 600 million francs. At this level, the principle of communicating vessels is known, too.

### Parliament Revolts

But did you know that the current expenditures of the presidency of the Republic will exceed that of all ministries? Except for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health, Armed Forces, Interior, National Education and Economy and Finance. All others, just like the National Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Supreme Court will get a measly share.

Glancing through the 1990-1991 budget bill, one also notes the huge financial needs of the National Assembly. With 3,119 million francs, the chamber of deputies maintains a very large staff, costing close to 1 billion, and its miscellaneous expenses (the chairman's slush fund) amount to 442.2 million. Speaking of this slush fund, let us recall that it was the cause of our parliament members' revolts against Habib Thiam and Daouda Sow. The former was blamed for laying on top of the "bread" (meaning the slush fund money), whereas the latter made the mistake of not laying it out as much as his colleagues wished.

Another outstanding fact: at a time when we are reorganizing in the name of austerity, the budget bill presented by the government is actually increasing. In fact, it is increasing by 9,581 million over last year. However, of these 9 billion, 3.5 went indirectly to the youth—the Ministry of National Education is going to provide a 2-billion franc subsidy to the Saint-Louis University—and 1.5 billion will be spent on students graduating from training schools.

The 1990-1991 finance law should also cover the municipal and rural elections of next November. Therefore, the budget bill provides for 200 million francs to prepare these elections.

Computed at 514,665 million francs, the total amount of state revenues and expenses is of course not yet available. This is why, in Article 2, the budget bill empowers the president of the Republic to borrow on behalf of the

state up to 249,083 million francs. This amount represents the difference between available resources (or revenues) and actual expenditures. The gap, then, must be bridged.

### \* Military Waits as Support for Reform Grows

90AF0209D Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
20-26 Apr 90 p 8

[Article by Malick Fall: "East Wind: In the Eye of the Storm"; first paragraph is WAL FADJRI introduction]

[Text] National conferences have replaced the monologues of single parties. Benin first gave the example, then Gabon followed, and the Ivory Coast is demanding a national conference to solve the political crisis. If dialogue does not prevail, the eye of the storm may sweep governments out of office.

National Conferences are the fashion in Africa. The example came from Benin, where President Mathieu Kerekou, wishing to rescue his regime from the dramatic fall it was heading for, had the bright idea to convene all actual or supposed opponents so they could speak up. Before long, the conference became a Constituent Assembly, a broad union government was formed and...the Beninese president was maintained in office and, as a bonus, the people marched in his honor.

Now, it is the turn of the Gabonese to pave the road to democracy, with a National Conference that President Bongo was careful to enlarge to include all organized groups, the better to have his arguments accepted. The Gabonese chief of state did draw the lessons of his friend Kerekou's Conference; from the start he asked and obtained that the conference should tie its own hands and agree not to give itself full powers.

The Gabonese conference was hardly over when the Ivory Coast teacher's union started blowing the horn of a national conference to solve the political crisis that is shaking the Ivory Coast, where "Doctor Houphouet-Boigny," to quote the happy phrase of Moussa Paye in "Le Temoin" [The Witness], does not know that it is midnight.

All these national conferences take place in countries where incumbent presidents have shown a singular lack of vision. With force on their side, at a time when the economic crisis was not doing as much damage as now, these three heads of state always intended to stay in office as long as they wanted. Thus, Kerekou boasted that no one would ever say "here comes the former Beninese head of state, but: here is his grave"; these words are also attributed to Houphouet-Boigny, for whom a Baoule king always dies on the throne. Omar Bongo never went so far, but when asked—after Ahidjo's resignation, in Cameroon—when he would leave office, he answered: "I am only 45, and that's the age to get into politics."

Explicitly or not, all these heads of state held a grudge against their Senegalese counterpart "mad enough to authorize a full-fledged multiparty system." Besides, the events that are now taking place in Africa show in hindsight how timid Senegal has been in its crusade for democracy: all along, the authorities insisted that the Senegalese model "could not be exported," although in February 1986, at a symposium on democracy, President Abdou Diouf stated: "Some blame us for adopting a generalized multiparty system. Our answer is that there is no age for democracy."

### Suicidal Folly

Having failed to see that, despite some failures, the Senegalese experiment could be of interest to them, all advocates of the single party system now feel sorry and really do not know what to do to control a situation for which they were not prepared. They know that they have no choice but to head for a multiparty system, but they have no answer that would reconcile their own interest and the people's aspirations. Bongo did try to invent "democratic rescheduling" with a multiparty system to be established after a five-year wait, but his opponents were quick to smell a rat and demanded a multiparty system "right now." At this stage, if the Gabonese head of state sticks to his guns, a confrontation is unavoidable, as the national conference that ended yesterday was not very explicit on the matter.

In the Ivory Coast, the government now relies only on force to maintain a semblance of law and order. After a week of unrest, the schools and the university were closed for the year, and all organized sectors are sharpening their weapons to fight drastic pay cuts. On these two points, too, the Ivory Coast did not benefit from the Senegalese experiment. On several occasions, Abdou Diouf coped with strikes of three months or more without having recourse to force, although the quality of education did suffer a lot. Similarly, simple calculations would show that the purchasing power of the Senegalese has declined dangerously, but progressively, thanks to the magic trick of freezing salaries and letting prices rise. And it is perhaps because the Senegalese president was facing legally organized forces ready to fight, that he did not take the risk of decreasing salaries by 40 percent in one day. Democracy, thus, is remarkable in that it prevents governments from yielding to certain kinds of suicidal folly.

Cameroon, too, is going to move, because Mr. Paul Biya is determined to maintain the single-party system at all costs in order to prevent a breakdown in national cohesion, although it is precisely his single party—the Central Committee of which has not met since its creation five years ago—which encouraged the emergence of a multitude of ethnic-based lobbies.

In all of these countries, the Soviet perestroika and the East European changes must be deplored: Bongo and Houphouet-Boigny, for instance, can no longer denounce international communism and Moscow in

particular to seek favor with the West and with conservative forces in their own countries.

Another remarkable thing in all these political convulsions, is the attitude of the armies. In Benin, in Nigeria, in Guinea, it is the military who are promising a return to democracy, and the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde] did not wait for blood to flow in the streets of Praia before it gave up its ruling position. There is a sort of new military mentality that causes officers to stay in the barracks. Not long ago, less dramatic situations would bring about a military coup. Now, the army allows the civilians in power to solve problems themselves. True, the bankruptcy of military regimes, with a few exceptions, and the dark prospects ahead are of a nature to discourage more than one soldier from attempting to seize power.

A notable exception is Cameroon. If, after eight years in power, Paul Biya does not have the means to achieve political liberalization, it is because the army does not make it easy for him. Recently, a military court sentenced lawyer Yondo Black, found guilty of having political views. The army is also opposed to the release of political prisoners: 10 are being held in custody since 1984; 10 were judged and found not guilty; and six were judged and given sentences that they finished serving long ago. All were arrested after the attempted coup of 6 April 1984.

So, what about the future? It's hard to say, except that, as they say, "things will never be the same again." If national conferences do not lead to more or less extensive changes, based on the quality of the governments' maneuvers and on the opposition's forces, then it will be difficult to control the cycle of violence. And this may be why it becomes increasingly difficult to find staunch advocates of the single-party system among African heads of state.

### \* Savane Calls for Major Changes, Diouf Ouster

90AF0210A Dakar XAREBI-LA LUTTE  
in French Apr/May 90 p 1

[Editorial by Landing Savane: "Diouf Must Wake Up!"]

[Text] Abdou Diouf, in a speech eagerly awaited in various political circles, has once again disappointed those who fail to understand the major difficulties associated with a man obsessed with power and totally out of touch with the people and the reality of the country.

The P"S" [the so-called "Socialist" Party] may be rejoicing over the fall of Collin and Marianne [an allusion to Collin's French heritage?], but it would be naive to think that the people will be satisfied by this ritualistic sacrifice. Jean Collin's departure is not an end in itself, just as Diouf's departure is not an end in itself. The central objective of current political and social struggles is to bring about a major change in Senegal where the material and moral distress of the downtrodden as well as the middle classes has reached an intolerable level.



making the country ungovernable since the February 1988 elections. The people know that sacrifices will have to be made if the economic and financial situation is finally to improve. But the people know that it could not happen under the Collin system (a political/police-like system, now beheaded) or under the P"S" system as a whole.

Today our country needs a spirit of sacrifice and enterprise, which is possible only if social and economic mechanisms are brought out into full public view and nepotism is eradicated. This country needs democracy if all classes and levels of society are to become attuned to their responsibilities and participate fully in the development process. This country needs to eliminate corruption by its root and restore the desire to work and a sense of public service. This country needs to restore hope, rebuild the confidence of its sons and daughters.

It is clear to all Senegalese that with or without Collin, the P"S" system is incapable of doing this. The P"S" political culture is a parasitic one, a culture of irresponsibility, sycophancy, misappropriation of public funds, mediocrity and mendacity. We must be rid of it.

After he formed an orthodox P"S" government, which raised questions about his intentions in some circles, Diouf gave a speech on 3 April that is a veritable provocation of the people's movement and its demands, which we raised earlier in this article. Where does the "hope of 4 April" radiate as Mr. Diouf claims he sees? How can he hail a new era of democracy when the bad faith and interests of a government propped up by its privileges have put Senegal with its nine years of a multiparty system at risk of being overtaken by such latecomers as Algeria, Tunisia, and Gabon, soon to include Ivory Coast?

It is appalling to see that only now the president seems to have discovered—with his customary calculated naivete—the concept of "inward looking and internally sustained development," which reduces dependency on the outside world, after the industrial fabric of Senegal has been extensively eroded by the rigors of structural adjustment imposed by the IMF, the World Bank and the P"S."

Isn't it clearly dishonest to speak of a "guarantee of all freedoms and rights to all" after the government did away with some basic collective freedoms? It banned peaceful demonstrations and denies the opposition access to the media, making democracy in Senegal an illusion designed to fool the uninformed observer.

If Senegal's civil service has become onerous and ineffective, the fault lies with the Diouf government, which always attempted to use it as a tool of the P"S." It is now forced to demolish entire branches of the civil service in order to satisfy the requirements of the IMF and the World Bank, but there is no reason to hope that a "modern and efficient civil service"—the opposite of the P"S" model with its still robust traditions of political scheming—will be created in its place.

We nonetheless agree with Mr. Diouf when he says that the spirit of reform must also extend to conduct in the administration" [quote marks as published], but the spirit of reform must first infuse the way the country is governed. It must also be realized that the country cannot be governed the way it was governed before.

Diouf has apparently not realized this and it could be his undoing. The people can accept "less government" but only if there is "more democracy" and a "better life." Mr. Diouf tells us that he about to begin massive personnel cutbacks, but he cannot reassure worried workers by pointing to the experience at the visibly failing AGETIP [expansion unknown] or the unkept promises of the Delegation for Integration, Reintegration, and Employment (DIRE). It is indeed surprising to note that the state is not even capable of keeping up the pace of its personnel reduction policy. (Because of a lack of funds?) According to the press, only 26 persons in recent months have received the indemnity for voluntarily leaving their jobs. At that pace, it will take more than a generation to achieve the established goals. Should we now expect to see involuntary cutbacks initiated in order to satisfy the funding providers? Some are quietly saying so.

Mr. President, you and your government are in no position to ask us to "buy Senegalese products," "invest in Senegal," or "save in Senegal in order to invest in Senegal." Extremely serious accusations have been brought against you in the press and in various pamphlets; the IMF, the World Bank, and the donors are shocked at the extent of corruption and the illegal or unjustified transfers of capital to Swiss and other foreign banks by the ruling classes in a country such as ours.

In this context, your oratory on the virtues of our people, on young people and women, and on values in general is mere rhetoric meant for foreign consumption.

Adding all of this up, we are far from the "language of truth" you claim to speak to Senegal's youth and to Senegal's people. Therefore, Mr. Diouf, "Wake Up!" While there is still time. It could soon be too late.

#### \* 'Widespread' Corruption Denounced

90AF0210B Dakar XAREBI-LA LUTTE  
in French Apr/May 90 p 3

[Article by Awa: "Senegal, Paradise for Corruption"]

[Text] Have corruption, nepotism, and malfeasance become virtues typical of Senegal? The answer seems to be "yes"! For several years, government inspectors and the independent press have regularly reported major scandals.

But there is no follow-up. Everyday we hear new stories about a minister or senior civil servant extracting a percentage on a contract or telling aid donors that their departments lack the vehicles and gas vouchers required to carry out their projects and there are stories about

ministers cheating the nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), etc. No one responds with indignation any more to "subsistence-level corruption" as practiced by civil servants who ransom the pension checks of retired workers and elderly women, or by low-paid government clerks who demand "lunch money" in exchange for issuing a birth certificate, an identity card, or a passport, or for cashing a money order.

And what about those in the police and even the *gendarmerie* who look for their daily spending money by harassing jitney drivers, taxi drivers, and motorists in a hurry. "Subsistence corruption" to which public employees resort in order to supplement their monthly incomes is so widespread that it has become commonplace. But lo and behold, some Senegalese citizens stand accused of attempting to buy off a referee: 100,000 through a director at an Arab bank to help a group of black Africans to win in an Arab country! Nothing could be shabbier!

This is sheer madness! The shameful of it is that the Senegalese wanted a fair and untainted victory. The problem brought out by this new scandal is that our society is diseased, ridden with an evil that has dangerously insinuated itself into the social fabric and thought patterns. At every turn, money changes hands.

Corruption has become the surest means of access to power and wealth, with complete impunity. This latest scandal turns corruption into a political weapon and delivers it on a silver platter, a soccer victory that will make them forget the hardships of structural adjustment, the appalling social injustice of the fact that Senegal has never exuded so much wealth as during the IMF-manufactured austerity period.

The head of state and his government imperviously press on, dismissing any cries of protest. Moral and religious leaders are lying low in complicit silence. The people content themselves with heated discussions in public places in which everyone tries to look more informed than the others. The political parties speak out but take no concrete actions.

Even in provable cases, never has anyone confronted the individuals in question, who move about flaunting their ill-gotten gains in the faces of hardworking taxpayers.

The tax authorities and public entities such as SENELEC [National Electric Company], SONEES [National Water and Equipment Company], and SONATEL [National Telecommunications Company] fail to prosecute these debt-evading big shots, but they are prompt to cut off water and electricity and prosecute when the common man is unable to pay.

We could continue to add to this list of grievances. But if Senegal is to become a modern state, a high-level authority must urgently be created to supervise the fight against corruption and educate the population. For their part, the people must organize Committees for Public Salvation to unmask, denounce and combat "subsistence

corruption." Not only that, they must make life impossible for the big shots who take food from the mouths of others, by investigating, exposing the guilty, and bringing them to justice. Senegal must become a hell on earth for the thieving and the corrupt.

#### \* Opposition Mobilization Required After Collin

90AF0210C Dakar XAREBI-LA LUTTE  
in French Apr/May 90 p 4

[Article by Mamadou Diop (Decroix)]

[Text] What does Collin's departure mean? The question continues to run through the minds of many Senegalese. Collin was not just anyone. His career was extraordinary in the context of Senegalese politics.

For 30 years, since the 1960 accessions to "independence," Collin remained not only in government, but also at the very heart of power, in the rarefied circles of political decisionmaking in Senegal. In recent years, starting with Diouf's rise to the presidency (which Collin himself is said to have engineered), Collin's personal role in national politics had become central. Very high-ranking figures in the party and in national office learned this the hard way very early on. Habib Thiam, followed by Moustapha Niasse (the one a close associate of Diouf, the other an icon of the Senghor era), were removed without a fight for having offended Jean Collin. When the 1987 police rebellion threatened to precipitate the regime's downfall, Collin revealed his scandalously exorbitant powers in full view of the Senegalese public and foreign observers. He personally took control of matters and restored order as he defined it, before passing the baton to his long-time protege, culled directly from his inner circle, Andre Sonko. But Collin, the subject of remarks by Abdou Diouf that tomorrow's historians will study with great interest (particularly Diouf's last open letter to Collin), is now gone. It is true that some observers see the work of Jean Collin in various facets of the new governing team and conclude that he has left in name only.

But the basic thrust of the question seems to lie elsewhere. Whether he has actually departed or not, Jean Collin's withdrawal from the center stage of state affairs comes as a great victory for the patriotic forces of the opposition, which have been battling for his departure for several years. In fact, the opposition eventually rallied broad sectors of the populace to the view that Jean Collin was an obstacle in Senegal's path. It is therefore not true, as some would think, that pressure from certain French socialist quarters and from the anti-Collin rebels in the Senegalese "Socialist" Party were independent factors in Collin's departure. Rather, they were the direct and/or indirect results of popular pressure. The question now becomes: What new dynamics and new prospects does Collin's departure open up for Senegal? It would indeed be mistaken and somewhat naive to think of it as just another incident or subchapter in Senegalese politics. In fact, in terms of political scope, Collin's departure could be compared to

that of Senghor whose former minister of state is attributed with having actually toppled Senghor, at least within the corridors of state.

It is therefore permissible to see far-reaching political maneuvers as highly probable in this context. The opposition demanded that the Diouf-Collin duo step down in order to bring the country out of deadlock. Collin may be gone, but Diouf remains and he is bound to seize the opportunity of his most loyal collaborator's withdrawal to regain the initiative. Collin's withdrawal may mark the beginning of new bids by the government to regain the initiative. [sentence as published]

Will the government take more radical stands in order to draw the opposition into close battle or will it make conciliatory gestures in an attempt to throw the opposition off balance? The second route seems the more likely, unless the regime has opted for suicide in both the figurative and literal senses of the term. What moves will it make on the political playing board and how will it make them? What will its objectives be over the short-, medium- and long-term? There is no ready answer to these questions as far as the tactical approach is concerned, but it is already clear that the opposition is being summoned more urgently than ever since Diouf came into office.

Will the opposition fully appreciate the scope and meaning of its unity within the present context? Will it manage to build its strength on the fundamental notion that only by organizing, reinforcing and broadening popular mobilization and resistance can a happy outcome be reached in the country's two-year-old political impasse? To ease up the pressure at a time when the regime is doing all it can to restructure in order to improve its chances of survival would only bring back the unfortunate situation of May 1988.

If the opposition adheres firmly to its positions and goals, if it mobilizes the people and perseveres in its struggle, it could then display clear-sightedness and wisdom by not missing a single opportunity to bring the country out of the present impasse in a truly national, democratic and popular perspective.

#### **\* Long Road to Democracy After Collin's Removal**

90AF0210D Dakar XAREBI-LA LUTTE  
in French Apr/May 90 p 4

[Text] Two years after the fraudulent elections of February 1988, Senegal remains mired in the most serious economic, political, and social crisis in its history. The potions of the great white sorcerer, Jean Collin, proved ineffective against this state of affairs and so his faithful associate Abdou Diouf decided with a heavy heart to remove him. Thus, one of the people's demands has been met and the door to a solution of the political crisis has been partially opened. But what will Diouf do? Won't he try to pursue a "Collinist" policy without Collin? Or, will he finally wake up to the reality so painfully obvious to every clear-sighted observer and address the real issues so

that a peaceful, political solution to Senegal's problem can be found? After nearly 10 years of power, arbitrariness and corruption, the Diouf/P"S" [Socialist Party] government has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

In response to the current crisis, the peoples of Africa in general and the people of Senegal in particular have demonstrated that the future holds no prospects for them without the restoration of democratic freedoms—the only guarantee of a population's effective participation in a country's development.

Senegal cannot afford any more political maneuvering, if we want to spare our people even greater suffering.

At a time when aid donors have lost all confidence in Senegal, the country's credibility must urgently be rebuilt. Young people and the nation as a whole must urgently be given fresh hope. Senegal must urgently be remade into the country of enterprise, creativity, intelligence and know-how, qualities that gave Senegal special prominence in black Africa, now lost because of the mediocrity and selfish interests of successive regimes. If Mr. Diouf truly understands that and has heeded the lessons it teaches, he will move quickly in the direction of the democratic solution demanded by the people. If he does, his stature will increase, for once. If he does not, the political opposition will have no choice—if it wants to be consistent—but to step up its mobilization effort and prepare for new and more serious confrontations with the government, in which Diouf stands to lose the most. As for the people, they have nothing more to lose but the chains of egregious poverty, oppression, and exploitation that bind them.

We salute the unfailing determination and fighting spirit of the Senegalese people over the past two years. Today, more than ever before, the watchwords are mobilization and vigilance. No matter what happens, the creation of Popular Resistance Committees must continue in urban neighborhoods and villages and in the workplace. The committees must be the forerunners of entities for the direct participation by the people, which offer the only guarantee, now as in the future, of regained popular sovereignty.

However it may now look, we still have a long road ahead of us. Not only must we clear away an authoritarian and corrupt regime that has totally disqualified itself, but we must also confront in earnest, and with dedication and self-sacrifice, the ills that plague our society. Those ills are the intolerable deterioration in our social services (schools and health care, in particular), unemployment and under employment, the devastation of small farmers and tradespeople, the turmoil in the middle classes with its jobless university graduates and its increasingly pauperized managers, and the asphyxiation of still productive sectors by a bankrupt government. Such are the basic challenges we have to face. We are convinced that our people are capable of meeting



those challenges if given committed, dedicated, and competent governmental leadership that respects human rights and freedoms.

#### \* Causes for, Reaction to Collin's Departure

##### \* Split on Appointments

90AF0148A Dakar SUB HEBDO in French  
5 Apr 90 p 6

[Article by Babacar Toure: "Bad Start"; first paragraph is SUD HEBDO introduction]

[Text] There are several versions of the reason for Jean Collin's sudden departure from the government whose makeup was announced on 27 March 1990. To reveal to its readers the comments about that departure, SUD HEBDO researched, analyzed, dug into, and cross-checked several sources to give them the two main versions that held our attention, even though neither one can be "certified as an accurate rendering" of what was truly said in the secrecy of the Avenue Roume office.

Returning from Paris on Sunday, 25 March, Collin met with the chief of state on Monday, the 26th, and a discussion immediately ensued of the final list of the members of the government scheduled to be announced the next day, Tuesday, 27 March. As was his wont, the Minister of State had his own ideas and list of ministers who would serve on the new cabinet. "Renewers" would be included and the names of Babacar Sine and Moustapha Kasse were mentioned. The strategic portfolio of interior would go to Mbaye Diouf, previously minister of animal resources, given the impossibility of keeping on current occupant Andre Sonko. Both are reputedly loyal followers of Collin's and both are considered the "eyes and ears" of the minister. (In)voluntary departures were anticipated. Mentioned were Minister of the Armed Forces Medoune Fall (because of his age, 71), Minister of Justice Seydou Madani Sy, and even Minister of Youth and Sports Abdoulaye Makhtar Diop, whose ministry was at the root of an attempt to bribe a referee at the most recent Nations of Africa Soccer Championship in Algiers. Talk about moral responsibility!

Keeping on Serigne Lamine Diop, even if "exiled" to another ministry, did not enjoy the minister of state's favor. The president usually saw nothing wrong with legitimizing the "Collin list" after making his own remarks and making sure the persons he chose were on it. The Minister of State sometimes even anticipated the chief of state's desires by making sure that his power and control over the machinery would suffer no dissent or limitation. But this time Abdou Diouf wielded a firm hand. He also had a precise idea about the government he wanted and who would do what on it. This time the alchemy did not take and profound disagreements surfaced, the main one concerning the Ministry of Interior, where the president had chosen to put Famara Ibrahima Sagna. Loud protestations from the Minister of State. The two men had little affection for one another and did not care who knew it. It is said that in two years they met

but once outside of cabinet meetings. The president was polite but firm. Seeing his cause was lost, the Minister of State then asked to be released from his duties in the government. This time (once again), the president did not have to be coaxed and gave in and this was not the first time he had done so.

But circumstances had changed. Returning home, Collin sent a letter of resignation whose effect was nil because the chief of state had already settled the matter in his own way, as the order announcing the cabinet shakeup and published on the evening of 27 March would show. Nowhere in his letter of thanks to Jean Collin is there any mention made of the president's "regrets" over a man who was initially to enjoy the title of government coordinator, in addition to his title of minister of state. In the original scenario, was he to retain that of general secretary to the office of president? While some sources answer in the affirmative, others retort that the president had already informed him that Senko would succeed him in that post. Is he Collin's man, as he is usually presented? Too quickly do people forget that he was first the loyal aide of then Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. And that he transferred that loyalty and faithfulness to the person to whom the chief of state later instructed him to: Jean Collin, just as "Jean Collin's friends" were encouraged to do by Diouf himself, asking them to "support him," particularly in the face of the demoralizing attacks by the opposition.

However, Collin's fatal mistake was to give "his closest" entourage and "friends" too much slack. The political sociology of the Wolof postulates that "Buur da fay fiir" (A king does not share). They had also forgotten Abdou Diouf's endless patience (just ask President Senghor!), a man who, like an elephant, can trumpet like thunder. It is reported that the Minister of State tried "to upset" the president's meditative retreat at Popenguine, but that "the closest entourage" found out and firmly opposed it. He goes or I go!

Did the president of the republic get rid of the "renewers" once the break was a fait accompli or were they part of the "evidence"? The question had lost its importance compared with the only real one: How did Abdou Diouf push Jean Collin to the resignation he had already planned? It is whispered that the combined efforts of a very, very high official in the Supreme Court, author of "find" Famara Sagna in interior, his "closest entourage," some of our French and Arab friends, his pilgrimage to Mecca, prayers of all the saints and the little people, and last but not least, the harassment by the opposition, especially Abdoulaye Wade and Ousmane Ngom, won out in the end over the brotherly love that finally had to yield to reason of state.

Collin is gone, a victim of the "Diouf method" made of patience and secrecy. He did not want it that way, this man who hoped to plan for his own succession with his "sons" in the right place and after a congress that would have enabled him to make a triumphant exit from the scene. To echo local horse show fans, it was a "bad

start." Have we reached Sangomar, where tourists say anything can happen? "Dougou nagnou Sangomar?"

### \* PS Task, Plans Unchanged

90AF0148B Dakar L'UNITE in French Apr 90 p 4

[Editorial by Oumar Kante: "Change Amidst Continuity"]

[Text] The departure of Comrade Jean Collin from the government has roused a flurry of commentaries and resulted in the most diverse and preposterous interpretations.

It is useless to go back over newspaper speculation and "in-depth analyses" of "experts" in the Socialist Party [PS] or those "close" to the president.

However great he may be, Jean Collin derives his eminence and powers as a statesman from the chief of state and president.

As if there were any need to repeat it, it is the president of our country who is the source of all power and rank in Senegal, which means that not only does he hand out posts and confer aura and prestige, but it is also he who maintains them and gives them their durability. Finally, it is he who defines them from the standpoint of scope as well as temporal limits.

Consequently, the departure from the government of Minister of State Jean Collin fits into the normal order of things, although the event surprised and astonished many observers, even within the Socialist Party itself.

In my opinion, the major political event resides less in the departure from government of Comrade Jean Collin than it does in the proof offered that Abdou Diouf, chief of state and president of the republic, is the only true head of the Senegalese Government, the only one who, in the final analysis, decides, appoints, and removes.

The question of knowing who governs Senegal is therefore a futile, absurd question for our country!

One must therefore not be taken in and, above all, not exaggerate an event which, all things being equal elsewhere, is part of what I was going to call the "natural" prerogatives of the president.

One must also realize that Collin's departure from the government takes nothing away from his great merit, his exceptional sense of loyalty, and his devotion to the man he chose to serve.

In no way does his departure taint the recognition that all Senegal owes him for the enormous work he has accomplished under the aegis of the chief of state in the undertaking of our country's economic and social development.

The official letter that President Abdou Diouf sent him and that is unique in our recent history bears witness to this.

There is consequently no problem at this level. The government will continue to govern, meaning it will continue to express in action the policies inspired by Abdou Diouf.

And it will be done well, as in the past.

It is important for all socialists to understand this fact.

Our country's strength is to offer grand designs and grand ideals. Our force does not reside and has never resided in a personality cult!

### Naivete

The Senegalese opposition does not understand this; it cannot.

For it, individuals or "strong" personalities make history. Its logic has therefore led it to believe or hope that Jean Collin's departure will facilitate its work, that the government is going to fall into its hands like a ripe plum! What naivete! What clouded intelligence!

If the Socialist Party is a powerful party, it is because it operates on principles that allow it to face the most unexpected situations.

Thus, what is true for the government is also true for the party.

There is no problem within the Socialist Party until there is proof to the contrary. Collin is a member of the Executive Bureau and chairman of the Follow-up Committee.

If it were otherwise, the party would continue to work and work hard.

This means that we shall continue to make the opposition pay through its nose. It will have to understand that it will no longer do anything in this country. This means above all that we shall continue to carry on the process of renewal and opening in our party in keeping with the line set forth by our general secretary, Abdou Diouf.

For us socialists, the main objective today is to prepare for our next regular congress with cohesion, amidst democracy and transparency, and with respect for the dignity of our rank-and-file members.

Our goal is to work so that by the close of our next congress, the inspiration behind the renewal and opening of the Socialist Party, Comrade Abdou Diouf, will be satisfied with the work of his members and have the right political personnel around him to help him lead our country down the long road to economic and social development for a long time to come.

### \* Opposition Hails Fall

90AF0148C Dakar SOPI in French 6 Apr 90 p 4

[Statement by opposition parties]

[Text] After observing the departure of Jean Collin from the government following the cabinet shakeup of 26

March 1990, the undersigned parties believe this departure is the result of pressure by the people's forces in general and those of the opposition parties in particular. While hailing the victory, they have emphasized the need to continue and develop the mobilization and fight of the Senegalese people around the other objectives included in the general policy statement of 24 February 1990, to wit: the resignation of Abdou Diouf; the establishment of a government of transition; and the organization of new free and democratic elections.

For the undersigned parties, only the satisfaction of such demands can lead to a peaceful solution of the political crisis and provide Senegal with prospects for true democracy and economic and social development.

They call on all activists and all Senegalese to participate en masse in the demonstrations planned as part of the program of action until final victory.

Long live the unity of the fighting opposition! Long live Senegal!

Signed by: the AJ/MRDN [AND-JEF Revolutionary Movement for the New Democracy], LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party], MSU (former MDP [People's Democratic Movement]), OST [Workers Socialist Organization], PAI [African Independence Party], PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party], PLP [People's Liberation Party], PPS [Senegalese People's Party], and UDP [Union for a People's Democracy].

#### \* Wade Plans Diouf's Departure

90AF0148D Dakar SOPI in French 6 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Ndiogou Wack Seck: "Collin Is Gone; Abdou Diouf Remains"]

[Text] Saturday, 31 March 1990. Dakar Airport. It was 1530 hours when the Air France plane from Paris landed. Among its passengers: a man, a symbol, a myth: Abdoulaye Wade, president-elect of the Senegalese people, idol of the masses, the hope of the nation. He had just participated in the Second Afro-European Conference at the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg whose theme was: "Systems of Protecting Human Rights in Africa and Europe: Experience and Prospects."

To the cries of "SOPI, SOPI, SOPI, long live the president!" Abdoulaye Wade ducked into his blue Mercedes that took off for Dakar.

The cortege arrived at the National Headquarters of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] at 1620 hours to plunge into a human wave, a monstrous crowd mainly made up of young people who had come to show their president their unwaivering attachment to him, with no trumpets or fanfare, but with sincerity, determination and discipline. Despite the rules of Ramadan, the women did not want to be left out and had been on the scene since early afternoon. It was amidst an indescribable rumble of "SOPI, SOPI, SOPI," that Ablaye Faye set the tone, recalling what he calls "Jean Collin's death." Boubacar Sall followed him to the rostrum to

urge the crowd to "do your duty, which consists of thanking God. Let us thank God because he has given us what we asked of him. The mother of thieves, the father of crooks, the symbol of unbelievers is finally gone! Jean Collin is buried; let us heave a sigh of relief! God is therefore with us!"

It was to cries of "Jallarbi-SOPI" that Abdoulaye Bathily went next to the rostrum alongside Abdoulaye Wade. After thanking everyone who had come to welcome the president elected by all Senegalese, Bathily exclaimed: "Collin has fallen! Who remains? Abdou Diouf! I won't tell you anything. You all know what we have to do to drive Abdou Diouf from power. We have to continue to fight, mobilize, demand free and democratic elections. In the meantime, I will see you on the evening of 3 and all day on the 4th. SOPI-Jallarbi!"

#### Provocation by Cops

It was finally Wade's turn to speak to the members. After greeting and thanking his friend and brother Bathily, after paying well-deserved homage to all Senegalese present for the right cause, he began to lay the first stone of the final stage leading to the final assault of the moribund, dying regime of Abdou Diouf: "Today I am going to summarize my remarks so they will be easier to interpret and report wherever necessary. Already in Pikine I said that Africa was on the move, but paradoxically enough, nothing has changed in Senegal for 30 years. Even in Gabon, Ethiopia, Benin, and the Ivory Coast, things have begun to move. They say everything comes from the East, but is that true? In my two books published over a year ago, I already announced these changes in the Eastern Bloc countries. I explained in complete detail the process of these changes, one of whose triggers was the capital drain. I showed that neither kings nor chiefs of state could do anything in the face of these changes and that they would all be swept away like straws before the upheavals on the horizon. The changes would be inevitable and the chiefs of state would have to accept that reality. Newsmen asked me to explain my 'prophecy' and I simply answered that the best form of intelligence is to know how to see far ahead."

At that precise moment, Wade's speech [text missing]

The imperturbable Abdoulaye Wade continued: "The fight is not over just because Jean Collin has left. I call everyone as my witness; you all saw the grenades. They will no longer say it is Jean Collin, but Abdou Diouf. We now know our target; it is Abdou Diouf. As for those policemen, I won't say anything to them. Nor will I say anything to the young people of the SOPI movement. If they are attacked, they know what they have to do without my telling them. Continue to mobilize; prepare for your Independence Day on 3 and 4 April. No bullet



will be fired in this country and if it has to be otherwise, the first one will be for me. I thank everyone and let the fight continue."

#### \* More Effort for Democracy

90AF0148E Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
6-13 Apr 90 p 3

[Editorial by Jean Paul Dias, publishing editor of the PRESS DE DAKAR and member of the National Secretariat of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]: "The Earthquake"]

[Text] The cabinet shakeup so long awaited has finally come. Amidst the newness, it is the most important change in government in nearly 15 years. Even if a few terms in the government's communique hint that the team in power will be somewhat provisional, the shakeup of 27 March is a veritable political seismic event, an earthquake. Not only have ten ministers left, but the all-powerful minister of state and general secretary of the presidency is leaving government.

The departure of the latter is certainly the most striking element of the event. It is true that all the problems of the PS [Socialist Party] as well as the opposition have recently been polarized around the Minister of State. But one cannot say with any certainty that it was the only basis for his departure, even if the facts did count for something.

That is why, in the PS and its periphery as well as in the opposition, one should adopt a cautious attitude because no one can say precisely what would have happened if Collin had been bent on hanging on.

Consequently, in order to remain in sync with the spirit of the missive he sent to his former aide, President Diouf should see that Collin's proteges, at least those whose reliability and competence are recognized, are not persecuted in their careers. Furthermore, the "Friends of Jean Collin" should give their sponsor proof of their sincerity. It is an opportunity for them to decide their future because adversity is about to set in. Aida Diongue has already received many phone calls in the form of gibes and even threats.

Time will tell whether Abdou Diouf will prefer to make a scurrilous attack on Collin to mark the scapegoat or whether he will manifest his friendship for him by preventing any slippage. Now alone at the helm, he has no more excuses of any kind.

#### New Elections

The opposition can be happy over Collin's departure, but one must be magnanimous in victory, modest in triumph. Indeed, just as in war one does not fire on an ambulance, the opposition, which even its adversaries call extremist, must prove its class and poise by not twisting the knife in the wound. Collin is gone; we must take note of it and move forward without trying to walk while looking over our shoulders.

After all, Collin's departure provoked no spontaneous popular demonstrations. In other words, it is a purely political event and one should adopt a political attitude.

The essential thing today is the demand for an effective democracy that is not pure facade and a clarification of the political situation by new elections. Moustapha Ka in Communications should justify the coherence of his group, the GER [Study and Reflection Group], with his post 1988 election note in which he defended the need to open up the government media to the opposition. We shall judge him by his acts. If he drags his feet as his predecessor did, one may then definitely doubt the capacity of PS intellectuals to face up to the debate.

Famara Sagna in interior will not have the excuse of following orders. He should accept the peaceful marches of the opposition, which are, like the meetings and press conferences, simply political demonstrations. It is the task of law enforcement agencies to maintain order by keeping a march orderly, for example, but not prevent democratic expression.

It is therefore not out of the question to hope for a relaxation of the atmosphere, however little one expects it from those in power.

Finally, new elections, at least legislative elections, remain a demand. After its congress in June, the PS will confirm new leaders even if a large proportion of old ones is expected. It is therefore not normal to have PS deputies in the National Assembly who no longer represent anything or anyone. Along with municipal and rural elections, the holding of legislative elections could therefore clarify the political situation.

#### \* Chance for Democratic Dialogue

90AF0148F Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
5 Apr 90 p 6

[Editorial by Ibrahima Fall: "New Chance"]

[Text] Jean Collin's departure from government and certainly the Socialist Party [PS] will, while at the same time putting an end to the dyarchy existing at the top, open up real prospects for a national democratic dialogue that alone can save Senegal.

With a bit of distance, one can objectively realize that despite his statements, Collin had no interest whatsoever in beginning a national democratic dialogue (much less a positive outcome). The latter necessarily postulates the end of the patrimonial state and the beginning of an arbitral state, the naming of officials with recognized competence and avowed patriotism, the sharing of national responsibilities by all representative forces of the country. No formula of co-management of government had any chance of winning as soon as it unfailingly confirmed the end of the centralized, tentacular, omnipresent power of the former minister of state. If Collin had been concerned about rehabilitating the political climate polluted by the guerrilla warfare between the government and the opposition, he would have led

Abdou Diouf, whose mentor and grey eminence he undoubtedly was, to adopt such innovative and stabilizing political instruments as a new and fair election code, a consensual democratic charter establishing the rules of play, the imposition of deterrent, exemplary sanctions in place of the illicitly rich and other corrupt officials crowding the corridors of power. The new political civilization that would result while at the same time marking the irreversibility of the Senegalese system would constitute a minimum but captivating program for all Senegalese concerned about the national interest and the image of their country in the world.

Concentrating all powers in his hands, naming and ousting at will the high government and party officials in power and leading the destiny of Senegal practically as a "solitary guide," Collin had little care for shakeups which, even if they reconciled the Senegalese with one another, urged him to leave the scene. Holding responsibilities higher than those of a prime minister (some made him Abdou Diouf's alter ego, to the point of referring to the Diouf-Collin couple) and knowing that politically, culturally, and sociologically speaking he would never be president of Senegal, Collin bet on the importance of his powers to set up a locked-in system totally devoted to him (see article "A Well-Oiled Machine").

With Collin gone, Abdou Diouf recovers his full powers. It is up to him to realize he is headed straight for disaster if he does not look at himself and evaluate his political approach. Senegal is now divided into two irrevocably opposing camps: the one in power, which, despite the increasingly rare lollipops and favors, is shrinking by the day; and the one belonging to the overwhelming majority of the people who no longer intend to be governed as they are now. Profound political changes are being induced by the renovation of the Senegalese system. No little reform will do it. The patriotic task is to rebuild the united nature of the Senegalese core by getting its main constituents to engage in a dialogue. The wretched strategy consisting of sweeping away freedoms by banning opposition demonstrations and recruiting additional forces to come to the rescue of legal law enforcement units cannot last forever. At a time when countries as politically backward as Benin and Gabon start to resort to such attractive formulas as national conferences, Senegal, known for the validity and solidity of its system, complacently stuck to monologue and crawling. Even attempts at dialogue as risque as those undertaken by the Party of Independence and Labor (PIT) are systematically sabotaged, thus discrediting both the government and its interlocutors and compromising any chance of arriving at concerted solutions leading us out of the crisis. President Abdou Diouf has a trump card with Jean Collin's departure. Now he must rise to the challenge: governing Senegal with the Senegalese people and not against them.

### \* Fear of Proteges' Sabotage

90AF0148G Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
13-19 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by A.C.: "After Collin the Deluge?"]

[Text] "We will not give up. We will not surrender our arms without fighting." This was the survival instinct of one political official from the Thies region generally presented as one of the "spiritual sons" of Jean Collin. In itself, his response is a confession: The "favorites" of the former No. 2 man in the PS [Socialist Party] (pejoratively known as "Collin's Boys") expect to be the object of group target practice by the party or even—why not?—a purge.

Is the evidence not striking to men often judged "mediocre" and who owed everything to the confidence that the former minister of state had in them? And yet, dictated by political necessity or government effectiveness, such an operation could not look like a witch hunt.

Indeed, President Abdou Diouf had very little room in which to maneuver. One must not forget the capacity to respond, even with an underground struggle if need be, of those who, by the grace of the former minister of state, occupy posts of responsibility in all party structures.

What the rank-and-file members now fear is seeing the outcasts of the post-Collin period remain in the party and engage in sabotage helping the opposition. That is the danger of a "de-Collinization" in the ranks of the PS. For example, it would suffice for deputy Papa Alioune Ndao to demonstrate a bit of ill will for Thies to fall under the permanent control of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party], and this could be true of other corners of the country. In Saint-Louis, for example, the same fear was expressed by a PS women's leader: "O Diallo (chief of staff of the former minister of the Civil Service) joined the party only recently. Nevertheless, he is the only PS official in the city capable of calling a meeting well attended by the Asc [expansion unknown], who are ordinarily reticent about anything having to do with the PS. Imagine what would happen if he wanted to play tricks on us!"

Given all the foregoing, one can better understand why on the list of all the members of the National Assembly Bureau, a list which Abdou Diouf submitted to the president of the parliamentary group, Samba Laobe Fall, and President Abdoul Aziz Ndao yesterday (Thursday), two hours before the beginning of the replacement operations, deputy Papa Alioune Ndao and the president of the National Assembly retained their respective portfolios, even if their "sponsor" was the former minister of state. None of these petitions that had gotten the better of Daouda Sow and Habib Thiam had circulated in the corridors of the Assembly, as Abdoul Aziz Ndao saw his reelection hailed by a majority and opposition on their feet.

These parameters bear less weight in the implementation of a policy of "de-Collinization" in the administration.

At this level, it could move even faster because there is no lack of competence in this country to take over with no transition. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that all these "new cadres" of the PS will have any reason at all to stay in the party and take over its leadership once removed from posts of responsibility.

The diabolical effects of a poorly negotiated "de-Collinization" means that Abdou Diouf will undoubtedly hesitate to get the train moving. They are not far from being impossible to avoid, these "friends" of Collin who still have plenty of tricks up their sleeves. And the most important of these tricks is that of being able, even from a distance, to influence for a long time to come the fate of the PS. Collin still has traces of power and it is still too soon to sound the knell, for it remains to be seen whether, once ousted by Machiavelli, he has not become Machiavelli himself.

#### \* Opposition Parties' Strategies, Activities

##### \* Coordination Needed

34190111A Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
16-22 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara: "Maintaining the Pressure"]

[Text] When the heads of parties find themselves behind bars at police headquarters, it remains for their lieutenants to take over to organize the response. This is one of the numerous lessons learned from the detention of the principal leaders at the national conference of opposition party heads (or "The Nine," if you wish) on Wednesday, 14 March. With the difference, however, that Mr. Wade, who was able to escape the police net, was present, as was Mody Diagne of the MSU [Movement for Socialism and Unity] (formerly the MDP [People's Democratic Movement]) at the consultations held at the home of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] leader at about 6:30 PM on the same day for the purpose of establishing a strategy for response.

The 14 March date was the day chosen by "The Nine" for the recitation of the prayer that was to be dedicated to the memory of Mor Fall, who died in Thies on 28 February following a protest demonstration by the opposition. The site chosen for the recitation of this prayer, during which Marxists (Majmout Diop, Abdoulaye Bathily, Amadou Guire, Landing Savane, and Racine Guisse) were to stand side by side with men imbued with the culture of Islam (Babacar Niang and Abdoulaye Wade), was the Zaouia El Hadj Malick Sy on Lamine Gueye Avenue. At 1:00 PM that day, a conflict with the imam's radio broadcast from the mosque could be expected.

##### Fundamentalists

At 5:00 PM when the party leaders were being escorted to the site planned for the recitation of the Takusaan prayer (they were all there except for Mody Diagne of the

MSU and Omar Wone of the PPS [Senegalese People's Party], who could not be present), they were denied access to the Zaouia, because the doors were locked. Meanwhile GMI [Mobile Intervention Group] and police agents were patrolling all of the neighboring streets, which had been blocked off. A number of regular visitors to the religious institution, which is located a few hundred yards from the Sandaga market in the business section of Dakar, were unable to fulfill their religious duties within the mosque. The leaders of "The Nine" had an even harder time, because a large contingent of antidemonstration police prevented anyone from entering Lamine Gueye Avenue. Thus it was at the intersection of Pompidou and Lamine Gueye Avenues that the Marxists, liberals, and nationalists sympathetic with the fundamentalist factions removed their shoes and lined up before beginning to recite their four "rakas" on the bare asphalt. Less than 50 meters away, more than 50 policemen watched them, clearly uncertain what attitude to adopt.

As soon as the prayer had ended, the situation began to deteriorate. One by one, the antidemonstration police arrested Landing Savane, Abdoulaye Bathily, Amadou Guire, and Hamedine Racine Guisse. Mbaye Niang was seized as he prepared to get into his automobile on Pompidou Avenue. As for Mr. Wade, he had been carefully installed in his vehicle by his personal bodyguards. Reacting, hundreds of the militants and sympathizers present in the area pelted the policemen with stones. The police retaliated by using their teargas grenades, which they did not hesitate to toss into the houses in which the fleeing demonstrators had sought refuge.

Did the quick reaction of his bodyguards explain why Mr. Wade was not taken into custody? He himself says that "this is a political game in which each side has its cards to play. I cannot guess the intentions of my opponents in failing to take me in for questioning. But they might have done so had things developed otherwise. In any case, I find the attitude of the government absurd."

The events on Wednesday also brought members of the PS [Socialist Party] vigilance force onto the scene. They were armed and they attacked the demonstrators. Some of them were then arrested. But the fact that they were armed by a political group and were acting as a parallel police force is very serious. This is the reason "The Nine" have written to the government to ask that they be disarmed. "If this is not done," Landing Savane and Abdoulaye Wade warned, "we will give our members the green light to arm themselves." In any case, on the day after these events (yesterday), no members of this force were in the area where the opposition was demonstrating to demand the release of 21 members and sympathizers still in custody. In fact, only the party leaders and the journalists (including our colleague, Babacar Toure, of SUD HEBDO) had been released on Wednesday evening. There were thus still 21 demonstrators in custody, scheduled for arraignment on the afternoon of 15 March. This is a veritable irregularity in itself, because



freeing the "brains" behind all that happened, and keeping only their followers in custody, definitely constitutes an aberration.

On 14 and 15 March, "The Nine" showed that they were close to reaching cruising speed in their challenge of the government. But their actions were so cruelly lacking in coordination that it will take more time before they can seriously worry the government, which may yet strike some blows against them without suffering too many in return. Solely because it wants to occupy the field, up to and including the mosques, this opposition force might provoke the irritation of certain social classes, in particular the workers who cannot get home for lack of bus service, or due to their fear of having their cars stoned or burned. Then there are the merchants in Pompidou and the surrounding area, who in these last two days have suffered considerable losses due to the need to close their shops in the afternoon because of the fear of vandalism. Thus there is here a two-edged sword—which will have to be handled with care.

#### \* Unions Reply to Strike Call

34190111B Dakar WAL FADJRI  
in French 16-22 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara: "Reaction of the Unions"]

[Text] Without unity among the youth movements, trade unions, and political parties, there is little hope of forcing President Diouf to resign. This idea is widespread among the ranks of the nine parties in the "combative opposition" (Landing Savane of the AND JEF [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy] has made this statement), and it is even the beginning and the end of their entire strategy. In fact, what impact could be expected of a general strike in which the workers, whether they be in the field of education, in the factories, etc., did not participate? What would the scope of a march or a sit-in be if the participants did not include the young people in whose name, among others, the claims, the demands, the criticisms are being made?

What is the thinking of the principal leaders in this union of which "The Nine" in the opposition speak so much? How do they conceive of a general strike "of a political nature" (to use Mr. Wade's expression), and how do they react to the fact that the strike appeal is coming from the political parties? One cannot fail to ask these questions at a time when on the level of the leadership of the nine parties, active preparations are under way for this great stoppage, which would empty the factories, offices, and classrooms of their occupants and paralyze economic life until Diouf departs. By telephone, or on the pretext of a press conference, we asked these questions of the officials in charge of the autonomous trade unions, which are the particular targets of the opposition groups. But the positions differ, depending on whether one pursues the logic of the UDEN [Teachers Democratic Union] or that of the SUDES [United Democratic Trade-Union Federation of Senegalese Teachers]. Except that it should

be specified that certain unions, such as the SYNPICS [National Union of Senegalese Information and Communications Professionals], take no position at all, because they have not been approached by "The Nine." But let us listen to what they have to say, in order to obtain some idea of their respective positions.

#### Mamadou Ndoye (UDEN)

"In principle, we do not exclude a popular front. But it is all a question of analysis to establish whether the political struggle in Senegal has reached a level such that unity should be brought about. This does not prevent us from continuing to be independent of the political parties. The fact remains that if we believe a political action favors the pursuit of the workers' and the teachers' efforts, we will support it. As far as a general strike is concerned, we have not studied this in our organizations. But I can say that if we believe that the policy being pursued will not allow us to develop further in normal fashion, we will combat it. As a result, we do not exclude participation in such a strike."

#### Moussa Samb (SAES) [Autonomous Union of College Teachers]

"We were not approached on these matters, and as a result our organizations have not established a position. For the time being, we would give priority to trade-union solidarity among the workers over unity with the political parties, because without this trade-union cooperation, it would be dangerous to move closer to the political parties. It is on the strength of this principle that we say that a strike should come from the trade-union leadership, and not from the political forces. Certainly a strike of a political nature falls within the realm of the possible, but what counts for us is the autonomy of the trade-union forces and their unity prior to any action of major scope."

#### Iba Ndiaye Diadji (SUDES)

"The most recent congress held by our trade union (last December) rejected any participation on our part in demonstrations (marches, forums) organized by the political parties. Thus we do not feel at all involved where a general strike is concerned. The same is true with regard to joint action by the trade unions and the parties, because we have no relationship with the political organizations. Moreover, a general strike of a political sort is contrary to the principles of democracy. Democrats cannot accept having orders handed down to them from above. To this is added the fact that the strike is a weapon that one cannot use in just any way and at any time."

#### Boubacar Diop (SAES)

"In 1988, during a meeting held in Thies on a full emergency basis, we proposed a general strike for the purpose of securing a reduction in the price of goods of first necessity and the reestablishment of democratic freedoms. But this proposal was rejected. Now it remains

to be seen what points of unity exist, which we can use as a basis for waging a struggle together. Party access to the state media? And what is the interest of the trade unions in all of this? There must be a discussion, and we will see to this in a meeting very shortly with Mr. Abdoulaye Wade. Then it will be a question of seeing how to implement the struggle."

#### **Babacar Sane (CINPFEN)**

"The Provisional National Initiative Committee of the National Federation Education (CINPFEN) has a position that does not suffer from ambiguity. Until the federation is established, we will not be linked to any political party."

#### **\* Wade's Concessions for Talks**

34190111C Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
16-23 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara: "Between Firmness and Moderation"]

[Text] "I am not the president of the Republic. I no longer claim the legitimacy of February 1988 election, or that I be installed in government, and I no longer demand implementation of the results of the election that I won. What we are demanding is the organization of immediate free and democratic elections." Thus a new Wade came back to us last Saturday after an absence of six months. He returned with a discourse that has developed noticeably in comparison to that of September 1989, when he departed, because his statements now are situated halfway between firmness and moderation.

First of all, there is this gesture of goodwill that almost represents a hand extended to Diouf, while Mr. Wade is agreeing that the February electoral contest is now behind us. Even if the secretary general of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] sees the issue as no longer current, it does not mean that Mr. Wade is not challenging the triumph of President Abdou Diouf in the presidential election. It is simply that the decision has been made to finesse the issue in the PDS. This new fact should facilitate the activities of the intermediaries who are seeking to reestablish the thread of dialogue, and who thus far have come up against President Diouf's refusal to talk with those individuals who have challenged his entire legitimacy. In admitting explicitly for the first time that he is not the president of the republic, and ceasing to demand that he be put in office as such, Abdoulaye Wade is making major concessions. But is it not possible that they have come a little late?

According to various sources, certain foreign ministries in Dakar have been approached by members of the PDS leadership and asked to play a role in the resumption of the dialogue between Diouf and Wade. But these talks do not seem to have come to much thus far, because the embassies involved are asking the PDS for guarantees of noninvolvement in the dismissals that have begun again

with the noisy return of Mr. Wade. Even if these talks seem to have been pursued by irresponsible elements in the PDS, Mr. Wade, who does not confirm them, says that for the present, he prefers to use the provisions of the Constitution rather than dialogue ("with whom?") in order to achieve his ends—that is to say, the organization of new presidential and legislative elections.

The Constitution allows any Senegalese citizen to engage in the classic actions of demonstration. It recognizes this right for the legally established parties as well. This is why Mr. Wade and the PDS agreed to prepare for the next (second or third?) stage of "Sopi" [an alliance of PDS-LD-MPT—Democratic League—Movement for the Labor Party] by organizing meetings and marches throughout Senegal to demand that free elections be held. "And if the government wants to prevent us from exercising our right to demonstrate, we will go further," the leader of the Sopi explains.

#### **Acts of Vandalism**

It should be noted, however, that by overriding prohibitions against demonstrations, the Sopi movement might be exposing itself to excesses that in the long run would do it harm.

The acts of vandalism that have been committed in the streets of Dakar, taking advantage of the eventful return of Mr. Wade on 10 February, are doing the PDS leader more harm than good. He is aware of this. However, although he criticizes them, he seems to see justification for them. Now such actions cannot find favor in the eyes of the citizens. In fact, Mr. Wade has said: "Last year, there was no trouble at all when I returned to the country. People greeted me all along the way from the airport to the office, and there was no violence. Why did the government decide this year to prevent this from happening, when there had been no threat to the public order? It was certainly in order to demonstrate to those abroad that my popularity level in Senegal had dropped. But the proof is there that I am more popular than last year. The fact remains that it was beginning at the moment when I was arrested and put in a police wagon that the people reacted. It is also a fact that the officials of the PS [Socialist Party] paid people to infiltrate the ranks of the Sopi supporters in order to cause trouble."

It is necessary, therefore, to recognize this infiltration, beginning now. Similarly, the PDS must rapidly find a way to halt the excesses. Because the public is noticing to an ever greater extent the coincidence between the acts of vandalism and the PDS demonstrations that have been prohibited.

#### **\* PIT Open to Change**

34190111D Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
22 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by El Hadj Kasse]

[Text] The Third Party for Independence and Labor (PIT) Congress held on 23, 24, and 25 March 1990 offers

the promise of something new. In the list of 222 theses submitted to the congress, the PIT effected many adjustments, and in some cases undertook to challenge what had previously been "accepted tenets of Marxism-Leninism" and "real socialism."

The 170 theses submitted to the second congress held on September 1984 assigned a limited role to the analysis of the international situation. At that time, the "socialist system" still served as a beacon and as an example for the future of mankind.

The party emphasized, among other things, that "the socialist countries constitute the most dynamic economic zone in the world." That was in 1984. This is perhaps no longer the case, because in its "new" theses, the PIT says that "the exhaustion (in the socialist countries) of the possibilities of development of extensive nature, the sterilization of the socialist mechanisms of management by bureaucratic organizational methods, and the considerable gap between the quality and the quantity of consumer goods..., the slowing of the rates of growth and low labor productivity—all of these are illustrations of the economic crisis in the socialist countries" (Thesis 24).

Is it a sudden weakness that has overcome "real socialism," or are there factors that existed there before perestroika?

#### Duty of Self-Criticism

Breaking with tradition, the party undertook, particularly in Thesis 25 submitted to the congress, to denounce the "serious restrictions on democracy" in the socialist countries categorically, along with the "dark techniques, violations of socialist principles, and the camouflage..., with every effort designed to expose these things being immediately dismissed as anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda."

The public in Senegal can only be pleased with this position adopted by the PIT, which claimed eight years ago in an article by its secretary general, Amath Dansokho, and published in the first (February 1982) issue of DAAN DOLE, the central organ of the PIT, that behind the 6 million Polish workers challenging the "Red bourgeoisie" lay the nefarious activity "of dens of anticommunist diversion." Doesn't this same mistaken opinion make it necessary today for the allies of the "socialist bloc" to engage in self-criticism in good and proper form, because for so long, they contributed to the maintenance a false image of reality? Is it not a principle of the Leninists that "only the truth is revolutionary?" The people are waiting, hoping, reviewing the national situation—the great "break" brought about by the new theses emerging on the strategic level. For the 1984 congress principle to the effect that "reformism sustains neocolonialism," the PIT has substituted a "strategy of reform" based on a "broad rally." It favors change without thereby being revolutionary, properly speaking (Thesis 200). In any case, the operational concept of the

"democratic national revolution" adopted by the second congress, although not abandoned, no longer seems to be the immediate goal.

Despite the "unilateral break" that it effected with the Socialist Party, which is always seeking to deceive, to entrap (its) interlocutors, the PIT still favors "dialogue" and "negotiated political solutions" (Theses 201 and 202). From this perspective, it criticizes "the intolerance and the sectarianism within the opposition" (Thesis 196), while stating its openness to unity with it, and in particular, with the Sopi Alliance [PDS-LD-MPT—Senegalese Democratic Party-Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party]. According to the PIT, the solution to the crisis must involve the establishment of a favorable balance of forces between the people and the government.

Will the congress radicalize the tendency to pose challenges introduced by the new theses, or will it resist them? The current atmosphere within the party rather points to the prevalence of an almost general unanimity.

#### \* 'Sopi' Meeting Plans Strike

34190111E Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
22 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by Thierno Gningue: "Popular Resistance"]

[Text] The meeting of the "Sopi" Alliance [PDS-LD-MPT—Senegalese Democratic Party-Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] in Pikine will have provided yet another opportunity to convince the militants that they should always be in the vanguard of the demonstrations, since according to the leaders of the Alliance, "All of the conditions exist for the departure of Diouf and Collin, except one—popular resistance."

Beginning early in the afternoon on Saturday, 17 March, the SOTRAC [Dakar Transport Company] customers who wanted to travel to Pikine found themselves obliged to find another means of transport after a long wait at the bus stop. The vehicles of this mass transport company were prohibited from entering Pikine. The reason? The meeting of the Sopi Alliance (PDS-LD-MPT), which was being held at the entrance to Tally Boubess.

The forces of law and order were deployed massively, and the feeling where the members of the Sopi were concerned seemed to be that the best way of avoiding war is to prepare for it. In fact, in order to be prepared in the event of possible attacks by individuals determined to prevent the meeting from being held, an impressive response mechanism was set up. In the end, all went well, and the meeting proceeded without incident or disturbance. It may, perhaps, have represented the beginning of an awareness of the enormous risk involved in limiting freedoms, the foundation of democracy.

In the opinion of the leaders of the Sopi Alliance, Abdoulaye Wade and Abdoulaye Bathily, plus Landing Savane of the AND JEF [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy] and the representatives of the PLP



[People's Liberation Party], the OST [Workers Socialist Organization], and the MSU [Movement for Socialism and Unity], "all of the conditions for the departure of Diouf and Collin exist, except one—the creation of popular resistance committees." And the meeting also provided an opportunity for convincing the militants that they must always be in the vanguard of the demonstrations.

The arrest of the opposition leaders and their subsequent release, while a number of militants were kept in custody, were described as government maneuvers designed to drive a wedge between the leaders and the base-level membership. After expressing satisfaction with the Alliance, the Sopi leaders, speaking for the entire opposition, deplored "the scandalous decision by President Diouf, just returned from the Kaaba, to close the doors of the mosques to Muslims who wanted to pray there, in a country that is preparing to host the next OIC [Organization of Islamic] conference."

The immediate action that reportedly resulted from this meeting is the meeting to be held at the court on Monday to demand the release of the militants arrested. In this connection, the Sopi Alliance, which had planned a gathering at the regional court in Dakar to demand the release of the militants arrested during the demonstrations on Wednesday, 14 March, appealed to the members for courage. "We can give everything to our members except courage," Mr. Wade said. He went on to quote Gandhi. "The best method for obtaining the freedom of comrades arrested is not to demand their release, but to get oneself arrested." The general strike the opposition parties are planning was mentioned, as well. It is said that a decision on the date and the methods for the strike will be made in the near future.

#### \* Labor, Youth Support Sought

34190111F Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
23 Feb-2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara: "A Close Game"]

[Text] On the evening of 24 February, the framework of the eight opposition forces will be officially buried at the conclusion of the meeting convoked by Prime Minister Maodo and President Mamadou Dia. No new framework for struggle will rise from its ashes, but instead, there will be a structure for coordinating the actions of the opposition, the main task of which will be to broaden the unity in this opposition sector as much as possible. In fact, the opposition is in the process of reorganizing with a view to preparing for the clashes with the government of President Abdou Diouf that will occur throughout the month of March. Their real launching will come on 28 February, the anniversary of the 1988 presidential and legislative elections.

All of the activities within the opposition are focused on the preparations for these clashes, in which we are likely to see Abdoulaye Wade, Landing Savane, and Mamadou Dia, who have been divided by everything since the end

of May 1988, working toward a single goal. This has only become possible because on all sides, the choice has been made to keep silent about the causes of division. Since his return from Paris on 10 February, Mr. Wade has ceased to proclaim himself the elected president of the Senegalese people and this has considerably facilitated the discussions among certain members of the group of eight and the liberal-communist alliance. Mamadou Dia and Landing Savane, among others, are softening the criticisms generally made of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party], with the same end in mind. And it is now certain that if Babacar Niang of the PLP [People's Liberation Party] continues to oppose any alliance with the PDS leader as vigorously as before, his former partners in the group of eight are prepared to let him ride alone.

The most serious threat to the desires of the opposition for unity, however, according to the political officials, remains the inclination of the PDS leader to blow hot and cold. It would also seem that the explanation for the attitude of rejection on the part of the secretary general of the PLP is to be found here. But for the Maoists and Trotskyites, the problem posed by the Wade case is not so much a problem of confidence as it is one of interest. In other words, they are well aware of where the interest of the PDS lies. Is it in struggle against the government or in the search for dialogue? Because the government, for its part, has closed all doors, its actions can thus only be seen in terms of a dynamics of confrontation. And it is being said in the same circles that even if Mr. Wade were to abandon this effort tomorrow, as he did in May of 1988, he would only be excluding himself.

The current stakes for the opposition have developed in such a way that since the month of December, contacts have multiplied. There have been meetings among the political parties, but also with the autonomous trade unions, which are deemed to have a combative attitude, and with the youth movements. In December, for example, Landing Savane and Boubacar Sall met officially to speak briefly about the revitalization of the opposition movements prior to the departure of the AND JEF [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy] leader for Paris for the purpose of talks in greater depth with Mr. Wade. At the same time in Dakar, the LD-MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] was initiating talks with almost everyone—except the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor]—and talks were under way with the trade unions (the SUTSAS [Single Union of Health and Welfare Workers] and the UDEN [Teachers' Democratic Union], among others) and the youth movements (CES [Coordination Committee of Senegalese Students], CED [Dakar Student Coordination Committee], etc.).

The new tactic that those in the opposition who advocate all-out confrontation want to implement is based on a fundamental fact—the connection linking the trade-union and workers' movement, the youth movements, and the political parties. According to the analysis of the advocates of this unity, sectorial struggles can no longer

yield tangible results, because the solution to the crisis involves the democratization of political, economic, and social life. Strikes might well multiply in the secondary schools and universities and in the factories, but no demands will be met as long as the bases of this crisis remain unchanged. It is rather through unity that it will be possible to foresee the overthrow of the regime.

The final goal of this merger of patriotic forces remains, in the thinking of those who have initiated it, the launching of a general strike of a political nature. It must be stressed, however, that until just recently, one of the stumbling blocks encountered in the talks between the LD-MPT and certain members within the group of eight was still the involvement of the political parties in the conduct of a workers' strike. In fact, in an initial period, the LD was opposed to any manipulation of the autonomous trade unions by the opposition parties, because for the communists, this came down to lapsing into the very errors typical of the PS [Socialist Party]. But after months of stalemate, this position has now been surmounted, with the Democratic League agreeing to go against its inclinations.

There must nonetheless be a minimal platform in order to make action possible, as well as great freedom of action for those who agree to the continuing rebellion the leader of the PDS urges. In connection with the platform, all of the political parties are agreed at least on the irreversibility of the need to overthrow the regime and to organize free and democratic elections, before reaching unanimity on the uselessness of establishing frameworks for action, which they reject because of their inherent constraints and sluggishness.

For a preview of what the opposition is planning for 28 February and the weeks to come, one has only to make a weekend tour of Thies, where the AND JEF [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy] and the PDS are holding separate meetings. Indications of unity are gradually developing.

#### The PIT Position

"The PIT has officially excluded itself from any alliance within the opposition." It is in terms of this verdict without appeal that Landing Savane of the AND JEF explains the absence of the Party for Independence and Labor [PIT] from the new efforts being made to achieve unity within the opposition. Mr. Savane will go further in justifying the isolation of the PIT on the Senegalese political chessboard. "We engage in discussions with those whose stated intention is to combat the regime." Now Amath Dansokho's party has put itself out of the running.

Disdained by its former partners on the extreme left, the PIT has nonetheless failed to make any notable advance in its agreements with the party in power. Instead, these discussions have been somewhat blocked since the National Assembly approved laws viewed as nefarious last October. Finally, the dynamics of the dialogue with the PS has only had the effect of cutting the communists

off from their natural environment (the extreme left). Pending the holding of its ordinary congress this coming March, the PIT is desperately looking for partners.

#### \* LD/MPT Adheres to Alliance

34190111G Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
23 Feb-2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Abdourahmane Camara]

[Text] The LD-MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] is a participant in the Sopi Alliance [PDS-LD-MPT—Senegalese Democratic Party-Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] and will continue to be. This is the first lesson to be drawn from its third regular congress held on 16 and 17 February. More than that, it has reasserted its commitment to "consolidation of the broad Sopi movement," which it regards as an essential tool for ensuring change in the country. The other lesson to be learned from this congress is that there is no movement opposed to the Sopi within the ranks of the Democratic League, contrary to what might be suggested by the resignation of its first secretary general, Babacar Sane. The proof is that all of the leaders who promoted the rapprochement with the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] were reelected by acclamation by the 1,500 delegates, who gave a blank check to the team headed by Abdoulaye Bathily.

Beyond this reelection process, the congress authorized the LD-MPT to join without reservation the promotion of broader unity within the opposition by going beyond the narrow framework of the Sopi Alliance, which will not, as a consequence, be challenged. Just as it was a pretext for proposing the drafting of a "joint government program" to the 16 opposition parties, since the Democratic League now embraces the expectation of the overthrow of the government, and is inviting the other parties to join it, as well. It is not a question, therefore, of establishing a parallel government at the present time, but rather of contemplating the structures to be established in the event of a power vacuum. And this is the reason for the transition government advocated by the third congress.

According to the report of the general commission submitted during the last plenary session on 17 February, the present political situation demands the organization of a broad opposition front and the definition of a strategy for the democratic conquest of power. The same intentions were to be reiterated a little later, when Abdoulaye Wade arrived unexpectedly at the Magic Cinema where the congress was being held. "We are determined to respond in positive fashion to any action designed to overthrow the government," the PDS leader said in particular. He feels that "it would be criminal to let a single day, a single week, pass without pushing the government to the wall."

Earlier, the LD-MPT had commented on the changes seen in the world in these last few years due to perestroika, "which emerged as the updating and deepening

of the Marxist-Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence." Thus communism is not dead, and it was with this conviction that the congress reasserted the Marxist-Leninist option of the party and denounced the anticommunist demonstrations that rely on the current crisis in the world socialist system for their justification. And the LD now recognizes that perestroika makes it clear that "the seizure of state power by the proletariat is not the only condition for the continued advance of society," and that "to dismiss all of the attitudes revealed within the party or to work to stifle them in favor of those of the proletariat is nothing but evidence of a dogmatic approach." But it can certainly be expected that an expanded national conference will be convoked soon to reflect on democratic centralism, the transition stage, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to establish to what extent the communists in the LD will be willing to go ahead with the reforms.

In the meantime, the congress placed under the sponsorship of Nelson Mandela undertook to swell the ranks of its three leading bodies—the permanent executive secretariat, which, with the addition of Bakhao Seck and Mamadou Diop Castro, has 11 members; the Central Committee (increased from 66 to 127 members), which will serve as the party parliament; and the political bureau (with 33 members, up from 27). Will the expansion of these bodies provide a guarantee of efficiency? The answer will be known in three years, at the fourth regular conference.

### Two Weights, Two Measures

The law on political party access to the state media is categorical on at least one point. All of the demonstrations of a statutory party nature should be covered on radio and television. Minister Robert Sagna understood this so well that he did not hesitate to mention it during a meeting with newsmen. But between the spirit of the legal text, the statements of intent, and the beginning of work upon them, there is a step that the media do not always seem to be ready to take. In fact, they practically boycotted the Third LD-MPT Congress, while at the same time, there was no hesitation about sending a television crew to cover a rally of "refugees" from the PDS. And it is this that is simultaneously scandalous and shameful. And since the law providing access to the state media that was approved last 4 October has not yet been promulgated, the LD-MPT does not even have the option of legal recourse.

### \* Kuwaiti Aid for Upcoming Islamic Conference

90AF0142C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
17 Apr 90 p 2

[Text] Moussa Toure, Senegalese minister of economy and finance, and Badr Al Hamaidhi, director general of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, signed an agreement on 13 April 1990 by which the Kuwaiti Fund provided Senegal with 5 million Kuwaiti

dinars or about 5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs for the development of infrastructure and the acquisition of equipment needed for the forthcoming summit meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization.

The ceremony took place in the presence of Mamadou Wahab Talla, Senegalese delegate to the Islamic Conference Organization, and Suleiman Ibrahim Al-Murjan, Kuwaiti ambassador to Senegal.

This contribution is in addition to a gift of the same amount also intended for the preparation of the summit meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization.

### \* French Assistance To Restructure BIAO

90AF0142B Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Apr 90 p 5

[Text] Following the meeting held on 4 April 1990 between Pierre Beregovoy, French minister of economy, finance, and budget, and Moussa Toure, Senegalese minister of economy and finance, who was accompanied by Alassane D. Ouattara, governor of the BIAO [International Bank for West Africa], full agreement was reached on the financial restructuring of the BIAO in Senegal, following the decision of the BNP [National Bank of Paris] to withdraw its capital from this subsidiary.

The withdrawal of the BNP from the BIAO in Senegal will take effect as of 1 June 1990 and will take specific form by its contribution of about 11.4 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs. This participation will involve renouncing any claim to the repayment of loans extended by the BIAO and the provision of fresh money by the BNP. This activity, added to the French contribution to the Senegalese state, will result in restoring the capital, liquidity, and solvency of the BIAO in Senegal. In this way the improvement in the balance sheet of the BIAO in Senegal will preserve the interests of the depositors in this bank, which is the third largest in the country.

Investors have shown their interest in participating in the capital of the BIAO in Senegal, replacing the BNP. Discussions in this area are now very advanced.

Following this meeting, Senegalese Minister Moussa Toure thanked his French colleague for the excellent cooperation and support of France in the fortunate solution of this important matter.

### \* Collin's Departure, Changes Urged

90AF0116D Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
29 Mar 90 p 5

[Editorial by Fatima Blanca: "Govern, Mr. President!"]

[Text] After the storm, a sign: no public display of joy, no banners unfurled, no fanfares in the streets. The departure from government of the man who, if one is to believe rumor and certain newspapers, was the most



unpopular individual on the team in power did not upset the daily routine of the Senegalese people.

Perhaps this is because the news came as no surprise. Let us look back: African governments, taught a lesson by upheavals in the East Bloc countries and cracks appearing within their own political edifices, have embarked, with the active blessing of financial backers, upon a crucial phase of political reorganization. While taking varied forms (the summoning of national conferences in Gabon and Benin, a war of succession in the Ivory Coast, a cabinet shakeup in Senegal), this reorganization has a single goal: to preserve accomplishments, to make concessions, to survive the perils.

In Senegal, Collin's departure, viewed from that angle, is heavy with implications, particularly since President Diouf did not get rid of his loyal lieutenant of his own free will. Collin was the buffer, whence his strength and his weakness. Because of his origins, his relative autonomy vis-a-vis traditional family, and clan sectors, he could not only agree to take the blows—all the blows—aimed at the president, but also shoulder unpopular measures and decisions. This is why he crystallized so much hatred and rancor around him. His weakness? We know what it was: Scapegoats are always fattened so that finally, one day, they may be sacrificed on the altar of interests they once served. The calculation is a simple one: Collin's departure will be a "divine" airing of the blocked government, a boost for its sagging springs.

And yet, another reading of events might temper optimism. More than any other, Collin was a man of his time. He helped shape and finally became the principal artisan of a sociopolitical system based on patronage and allegiance, on the one hand, and administrative and

police staffing, on the other. Government machinery implemented this policy. What is worse, in recent years, following a break between the party in power and a large share of the people (including the young), the government's efficiency was used as the ultimate weapon for cajoling, recovering, threatening, imprisoning, corrupting, promoting, and so on, in the unfortunate absence of a political group that could negotiate the historic turn. But in the face of a wave of grave perils and complex challenges, the policy conceived as the management of small objectives and daily affairs no longer sufficed! The future pleads for another policy, a real break. This is why men like Collin were (despite their personal merits!) outdated, out of sync. Even with Collin gone, the problems remain. One question: Will the Presidential Center (to use SUD-HEBDO's felicitous expression) survive the departure of its main promoter? Two effects can be foreseen: Either continuity will be ensured by optimum utilization of the technostucture (Bom, Ige, Delegations), that Diouf calls the "new generation," or Senegal will be headed straight for an administrative catastrophe if ever the inherited macrocephaly operates based on mediocrity. Finally, the combination at the top leaves a bitter, unfinished taste: the same men, the same style. Indeed, there was but a political shudder, a passing wave over this scorched land. The real change expected by the Senegalese is elsewhere: changing the foundations of power, fighting against corruption and for greater social justice, the invention of a model of national solidarity, the promotion of effective participatory democracy. Institutional alchemy will not solve the problems, which is why one feels like shouting at Diouf: "Managing a country is fine and Collin did that very well. What we expect of you now is more than that. Govern, Mr. President!"

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